While much of the politics of the year ahead will be preoccupied with controversies about the cost of living and the Indigenous Voice to parliament, in the next several weeks the Albanese government will be required to make two calls which, while less attention-getting, will be among the most important decisions it will ever make.

Both will have a generational impact on Australia’s future security. Those decisions are the response to the Defence Strategic Review and the choice of nuclear-powered submarine under the AUKUS agreement.

Who will build Australia’s nuclear-powered submarines? Decisions made in the coming months will be critical for the nation’s future security.

In August last year, the government appointed the Rudd government’s defence minister, Stephen Smith, and the former chief of the Defence Force, Sir Angus Houston, to conduct a strategic review of Australia’s Defence needs. The purpose was “to consider the priority of investment in Defence capabilities and assess the ADF’s structure, posture and preparedness in order to optimise Defence capability and posture to meet the nation’s security challenges ... to 2032-33 and beyond”.

It is, in a sense, the continuation of a similar exercise initiated in 2011 by Smith when, as minister, he announced the Australian Defence Force Posture Review. Its terms of reference required it to “outline the future security and strategic environment and challenges Australia needs to be positioned to respond up to 2030”. That was reported in 2012; a number of its recommendations were implemented by the Abbott and Turnbull governments.

It is notable that while the 2011 review prescribed a 20-year timeline, the Smith-Houston review – which is more granular, and more ambitious in scope – uses the vaguer phrase “to 2032-3 and beyond”. But whether it is one decade, two or more, there is a degree of artificiality in all such timelines, for the simple reason that, with the most advanced weapons systems, the time elapsed from decision to acquisition is almost always beyond the event horizon.

The problem is unavoidable; it can be mitigated, but never overcome, by preferring tenders that promise sooner delivery, and favouring systems that are more readily adaptable in the development and construction phase (one of the considerations in the Turnbull government’s choice of the French submarine build).

I predict the Smith-Houston review will be more radical than many are expecting. Smith had a reputation as a tough-minded defence minister; Houston was a hugely respected CDF. Both speak with great authority. And for both of them, this will almost certainly be their last chance to put their permanent stamp on our military posture. They can be expected to be bold. In particular, given the greater appreciation than ever of Australia’s need to defend itself beyond its borders, principally in the maritime domain, do not be surprised if they recommend a reduction in emphasis on land-based weapons systems as a proportion of the overall procurement mix.

The problem of long-term decision-making in defence procurement will be nowhere more acute than in the choice of submarine type for AUKUS – a decision the government has committed to announcing in March.