What is migration really costing Britain? |
The worst forecasting error in British government history may be unfolding as we speak. While much attention is given to grand projects, such as HS2, which end up costing tens of billions of pounds more than they were supposed to, these at least have a start and finish date – and something tangible emerges at the end. The same can’t be said for forecasting errors involving even more complex, politically contentious issues – such as what migration might actually be costing Britain.
When the full accounting is done, the fiscal impact of migration may well prove to be one of the biggest misestimates of all
The notoriously wobbly Covid epidemiological scenarios are often seen as the archetypal example of the state’s failure to understand reality, but the various immigration fiascos over recent decades may be a better candidate for proving this point.
When the health and care visa was introduced in late 2020, 43,000 people were expected annually. The state then forecast that ‘thousands’ more would arrive after the visa was expanded the following year. But in the government’s own ‘Why do people work in the UK?’
pages, we learn that 118,522 visas were granted to main applicants on the skilled worker–health and care visa, with 209,638 visas granted to dependents on the same route, for the year ending March 2024. In other words, the state was wrong by a multiple of as much as eight.
Another drastic underestimate can be found in a 2003 Home Office-commissioned study that predicted only 5,000-13,000 people would come to the UK annually after the EU enlargement to eastern Europe. The paper’s executive summary noted cockishly that ‘even in the worst-case scenario, migration to the UK as a result of Eastern enlargement of the EU is not likely........