Thomas Crombie Schelling was an American economist and professor of foreign policy. In his major work “The Strategy of Conflict” (1960), his starting point is a counter-intuitive observation: in a conflict, it is not force that decides, but the communication of the resolution. Rational actors rarely go to war with each other because what they are interested in is changing the adversary’s behaviour at lower cost. Here are its five foundations, along with their direct interpretation in the current context.

First pillar: coercion through inflicted suffering. Schelling distinguishes between two military logics: “brute violence” (destroying the enemy’s capabilities) and “coercion” (inflicting enough pain to change his behaviour). The US naval blockade ruled on April 13 illustrates exactly this logic. D. Trump has ordered a ban on all ships entering or leaving Iranian ports, calling Iran’s position on the Straits of War “extortion”. It’s an economic message: continuing to exist under this pressure will become unbearable.

Second pillar: the credibility of the threat. For T. Schelling, a threat has value only if the opponent believes that you will actually execute it. On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched major strikes against Iran, including the assassination of Khamenei and Ali Larijani at the same time that negotiations were underway. This precedent is of major theoretical importance: Washington has demonstrated that it strikes during the negotiations. The credibility of the threat is maximum—and that is precisely what is holding Iran back, because it knows that the threat is real.

Third pillar: the focal point. Two actors who can’t talk will naturally converge at a “clear” point—not because it’s optimal, but because it’s salient. Pakistan has become this focal point: it shares a long border with Iran, maintains close ties with the Gulf states, and does not host US military bases. It is no coincidence that both rounds are being held in Islamabad—this is the only place where both sides can appear without the presence signifying surrender.

Fourth pillar: “burn one’s bridges.” Schelling shows that reducing one’s own freedom of action can be a strategic advantage. If you make your retreat physically impossible, your opponent knows that you will not back down, which forces him to back down. This is exactly the logic: by saying publicly “It’s our last offer”, Washington is tying its hands to signal to Tehran that there is no more latitude. But it is also a trap for the Americans themselves: what do they do if Iran refuses?

Fifth pillar: the “chicken game”. T. Schelling’s most powerful model for this conflict. Two cars rush towards each other: whoever deflects the first loses face, but if no one deflects, both die. The winning strategy is to make it visible that we are unable to deviate. At this very moment, Iran declares that it has “no plan for the next round” as long as the blockade lasts, while the Iranian spokesperson asserts that his country “does not believe in deadlines or ultimatums”. Tehran is trying to make its own inability to back down visible.

Schellingian diagnosis of the current situation

What makes this crisis particularly dangerous is the superposition of three simultaneous “commitment” problems. President Trump has said ‘zero enrichment’ publicly—he cannot back down without losing his coercive credibility for the future.

The new post-Khamenei Iranian regime cannot accept full denuclearization without risking losing the internal legitimacy that keeps it standing—this is an existential constraint, not a posture. Iran accused the US of “moving the poles” during the first round of negotiations, which signals that the distrust is so deep that no partial agreement will be seen as reliable.

“The exit”, if it exists, can only be what he calls a “saving ambiguity”: a text that Washington can present as “denuclearization” and that Tehran can present as a “non-proliferation agreement with civilian capabilities maintained”. This language-building work is precisely what Pakistan is trying to do at the moment by keeping the “Islamabad process” open despite the failure of round one.

In a coercive game, whoever controls the pace of the inflicted pain controls the outcome. In this game, and regardless of Tehran’s diplomatic posturing, Washington holds the clock—and it knows it.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)