India is making the same mistake over the Indus Waters Treaty that it made during Operation Sindoor. There, too, it committed a strategic miscalculation and ended up facing international embarrassment. On the Indus Waters issue, India is repeating the same error. It still appears unaware of the price it may have to pay for violating the treaty.

Prime Minister Modi seems to believe that by unilaterally undermining the Indus Waters Treaty and turning water into a weapon, he can force Pakistan into submission. Yet he has not fully grasped the gravity of the situation. The greater cost of violating the treaty will not be borne by Pakistan but by India. This is not mere speculation. It is writing on the wall. If the Indus Waters Treaty ceases to exist, India will find itself trapped in a strategic quagmire that, at present, Mr. Modi does not appear to foresee.

Pakistan has so far exercised strategic restraint, but India has mistaken that restraint for weakness. Pakistan has consistently demonstrated responsibility and caution in every matter. However, once Pakistan chooses to respond in kind, Mr. Modi may once again find himself asking in disbelief, “What? Pakistan has turned the tables on us.”

Pakistan also took its time before responding to Operation Sindoor. When it did respond, the answer was, in its own assessment, more than satisfactory. The same approach is being followed in the case of the Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan is first completing the process of making its case before the world. It is informing the international community that India is violating international law and putting the lives of millions at risk. Why, then, was the international seminar recently held in Islamabad? It was part of that process: a final warning before a decisive response.

Let us now consider what could follow.

Suppose India persists in its decision to violate the Indus Waters Treaty. What then?

If the Indus Waters Treaty no longer exists, is it inevitable that the Simla Agreement should remain in force under all circumstances? Pakistan, acting as a responsible state, has continued to respect the Simla Agreement despite India’s repeated unilateral and unlawful actions. But for how long? What guarantees are there that Pakistan, in response, will not declare the Simla Agreement terminated? If that agreement no longer remains in force, what becomes of the Line of Control, and what obligation remains to respect it? The entire framework could be fundamentally altered. However, that is not today’s subject and deserves a separate discussion. For now, let us remain focused on the Indus Waters Treaty.

The treaty recognizes Pakistan’s rights over three rivers and India’s rights over the other three. If the treaty ceases to exist, then under generally accepted principles of international law, Pakistan’s rights would extend to all six rivers rather than only three. The three rivers over which Pakistan currently recognizes India’s rights derive that status solely from the treaty. Once the treaty is gone, India’s exclusive rights over those rivers would also cease to exist. If India believes that by ending the treaty it can claim all six rivers for itself, that would be both a strategic miscalculation and a grave mistake. In this view, the treaty’s termination would instead restore Pakistan’s legitimate claim to all six........

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