Israel and the Great Partisan Sort in American Politics |
Uriel Zehavi’s sweeping essay on the “sorting” of American politics and its implications for Israel advocacy, which I recommend reading in full, is unsettling precisely because so much of it rings true. His central argument is not that Israel lost Democratic support because of any one war, settlement announcement, or even because of Benjamin Netanyahu’s long and increasingly open alliance with Republicans. Rather, he argues that Israel became trapped inside the broader “great sort” of American politics, the decades-long process by which nearly every politically salient issue gets absorbed into partisan identity. Once that happened, a bipartisan consensus on Israel became structurally unstable.
Zehavi’s argument deserves serious attention because it explains trends that simpler narratives cannot. If the shift were only about Netanyahu, or only about Gaza, we would expect Democratic opinion to rebound whenever Israeli governments changed tone or policy. But as Zehavi notes, Democratic support for Israel had already been eroding for years before October 7 or the current war. The same partisan polarization that transformed attitudes toward climate change, immigration, and Ukraine increasingly transformed attitudes toward Israel.
The logic is straightforward. In an earlier era, both parties contained ideological diversity. Liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats created overlapping coalitions. A pro-Israel organization such as American Israel Public Affairs Committee could appeal to shared Cold War assumptions, democratic solidarity, or common strategic interests. But modern American politics no longer functions that way. Party identity now acts as a master category through which voters interpret almost every issue.
Once progressive activists increasingly coded Israel as aligned with nationalism, militarism, and American conservatism, many Democratic voters followed elite cues from their own ideological ecosystem. At the same time, evangelical Christians and conservatives embraced Israel even more strongly, making support for Israel increasingly identified with Republican identity. The result was a widening partisan gap that could not have been avoided regardless of Israeli policy choices.
If Zehavi is correct, then the implications for pro-Israel advocacy are profound. The old bipartisan “consensus politics” model associated with AIPAC becomes harder to sustain. Zehavi argues that organizations built for a consensus era are trying to defend ground that no longer exists. Instead of one message aimed at a unified political center, Israel advocates may need entirely different arguments, messengers, and vocabularies for Republican and Democratic audiences.
That conclusion will make many longtime pro-Israel activists uncomfortable, because bipartisan support has long been treated not merely as a strategy but as a moral imperative. Yet pretending the old coalition still exists may simply accelerate its collapse. Messages that resonate with conservative audiences, emphasizing alliance loyalty, shared civilizational values, or biblical ties, often alienate progressive audiences. Conversely, arguments centered on humanitarian law, minority rights, and democratic norms may resonate with Democrats while sounding defensive or apologetic to Republicans.
Still, there are at least two reasons for cautious optimism that Zehavi underestimates.
First, many mainstream Democratic politicians have consciously framed their criticism around Netanyahu rather than around Israel itself. Figures such as Mark Kelly and Elissa Slotkin and even Bernie Sanders have often paired criticism of Israeli policy with criticism of Netanyahu personally. That distinction may partly reflect political convenience, but it also matters substantively. If Democratic elites still feel compelled to separate Israel from Netanyahu, that suggests the break is not yet complete. A post-Netanyahu Israeli government that projects moderation, pragmatism, and distance from the populist right could potentially regain at least some Democratic goodwill.
Second, despite rising anti-Israel activism on parts of the far left, there remains overwhelming revulsion among mainstream Americans, including most Democrats, toward terrorism and overt antisemitism. After October 7, many Americans were horrified not only by the massacre itself but by celebrations of the attacks on elite campuses and social media. When anti-Israel activists slide into open apologetics for groups such as Hamas or traffic in antisemitic rhetoric, they risk alienating precisely the moderate Democrats they hope to recruit.
Indeed, the more radical anti-Israel movements fuse themselves with excuses for terrorism, harassment of Jewish students, or conspiracy-laden rhetoric about Jews and power, the more they may repel the Democratic mainstream. Most Americans still distinguish between criticizing Israeli policy and celebrating mass murder. That distinction matters politically.
None of this means the old bipartisan consensus is likely to return in full. Zehavi is probably right that the age of uncomplicated consensus politics on Israel is over. But the future is not necessarily one of total polarization either. Political coalitions shift. Leaders change. Moral boundaries still exist.
The challenge for Israel advocates now is to recognize political reality without surrendering to fatalism. The great sort may have reshaped the battlefield. It has not yet determined every outcome.