For over seven decades, the United States built its global military doctrine on a proposition so compelling that it acquired the status of strategic orthodoxy: that overwhelming naval power could project control across distant theatres and shape political outcomes on land. From the Pacific island campaigns of the Second World War to the carrier-led interventions in Iraq, Yugoslavia, and Libya, maritime dominance appeared not merely advantageous but decisive. Yet, in the ongoing war against Iran, that foundational assumption has been fundamentally challenged. Despite unmatched naval superiority, the United States has struggled to secure even the narrow waters of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran, by relying not on sea control but on a doctrine of denial rooted in geography, missiles, drones, and asymmetric warfare, has exposed a deeper truth: the geometry of naval power has changed. This is not a failure of capability—it is a failure of doctrine.

The intellectual foundations of sea power were laid most powerfully by Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose seminal work The Influence of Sea Power upon History argued that maritime dominance was the key determinant of national greatness. Mahan’s thesis was straightforward: control the sea lanes, dominate commerce, and shape the destiny of nations. His ideas found fertile ground in the strategic imagination of rising powers, particularly the United States, which transformed itself into a global maritime hegemon in the twentieth century.

History seemed to vindicate Mahan. The British Empire, often described as a maritime empire par excellence, secured global dominance through control of sea routes and naval chokepoints. During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain’s command of the seas isolated France economically and strategically, culminating in Napoleon’s eventual defeat. Similarly, in the Second World War, the Allied victory was deeply dependent on control of the Atlantic sea lanes, which ensured the uninterrupted flow of men and materiel from the United States to Europe. In the Pacific theatre, the United States employed island-hopping campaigns supported by overwhelming naval and air power to dismantle Japanese defences and project force towards the Japanese mainland.

Yet history also offers cautionary tales—moments when naval power, despite its strength, failed to deliver decisive outcomes. The Vietnam War stands as a stark example. Despite overwhelming naval and air superiority, the United States was unable to impose its will on a determined continental adversary operating within its own terrain. Similarly, the Soviet Union’s........

© The Nation