The regime of the mullahs: wavering or last gasp? |
If we are indeed talking about the open war phase initiated on February 28, 2026, between Iran and the American-Israeli coalition, the question is not whether the Islamic Republic is affected. It is deep. The real question is another: does being very touched mean being close to collapse? At this point, my answer is no. The Iranian regime is shaken, weakened, and disorganized at the top, but it is not yet in a situation of imminent collapse. Even after the elimination of Ali Khamenei, then of Ali Larijani, and other leading officials, several analyses and even assessments of US intelligence estimate that the system still retains control over the state apparatus, coercion, and the street.
The first reason for this resilience lies precisely in the «mosaic defense.» It is not a simple slogan. It is a doctrine built for nearly twenty years to prevent a campaign of “decapitation” from bringing down the entire building in one fell swoop. The Revolutionary Guards have delegated authority very far in the hierarchy, with planned replacements several ranks below. According to Reuters, each level of command prepared successions up to three levels lower down. The idea is simple: if Tehran is hit, a province, region, or branch of the Pasdarans must be able to continue fighting, hold the territory, and enforce internal order. This logic was developed after observing the Iraqi collapse in 2003. It is also based on the role of the Basij, the paramilitary arm of the regime, which the Guardian Corps has long commanded and used for social control and internal repression.
But it would be false to conclude that this architecture makes the regime invulnerable. Mosaic defense protects the continuity of command, not the quality of political decisions. Yet this is where Iran suffers the most. Targeted assassinations have not only suppressed military leaders; they have also removed from the regime mediators, arbitrators, and men capable of bridging the gap between the clergy, the security apparatus, and state strategy. The death of Ali Larijani, for example, has been analyzed as a blow to the system’s ability to transform military realities into coherent political lines. In other words, the regime can continue to shoot, strike, and repress; it becomes more difficult for it to think, coordinate, negotiate, and intelligently emerge from war.
We are already seeing the signs of this political weakening. Reuters described growing fissures between the hardliners of the regime and the more pragmatic currents around President Masoud Pezeshkian. Since the disappearance of Ali Khamenei, the divisions that were previously contained by his authority have been more openly manifested. In parallel, the Revolutionary Guards have strengthened their weight in all major decisions. This means that the regime could survive, yes, but by further militarizing itself. The most plausible scenario is therefore not necessarily a rapid collapse; it may be the transformation of the Islamic Republic into an even more pretorian system, more closed, more brutal, with less diplomatic flexibility and less space for civilians.
It is also necessary to recall one essential thing: a regime does not fall only because its leaders fall. It falls when three ruptures combine: THE BREACH OF COMMAND, THE RUPTURE OF COERCION, and THE RUPTURE OF LEGITIMACY. However, for the moment, Iran has not yet crossed this triple threshold. The command remains functional despite the losses. Coercion remains strong: the authorities continue to severely suppress protests, as shown by recent executions linked to the January demonstrations. As for credibility, it is very weak in some parts of society, but the regime still retains a militant, religious, security, and clientelistic core strong enough to prevent an immediate implosion.
That said, resisting for a long time does not mean resisting indefinitely. In the medium term, the true Iranian vulnerability is less military than political-strategic. If the strikes continue to eliminate not only the very top leaders but also the intermediate levels that keep the system running, the coherence of the whole may deteriorate. If the war is prolonged, if the economy is further asphyxiated, if the succession around Mojtaba Khamenei remains contested, and especially if a new wave of internal uprising coincides with cracks in the security forces, then the regime could go from controlled vacillation to a much more dangerous regime crisis. Reuters notes that analysts exclude an immediate fall but not a shift towards either pure military power or a gradual collapse of the state through attrition.
My judgment is therefore as follows: no, the Iranian system does not seem today to be on the verge of mechanically collapsing, despite historical losses at the top. On the other hand, yes, it really wavers. And the longer the war lasts, the more likely it is to survive in a degraded form: less theocratic in its internal balance, safer, more dependent on the Pasdarans, more nervous, and more unpredictable. Mosaic defense can hold the building up for a while, because it ensures succession and local continuity. However, it fails to address the loss of political acumen, societal deterioration, or the crisis of legitimacy. In the short term, Iran can still resist; in the medium term, it can even last; but what is wearing down is the political quality of the regime, not just its military capability. And this is often how authoritarian systems enter their most dangerous phase: they don’t fall right away; they harden first.