New Security Paradigm |
There is deep anger and resentment amongst US allies within the region regarding the unilateral US-Israeli military action on Iran, especially when the GCC had warned the US that it would have to bear the brunt of Iranian attacks. In the aftermath of the Iran war, the GCC will need to rethink its security calculus and consider a robust regional military alliance with partners who are deemed neutral, have global economic and military clout, and a deeper understanding of the GCC’s security concerns. With the US becoming more focused on its own hemisphere and losing interest in traditional security alliances, including NATO, it is only a matter of time before it begins to reduce its military presence in the Middle East. As such, the GCC needs to start engaging with China and Pakistan as two potential partners who, between them, have the global clout, military strength, and war-fighting capacity to fulfil the region’s security needs.
China is today recognised as a pre-eminent economic and military power with vested interests in the Middle East. Almost half of its oil comes from the GCC, and China is also the Middle East’s largest trade partner. Across the GCC, Chinese capital and consumer goods such as mobile handsets, buses, and electric vehicles are more prevalent than ever before. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with strategic partnerships and deep investments in the financing and development of infrastructure—including roads, rail, ports, energy, and technology—across Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, makes it a major stakeholder in the future security calculus of the region.
Pakistan, given its historical military ties to the GCC, professional and battle-hardened armed forces, and its modern military-industrial complex established with Chinese support, also makes it an ideal partner for the GCC to rely on. Pakistan’s deployment of pilots and soldiers during the 1967 war with Israel and the first Gulf War is evidence of its support for the Arab world whenever called upon. Pakistan’s Military Academy has, for decades, trained officers from the Arab world, thereby fostering strong bonds between the militaries of those countries and Pakistan.
Moreover, Pakistan, like the GCC, was a heavy user of US military equipment but, due to various considerations, reduced its dependence on Western weapons suppliers and successfully integrated Chinese weapons platforms into its three services. Today, Sino-Pak defence cooperation is evidenced by the joint manufacturing of JF-17 fighters, Al-Khalid tanks, and Hangor-class attack submarines. Some of these weapons platforms have been successfully tested in the modern battlefield and have proved their worth against far more expensive Western systems. Whilst the GCC cannot reduce its dependence on Western arms, nor should it, there is a strong case for diversification and integration of multi-country weapons platforms, as successfully demonstrated by the China–Pakistan strategic partnership, which can provide a strong foundation for a GCC regional alliance.
Another factor that makes both China and Pakistan strong candidates for forming the core of a GCC alliance is their relationship with Iran. China is Tehran’s largest trading partner, and 90% of Iran’s oil is bought by China. In 2023, China played a critical role as a mediator between Saudi Arabia and Iran in bringing about a détente and regional stability, as envisioned by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. China’s strong economic connectivity with the GCC, as well as its neutral standing, provides it with considerable leverage in bringing Iran and the GCC to agree on and implement certain confidence-building measures, which can eventually lead to lasting peace.
Pakistan also brings its own advantages for the GCC vis-à-vis Iran, as it shares a 900 km border with it and is Tehran’s fourth-largest trading partner. Pakistan also has deep religious and cultural ties to Iran, with 15% of Pakistan’s population being Shia, who exert considerable influence in balancing relations between Iran and the Arab states. Pakistan’s understanding of Iran was recognised by President Trump when he stated that “They know Iran very well, better than most, and they’re not happy about anything. They see what’s going on,” following his meeting with Field Marshal Asim Munir in Washington, DC. During the current conflict, Pakistan and Iran have kept diplomatic channels open, and the Iranian foreign minister has publicly thanked Pakistan for its efforts in bringing an end to the war by all sides. Pakistan’s signing of the mutual defence pact last year with Saudi Arabia was also not questioned by Iran. This was, in large part, driven by behind-the-scenes efforts made at the highest levels of leadership in the two countries in building trust and allaying any fears Tehran may have.
For decades, the logic of hosting the US military was the protection of the host nations; however, in a cruel twist, that very logic made them targets for punitive strikes from Iran. Not only has the movement of oil and gas through the Persian Gulf come to a halt, but the attacks have also upended the carefully curated model of safety, financial, and political stability built over time. The hard lessons for the GCC countries, living through this conflict and pushing them towards a regional military alliance, are shaped by the realisation that recent US actions are guided by unilateralism and self-interest. Its foreign policy is skewed in favour of Israel, without regard for or appreciation of the GCC’s security considerations. It is, therefore, imperative for the GCC to take a long, hard look at its historical security model and consider changes in security partners who will be able to guarantee a secure and stable future.
Yusuf Ali KhanThe writer is an international trade expert. He has previously worked with the Brookings Institute and is a graduate of Syracuse University.