It is possible that Washington is seeking less an additional military victory than a victory by economic strangulation. In other words, stop bombing, but make Iran financially, logistically and psychologically incapable of continuing the confrontation.

The heart of the matter is there: Hormuz has become an American economic weapon as much as a maritime theater. The Strait accounts for a huge share of global flows: the IEA estimates that about 20 million barrels/day of oil and petroleum products were transported through it in 2025, representing nearly 25% of global maritime trade in oil; The EIA also points out that there are very few alternatives for extracting oil from the Gulf without passing through Hormuz.

The decisive point is that Iran is not just losing oil revenues; it is wasting strategic time. The longer the blockade lasts, the more stocks accumulate, the more tankers hesitate, the more Asian buyers seek alternatives, and the more expensive and risky the bypass routes become.

The other dimension is Chinese. Washington is not only targeting Tehran: it is also targeting Iran’s last commercial lung, namely the independent Chinese refineries, the so-called “teapots”. The US Treasury claims that China buys about 90% of Iran’s oil exports and has warned financial institutions about sanctions on Chinese refineries that import Iranian crude. This is where the strategy becomes daunting: America is no longer bombing only Iran; it is threatening the financial ecosystem that allows Iran to breathe.

An economic war can produce an effect equivalent to a military victory but with fewer images, fewer visible victims, and less immediate political cost for Washington. It is a war of strangulation: oil blocked, currencies scarce, foreign trade plummeting, imports complicated, inflation aggravated, public wages under strain, and the security apparatus more expensive to maintain.

But suffocating a regime does not automatically mean bringing it down. Iran’s economy is already badly damaged. But a regime like the Revolutionary Guard may choose to make society pay rather than give in immediately.

The scenario of a civil uprising is therefore possible, but it should not be presented as mechanical. Misery can trigger the street, but the street only topples a regime if three conditions are met: social exhaustion, a fissure in the elites, and hesitation of the repressive apparatus.

The US may be winning the war without needing to win another battle. They are turning the conflict into a solvency test for the regime. The question is no longer just, “Can Iran retaliate?” The real question becomes: how many weeks can the regime finance the war, pay for its networks, feed its social base, keep its currency and prevent popular anger from becoming political?

But this strategy also risked Washington. If the strangulation lasts too long, it can produce an indirect Iranian escalation: proxy attacks, maritime harassment, pressure on the Gulf states, and an attempt to raise oil prices in order to turn world opinion against the US. The economic weapon is powerful, but it is rarely clean.

American victory, if it comes, may not take the spectacular form of a final bombardment. Perhaps it will take the colder form of an Iranian regime forced to choose between giving in to survive or holding on and risking internal implosion. In this war, the real battlefield may no longer be just Hormuz. It is the treasury of the Iranian state, the patience of the population, and the loyalty of the security apparatus.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)