How China Views the US Strikes on Iran

Chinese President Xi Jinping chairs a meeting at the 2017 World Economic Forum. China is reconsidering its global strategy as a result of the US strikes on Iran. (Shutterstock/Drop of Light)

How China Views the US Strikes on Iran

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Operation Epic Fury is a reminder to China that its global position depends on overwhelming hard power.

When the United States and Israel struck Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure—and reportedly killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the opening phase—the shock waves reached far beyond Tehran. China condemned the campaign as a violation of sovereignty and warned against “regime change.” It evacuated thousands of its nationals. It assessed the risks to oil flows, shipping lanes, and regional investments. And it recalculated.

For China, Operation Epic Fury presents both temptation and danger. In the short term, it offers openings in diplomacy and propaganda. In the medium and long term, it exposes structural vulnerabilities in energy security, technological dependence, and geopolitical positioning. For Washington, the task is not simply to manage the Iranian theater. It is to understand what this moment does to the broader US-China contest—and to act accordingly.

Energy Is China’s Achilles’ Heel

Beijing’s most immediate exposure is economic. It is the world’s largest importer of crude oil, and the Middle East remains central to its energy portfolio. Roughly 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports have flowed to China in recent years, often at discounted rates that helped Beijing buffer sanctions risk and price volatility. That arrangement has now become a liability.

Even the possibility of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz—the narrow artery through which a significant share of global oil passes—drives up insurance premiums, reroutes tankers, and injects instability into markets. Asian manufacturing economies are particularly sensitive to sustained spikes in oil prices. For China, whose growth model still relies heavily on industrial production and exports, higher energy costs are not abstract macroeconomic variables; they are political risks.

If the conflict remains contained, Beijing may continue arbitrage of sanctioned crude and diversifying supply through Russia and others. But if maritime disruption becomes prolonged or severe, China will feel it more sharply than the United States. America’s energy posture today is fundamentally different from that of past decades. China’s is not.

Washington should understand this asymmetry and treat energy leverage as part of the broader strategic toolkit. Maritime security in the Gulf is not charity for global markets; it is a reminder that American sea power underwrites China’s growth.

The Limits of China’s “Responsible Power” Rhetoric

China has long sought to portray itself as a more restrained and responsible global actor than the United States. Epic Fury allows Beijing to repeat that script: denounce intervention, call for negotiations, frame Washington as........

© The National Interest