Why the Gulf States Stay Loyal to the US |
On September 9, 2025, 15 Israeli fighter jets fired 10 missiles at a building in Doha, Qatar that housed members of Hamas’ negotiation team. Six people were killed in the attack, including a Qatari police officer who was on the scene. Israel’s attack on Qatar, home to the largest US military base in the Middle East, elicited a mix of shock and indignation from members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
Gulf leaders have long sought closer security ties with the United States by purchasing American weaponry or hosting US military bases on their soil. The strategy was borne out of the belief that entangling their security interests with Washington would shield them from the chaos plaguing the rest of the region. The strikes on Doha have shattered such illusions. Nevertheless, for an attack described by Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Qatar’s prime minister, as “a pivotal moment” in the region’s history, the response from Gulf states has been lackluster. Rather than decoupling from the US security architecture, GCC states have doubled down on American security assurances.
Qatar deepened defense ties with the United States by signing a mutual defense agreement, which considers any armed attack on Doha a “a threat to the peace and security of the United States.” Similarly, during his recent visit to Washington, Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) signed a major defense agreement, which, according to the White House, “affirms that the Kingdom views the United States as its primary strategic partner.”
The decisions made by Gulf leaders in the aftermath of Israel’s attack on Qatar reflect their precarious regional position. Gulf states recognize that no global power can supplant Washington’s role as a security guarantor. Moreover, GCC states are unable to hedge against US security assurances by strengthening defense ties among themselves, as their respective strategic autonomy agendas clash with the multilateralism inherent to collective defense organizations. Washington must leverage its privileged bargaining position by not overextending security guarantees to Gulf states, which would further entangle it in the region.
The 2011 Arab Spring protests and the subsequent turmoil were among the primary factors that drove Gulf leaders to pursue strategic autonomy. The fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt, a close ally of Saudi Arabia, and the Obama administration’s calls for the Egyptian president to step down forced Gulf leaders to confront fundamental questions. After all, if the United States stood by and allowed Mubarak’s 30-year regime to fall, who is to say they would be of any assistance if Gulf monarchies found themselves under similar public pressure to abdicate?
Closer to home, the 2011 uprising in Bahrain hit at the heart of Gulf leaders’ anxieties, as the predominantly Shia makeup of the protests aroused suspicions of Iranian meddling in the domestic politics of the region. Saudi Arabia, with a substantial Shia population in the oil-rich eastern part of the country, viewed Iranian interference in Gulf politics as existential to its security. The kingdom expected a US response that matched the gravity of the situation. However, instead of supporting the Bahraini monarchy, the Obama administration condemned violence against protesters and urged restraint.
Washington’s response enraged Gulf leaders and prompted a shift in mindset toward American security assurances. This new strategy was expressed concisely by Anwar Gargash, former Emirati minister of state for foreign affairs: “No outside country will any longer guarantee regional security, as Britain once did, and as the United States did until recently. We [Gulf states] must step up.” However, in pursuit of self-sufficiency, Gulf leaders sought American expertise to build domestic capacity, thereby locking themselves in a dilemma that increased their reliance on the United States.
From conducting organizational assessments to commanding entire special operations units, American expertise underpins the Gulf states’ military modernization agendas. A series of 2022 Washington Post investigations highlighted the staggering extent to which Gulf leaders enlisted the assistance of retired US military personnel to oversee reforms. The Post’s reporting found as many as 280 former US service members working as contractors in the UAE and 500 in Saudi Arabia. US contractors serve in a variety of roles, including strategic consultants, drone operators, and missile-defense experts. The investigations also identified several retired senior US military officials who have lent their expertise to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
Stephen Toumajan, a retired US Army lieutenant colonel, was tasked by UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) with commanding Group 18, the Special Operations helicopter unit of the Presidential Guard, which saw heavy combat during the UAE’s war in Yemen. Toumajan would later take charge of the UAE’s Joint Aviation Command, which operates most of the country’s combat helicopters.
Similarly, in Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman