Afghanistan has long been called the graveyard of empires, as numerous invaders have set foot on its soil, mostly to conquer it for its strategic location in Central Asia. Rudyard Kipling, in his novel ‘Kim’, writes, “When everyone is dead, the great game is finished. Not before”. Although not named directly, the comment addresses Afghanistan and wider Central Asia as the chessboard for strategic rivalry between the British and Tsarist Russia, both of whom were deeply aware of Afghanistan's buffer-state status. These nations engaged in full-fledged wars, vying for strategic strongholds like the famous Second Anglo-Afghan War, triggered by British fears of Russian encroachment. In this sense, the conflict in Afghanistan is not rooted in closure or morality, but in power, security and strategy between nations, or simply, in realpolitik.

Amidst this turmoil, Afghan soil has recorded the trail of empires that arrived disguised as allies or saviours and left as arbiters of destruction, echoing the agonising sting of Julius Caesar’s “you too, Brutus?”, not only at distant empires but also at neighbours once called brothers. A contemporary continuation of this Great Game realpolitik was the Cold War rivalry, where the Soviets and the West, led by the USA, turned Afghanistan into a bloody battlefield yet again. As a consequence, the equation between Pakistan and Afghanistan was altered in ways that remain visible in today’s tensions. By supporting the US in the Global War on Terror, Pakistan bore the brunt of Afghan animosity. What Afghanistan once saw as a trustworthy ally during the Soviet-Afghan war came to be viewed as a treacherous Brutus, accused of betraying a close partner at the behest of Western interests.

The reality is that Afghanistan has struggled to sustain a stable political order under any governance model, whether imposed by ‘atheist Soviets’, ‘Western forces’, or shaped by regional actors. Even in the absence of foreign intervention, internal divisions have persisted. The post-Soviet withdrawal period in the 1990s is a prime example, when the country descended into civil war among factions led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, Rashid Dostum and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. During this period, Afghanistan became a case study in state collapse and the limits of international law.

Even after the Taliban’s return to power, the regime has largely disregarded commitments made under the Doha Agreement. Following the US withdrawal, Afghanistan pledged to prevent the use of its soil for terrorism and to pursue peaceful political reconciliation. Yet after a brief reduction in violence, attacks resumed against both security forces and civilians.

Afghanistan’s fractured polity, shaped by ethnic divisions, tribal structures, historical grievances and warlordism, remains resistant to rigid centralised rule. A more viable model would involve power-sharing and regional autonomy, something the current regime has failed to deliver. Khaled Hosseini’s ‘The Kite Runner’ captures this stratification through the relationship between Amir and Hassan, reflecting deep-rooted inequalities that continue to shape Afghan politics. The Taliban’s exclusionary approach has only deepened internal discord while allowing instability to spill across borders.

Recent clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan reflect Islamabad’s assertion that Afghan territory is being used by the TTP. Since the Taliban takeover, terrorist incidents in Pakistan have increased, prompting military responses, including airstrikes in October 2025. This has further strained relations between the two countries.

Taliban 2.0 has struggled to establish both internal stability and credible foreign policy. The risks of continued instability are severe. Any internal collapse in Afghanistan would inevitably spill over into Pakistan, just as prolonged hostility risks fuelling further proxy conflict. Neither country can afford a return to sustained cycles of violence. It is therefore imperative that both nations move towards an immediate and lasting consensus to secure long-term peace.

Noor HumairThe writer is an economics graduate from Forman Christian College.

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