How Cash Flights to Kabul Help Iran and the Taliban

The Taliban seized control of Afghanistan as the United States withdrew its forces under the Doha Agreement, which was initially billed as a framework for a responsible transition of power in Afghanistan. Under the terms of that deal, the Taliban promised to cut ties with global jihadists like Al-Qaeda, allow space for political pluralism, and participate in a state-building process. Four years on, none of these goals have been met. Apparently vindicated by their victory in Afghanistan’s civil war, the group no longer feels bound by the constraints of the Doha Agreement, and has ruled for the past four years through fear, ethnic division, and brutality against disfavored groups—all while steadfastly keeping ties with the terrorist organizations that prompted America’s intervention in the first place.

Yet all is not well for the insurgents-turned-rulers. Deep rifts inside the Taliban’s leadership, centred on Kandahar, have paralysed the basic decision making system, and the group is more divided than it has ever been. Afghanistan’s governing authorities today do not resemble a government so much as a closed armed faction with a flag, creating a hotspot for chaos that feeds every regional crisis around it—including the one now playing out with Pakistan—and creating an opportunity for countries like Iran to bypass international sanctions.

Since the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the flow of tens of millions of dollars in cash each week through Kabul airport has been constant, by the International community, including the United States. On paper, this money is intended to stabilize Afghanistan’s collapsed banking system and prevent a complete social breakdown. In reality, once those dollars enter the Taliban-controlled economy, they functionally disappear. Shipments of money quickly move across Afghanistan’s porous borders. They also enter the hawala network, where they are virtually impossible to trace, and other trade routes in ways that no one can really follow. The main beneficiary of this arrangement is the Taliban—but a secondary beneficiary has been the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has used money for Afghanistan to address its deep dollar shortage at home.

To understand how this situation arose, it is important to first understand the breakdown of the Taliban-Pakistan relationship. For decades, Pakistan’s security establishment treated the Afghan Taliban as a strategic asset by giving them sanctuary, training, and diplomatic cover, even when the United Nations was calling for states to end support for the Taliban. Islamabad hoped that a Pakistan-friendly Taliban would provide “strategic depth” against India and help it shape regional politics at a low cost.

However, after the Taliban returned to power in 2021, this 30-year-long project has turned against Pakistan. During this time, Pakistan has faced a sharp rise in attacks by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), better known as the Pakistani Taliban. Islamabad accuses the Taliban of sheltering the group and refusing to act against it. The Taliban deny this, but many reports, including from the UN, indicate that TTP commanders move, recruit, and rest on Afghan soil. Pakistan........

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