From a rational-choice perspective, the current Iran–United States–Israel interaction is best modeled as a three-player bargaining game conducted under the shadow of war. The actors possess asymmetric capabilities and divergent risk tolerances, yet their preference orderings exhibit partial convergence at the upper end of their respective utility functions—most notably in their shared desire to avoid large-scale regional conflict.

The United States occupies the structurally dominant position, and its preferences are therefore decisive. At the top of the U.S. utility function is the avoidance of a major war with Iran, which would entail substantial military, economic, and political costs. Conditional on peace, Washington prefers a negotiated nuclear arrangement that constrains Iran’s enrichment to low levels—preferably lower than the 3.67 percent threshold established by the JCPOA—over more maximalist demands such as zero enrichment, far-reaching ballistic missile restrictions, or comprehensive rollbacks of Iran’s regional proxy network. While desirable, these latter objectives significantly raise the probability of Iranian rejection and thus increase the risk of war. From a rational-choice standpoint, a limited but enforceable nuclear agreement that credibly extends breakout timelines strictly dominates more ambitious agreements that are unlikely to be accepted or sustained.

At the same time, regime change in Iran constitutes an attractive theoretical outcome for the United States, particularly given the regime’s internal weakness, economic fragility, and........

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