The ceasefire announced this week between the United States and Iran is less a resolution than a pause.

Both sides have reasons to de-escalate, at least for now. But whether this holds will depend on progress on the two issues at the heart of the conflict: Iran’s nuclear program, specifically its enriched uranium stockpile, and the status of the Strait of Hormuz.

What “Victory” Requires

Let’s start with Iran’s nuclear program – one of the stated goals from the outset of the U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran. Any agreement that leaves the regime with a substantial stockpile of highly enriched uranium will be hard to defend as a win. For years, multiple U.S. presidents from both parties have worked to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. That goal will not be met as long as Tehran still has the material and capability (not to mention possible intent) to move quickly toward acquiring one.

Whether through removal, dilution, or strict international oversight, the uranium stockpile must be addressed. Otherwise, the ceasefire risks preserving the very threat this war was meant to contain.

Then there is the Strait of Hormuz.

Reopening the Strait is not enough. The real question is: who controls access to it going forward? If Iran can allow or restrict passage at will, especially under the watch of its own military, then the situation will be far worse than before the onset of the conflict. 

This is an especially critical issue for many of the Gulf states, key U.S. partners who continue to be on the receiving end of Iranian missile and drone attacks. They weren’t consulted on the terms of the ceasefire, and will be the ones most directly impacted if Iran maintains control over the international waterway. 

Here’s the blunt truth: global commerce cannot depend on Iranian discretion.

Israel Is Not in the Deal—But It Is Central to It

Israel is not a party to this ceasefire. That matters.

Iran’s conflict with Israel continues on a separate track, and there is little reason to believe Tehran will stop targeting Israel directly and through its proxies — especially Lebanese Hezbollah.

This creates an obvious pressure point and is why Israel and the U.S. maintain that Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah falls outside of the bounds of the U.S.-Iran ceasefire agreement.

However, Lebanon is not and cannot be treated as merely a side issue.  

By claiming that Lebanon is part of the ceasefire agreement while quietly enabling Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel, Iran is trying to drive a wedge between Jerusalem and Washington. The goal is to see whether the U.S.  will hold firm in its support for Israel’s security while trying to preserve calm with Tehran. Leaders in both countries must remain vigilant against such divisions. 

A Ceasefire That Both Sides Need

For now, both sides benefit from holding the ceasefire together.

President Trump needs reduced tensions and stability in global energy markets as well as a political win. The Iranian regime gets breathing room at a time its leadership and missile and naval capabilities have been severely degraded.

But the core issues that started the war have not been resolved. Iran’s nuclear program remains intact. Its regional proxy network is still active. The vulnerability of global energy routes has not fundamentally changed. If Iran remains unwilling to make meaningful concessions on these issues, fighting could easily flare right back up again, which would not be in the interests of regional security.

It will therefore be critical for the diplomatic efforts taking place in Islamabad to demonstrate tangible progress.

If Iran remains on the threshold of a nuclear weapon and if the Strait of Hormuz remains vulnerable to coercion, diplomacy will not have accomplished its objectives.

And if Lebanon becomes the main arena for continued conflict, the ceasefire may end up shifting the fight in the near term rather than ending it.

For now, tensions in the Gulf may ease temporarily, but the region is not on a path to real stability—at least not yet.

© The Times of Israel (Blogs)