What’s Wrong with Iran’s Opposition? |
This month, the Iranian people once again took to the streets to protest for a better life against the Islamic Republic. In the early days of the protests—before a violent government crackdown killed thousands, if not tens of thousands, of demonstrators—one often heard the refrain among observers and commentators that the regime’s “endgame” was at hand, and that Iran was on the cusp of freedom.
As the scale of the massacre inside Iran becomes clearer, it is apparent that the present authorities in Iran have lost all legitimacy, relying solely on brute force and intimidation to remain in control. But in the midst of the chaos, one question that has remained unanswered is what alternatives to the Islamic Republic actually exist. After the fall of Khamenei and the IRGC, who will govern the “free” Iran? Indeed, the central fact of the clerical dictatorship’s longevity is not merely its willingness to engage in mass slaughter to remain in power, but the inability of Iran’s divided opposition to meaningfully challenge it.
The vast majority of Iranians—both inside the country and in the diaspora—oppose the Iranian regime. But “anti-regime” sentiment comes in many flavors. Iranians opposed to Khamenei are divided by identity, history, borders, language, religion, class, and even what the word “Iran” should mean.
Start with Iran’s monarchists—the supporters of Reza Pahlavi, the son of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who fell from power in 1979. Pahlavi leads one of the staunchest and most widespread opposition movements to the Islamic Republic, and there is clear evidence that he has some support within Iran; chants of “Javid Shah” (“Long Live the Shah”) were a mainstay of the recent protests. Of course, the shah-in-waiting has spent nearly all of his adult life in the United States, and his qualifications to rule a nation of 90 million are far from certain. Still, Pahlavi is perhaps the most obvious choice for a successor to the clerical government, and has expressed his willingness to be a temporary leader during a transition to democracy. In that sense, he could serve as the leader of a united front.
The main obstacle to the creation of such a front is the loud pro-monarchist ecosystem surrounding Pahlavi, which behaves in a way that is deeply offensive to some who might otherwise support him. Pahlavi has spoken about the need for democracy, and stressed that if he were to return as Iran’s monarch, it would be of a constitutional monarchy. Yet his most strident supporters have made it clear that they envision his rule as a restoration of Iran’s pre-1979 absolute monarchy (and, opponents presume, its various human rights abuses). Pahlavi’s refusal to distance himself from the advocates of these positions is a major red flag. His camp is also notorious for picking fights with other members of the opposition; it regards Iranian dissidents who refuse to support Pahlavi as traitors, regime agents, or obstacles to liberation. In doing so, it undermines any effort to form a broader coalition with them.
This behavior can be widely seen online. For instance, Iranian women’s........