How the US Marines Could Take Over Kharg Island

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Seizing Kharg Island from Iran would be a relatively straightforward amphibious military operation. Holding onto it amid constant bombardment from the mainland would be far more challenging.

Kharg Island is Iran’s primary oil export terminal—making it a tempting target for the Trump administration to seize in the ongoing war. On paper, the island offers high economic leverage, making for a clean and decisive objective. In reality, however, a long-term occupation of Kharg could make for a logistical nightmare: territory that can be taken quickly, but will inevitably be far too costly to hold. 

How to Capture Kharg Island

Action against Kharg Island would likely unfold in three phases: isolation and suppression, seizure, and sustainment. The US would have advantage initially, including air superiority, technical superiority, amphibious capability, etc. So the operation is feasible, at least in the opening phase. 

Isolation and Suppression: In the first phase of an amphibious operation against Kharg Island, electronic warfare assets would jam radar and communication. Airstrikes would destroy SAMs and bunkers on the island. Mine clearing would open lanes for amphibious ships. This phase would likely be successful—but, as noted, would require sustained air dominance, time, and money. 

Seizure: The second phase of the battle plan would involve the actual seizure of the island. An amphibious or airborne attack on the island would probably require around 800 to 1,000 troops—a number that could be provided either by a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or by the 82nd Airborne Division. Supporting assets would likely include the F-35B Lightning II providing close air support, AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters suppressing defenses, and MV-22 Osprey tiltrotors and CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters transporting Marines. With such assets, the US enjoys overwhelming dominance in conventional military terms, seizure is likely to be successful. This is arguably the easiest part of the operation.

Sustainment: The third phase, and the most obvious problem, would be holding the island. Sustained control over Kharg Island and its environs would require Patriot batteries, naval escorts, and constant ISR coverage. Kharg Island is only around 20 miles from the Iranian mainland, meaning the threat environment would be dense; US troops would be faced with constant missile fire, drone swarms, and artillery strikes—low-tech weaponry that can still cause a serious problem for US forces, as the apparent recent downing of an F-15E with a hand-held MANPADS launcher demonstrated.

The island’s fixed and proximate position would make for a “shooting gallery” effect. Logistical lines, needed to resupply the island, would be vulnerable, needing constant naval and air protection. And risks of escalation would be acute during this phase; oil infrastructure is extremely flammable. Combat damage could lead to both environmental and operational harm. 

Iran’s response would be asymmetric, including coastal missiles, fast attack boats, and drone saturation. The mainland’s proximity would allow for continuous pressure. And Iran wouldn’t need to retake the island; they would just need to harass US forces perpetually. 

Bottom Line: Kharg Island Just Isn’t Worth It

So is taking Kharg worth the trouble? The benefits would be a disruption to Iranian oil exports and general economic pressure. But oil disruption harms the entire global community, including the United States. And Iran is already degraded; taking Kharg will not meaningfully move the needle. At best, the prospective gains look marginal—which makes it hard to justify the sustained risks of troops exposure.

The premise of a Kharg invasion serves as a microcosm for the wider conflict: the likelihood of tactical success is high, but the strategic value is unclear. Kharg sounds somewhat symbolic—but a symbolic occupation hardly seems worth the costs.

About the Author: Harrison Kass

Harrison Kass is a writer and attorney focused on national security, technology, and political culture. His work has appeared in City Journal, The Hill, Quillette, The Spectator, and The Cipher Brief. He holds a JD from the University of Oregon and a master’s in Global & Joint Program Studies from NYU. More at harrisonkass.com.

© The National Interest