In a talk at the National Defence College, Kissinger likened strategy to a chess game in which each player seeks to control the maximum number of squares on the chess board to retain an advantage over his opponent which either enables him to win the game from a stronger position or at least force a draw from a weaker position which is what Bhutto achieved in Shimla in 1972.
Dr Kissinger is no less lucid and illuminating in his book, ‘On China’, where he contrasts the Western concept of strategy and statecraft with its Chinese counterpart. He writes “a turbulent history has taught Chinese leaders that not every problem has a solution and that too great an emphasis on total mastery over specific events could upset the harmony of the universe.”
Only a civilizational country that sees itself as ‘Chung-wa’, the centre of the universe, could have such a comprehensive concept of strategy and statecraft. He notes that China had too many potential enemies for it to live in total security. Accordingly, it accepted relative security which implied accepting relative insecurity which in turn implied the “need to learn the grammar of over a dozen neighbouring states with significantly different histories and aspirations. Rarely did Chinese statesmen risk the outcome of a conflict in a single all-or-nothing clash; elaborate multi-year manoeuvres were closer to their style.
Where “the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasizing feats of heroism”, Kissinger says “the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, indirection and the patient accumulation of relative advantage.” He contrasts the Chinese strategic board game of ‘Wei-chi’ better known by its Japanese name of ‘Go’ with chess. Wei-chi is “a game of surrounding pieces and it involves strategic encirclement. Whereas the chess player aims for total victory the Wei-chi player seeks relative advantage. Chess produces single-mindedness. Wei-chi........