For the first time in over a month, there was no alert, no siren today.

The last one came at 3:30 a.m when a cluster munition warhead passed overhead en route to Tel Aviv. We huddled in bomb shelters as we have so many times before. It was there, underground, that word reached me: US President Donald Trump had declared a two-week ceasefire an hour earlier. It certainly didn’t feel like one.

That same day, Trump had threatened to wipe out Iran’s civilization, or at the very least, its power plants and bridges. The whiplash was staggering. A maximalist message, one with deeply destructive implications, was suddenly replaced by a temporary ceasefire in which most of Iran’s demands were accepted as a “starting point” for negotiations. It took hours to fall asleep, trying to process it all.

Nothing about this war has made sense atleast in terms of messaging and results.

What initially appeared to be a lightning campaign to incapacitate the regime quickly devolved into a war of attrition between Israel, the United States, and Iran. Many expected the Iranian people to rise up. Yet no such uprising came. Some argued it was simply too dangerous; even exiled figures like Reza Pahlavi urged restraint.

In Israel, however, expectations had been different. With near-total air superiority achieved early, the assumption was that Israel could provide cover against forces like the Basij and enable internal revolt. Instead, nothing happened.

We are left, then, with an air war, and wars are rarely won from the air alone. History offers clear examples: Alexander the Great and the Mongol Empire both conquered Persia, but only with massive land armies. Geography reinforces the challenge. Iran’s mountainous terrain makes invasion extraordinarily difficult, which helps explain why even European imperial powers never totally subdued it.

So where does that leave Israel and the United States at the moment of ceasefire?

If the war ended today, Iran, though weakened, could plausibly claim victory. It has endured over a month of sustained conflict against two powerful adversaries and remains standing. It continues to launch ballistic missiles and has refined its use of cluster munitions over civilian areas in Israel, clear violations of international law. It also maintains effective control over the Strait of Hormuz, now a central issue in negotiations despite being a non-issue before the war.

By contrast, the United States, despite declarations of success, has achieved few of its stated objectives. Regime change has not materialized; if anything, power has consolidated further under the IRGC. Iran continues to enrich uranium and support its regional proxies. It is unclear what, if anything, Washington believes it has gained.

Reports suggest that Vice President JD Vance and envoy Steve Witkoff played key roles in pushing for the ceasefire. Both are aligned with an “America First” approach, viewing the war as a costly distraction that risks dragging the U.S. into another prolonged Middle Eastern conflict. From that perspective, even a partial agreement limiting uranium enrichment could justify a U.S. withdrawal.

But Iran is unlikely to allow such a withdrawal without extracting a price. Its strategic compass emphasizes retaliation and symbolic victory. In its worldview, the United States remains the “Great Satan,” and weakening American influence is a central objective. Any attempt by Washington to disengage may simply invite further escalation later.

Israel, for its part, has neither won nor lost so far. It however also views the war in existential terms and cannot follow a similar retreat as the “America First” proponents. It has demonstrated significant intelligence capabilities, particularly through successful decapitation strikes on Iranian leadership. Its position in southern Lebanon has also improved its strategic depth and reduced the likelihood of a large-scale Hezbollah ground assault.

Yet the core objectives regarding Iran remain unmet. Hundreds of kilograms of enriched uranium remain in Iranian hands. Its missile capabilities are intact. Its proxy network endures.

A ceasefire with Iran may give breathing room to restock on interceptors, and to focus on new strategy. With Iran focusing increasingly with Cluster Bombing of Israeli cities, a mass production of the expensive Arrow 3 interceptor is essential (the only interceptor missile currently available that can effectively take out the cluster ballistic missile in space). Reports are that Israel is indeed moving in the direction of mass production but plans take time to materialize.

Hezbollah emerges as a relative loser, internally weakened and increasingly unpopular in Lebanon after dragging the country into conflict.

The Gulf states, however, may be the greatest losers of all. They now face a more volatile Iran while also confronting the economic consequences of disrupted trade through the Strait of Hormuz by Iran seizing control. Their energy exports are more vulnerable and their strategic calculations are shifting. In time, this may push them closer to quiet cooperation with Israel.

For now, as wartime restrictions begin to ease, a sense of normalcy may return. But nothing about this moment is normal. The underlying drivers of the conflict remain unresolved.

Which means this ceasefire may not mark the end of the war, but rather only the pause before its next phase.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)