Now We Have It, Now We Don’t: Iran’s Second Chance In Islamabad |
Friday’s separate telephone conversations between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir, and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar have reopened a narrow diplomatic window. They do not mean the second round of U.S.–Iran talks in Islamabad is confirmed. But they do indicate that Tehran has not closed the Pakistan channel after days of delay, hardline posturing and uncertainty over whether Iran would respond to U.S. proposals.
The timing matters. These contacts came after the three-week extension of the Lebanon ceasefire and after President Trump’s earlier extension of the broader ceasefire while keeping the U.S. naval blockade in place. Those steps have bought time and reduced the immediate risk that events on a second front could overtake diplomacy before Iran decides whether to return to Islamabad. The calls should therefore be read as a positive sign that pressure may be moving.
The strategic balance also matters. The United States retains more room than Iran does. Washington has not suffered direct losses in the first phase of the conflict. It is not directly affected by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the way others are. Its options of diplomacy and escalation remain open. Iran faces a different reality. It is under blockade pressure, economic strain and growing strategic squeeze. That pressure will deepen if the delay continues.
This is where Trump’s calculations matter. His second-term discourse has consistently emphasised peace rather than another prolonged war. That reflects domestic political needs as much as strategy. His political base does not want another Middle Eastern war. Midterm calculations reinforce that preference. This helps explain why he still appears to prefer a deal, even while sustaining pressure.
That pressure has not weakened. The blockade remains. U.S. naval deployments have grown, including three aircraft carriers in the region for the first time in decades. Washington does not need to rely on the blockade alone, because it has already begun interdicting Iranian vessels in the open seas while keeping military options ready. This matters because, if necessary, the United States could ease or adjust the blockade while still sustaining pressure through interdiction. That would remove one of the main pretexts used by Iranian hardliners for delaying a return to Islamabad.
This is why Iran is the more squeezed party. If escalation resumes and Iranian retaliation reaches Gulf energy infrastructure or shipping, the costs could become politically and strategically severe for the regime, including the hardline actors who now appear to have asserted themselves. That may be one reason Araghchi’s calls to Pakistan’s military and political leadership should be read seriously. They may reflect recognition in Tehran that drift carries growing risks. They may also suggest that despite hardline pressure, the diplomatic camp has not been pushed aside entirely.
There remains an internal problem in Tehran. The split between the political-diplomatic camp around President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Araghchi, and harder security actors around the IRGC, continues to affect decision-making. Reports about the weakening or resignation of Ghalibaf’s role have reinforced doubts over who can close a compromise. But it is also important not to misread the first Islamabad round. It did not collapse because the entire agenda broke down. It stalled because the Iranian side could not close the remaining issues without authority from the real power centres in Tehran.
If Tehran responds to the broad U.S. points already conveyed through Pakistan, the Vance-led delegation can return, and the Islamabad track can move toward a framework. If it delays further, pressure will intensify while Iran’s room for manoeuvre narrows
If Tehran responds to the broad U.S. points already conveyed through Pakistan, the Vance-led delegation can return, and the Islamabad track can move toward a framework. If it delays further, pressure will intensify while Iran’s room for manoeuvre narrows
That is why Pakistan’s role became more central. Field Marshal Asim Munir’s Tehran visit was intended precisely to take the U.S. proposals to those who could decide. Friday’s calls suggest that effort may not have been wasted.
This is also why the campaign against Pakistan’s role has intensified. In the past two weeks, a sequence of articles and commentaries has questioned Islamabad’s neutrality. Fox News carried a piece that praised Munir’s access but revived old claims that Pakistan should not be trusted. Then came the Jerusalem Post’s sudden interest in Pakistan’s internal politics through an article on Imran Khan, the jailed PTI leader. The Washington Post subsequently portrayed Pakistan as a peacemaker but raised doubts about the motives of its principal facilitator.
On April 22, The Wall Street Journal published “Hatred of Israel Holds Pakistan Back” by Indian-origin columnist Sadanand Dhume, a writer long critical of Pakistan and broadly aligned with Hindutva narratives that cast Pakistan in a negative light. The article used Pakistan’s position on Israel to imply a wider national dysfunction and, by extension, questioned its credibility in regional diplomacy. Its timing, amid visible Indian state and public discomfort with Pakistan’s role and growing recognition of Islamabad’s facilitation, made it appear less like detached commentary and more like part of a broader effort to diminish Pakistan’s diplomatic relevance.
Financial Times then questioned whether Pakistan’s interests make it unfit to mediate, effectively implying that because Pakistan has stakes in avoiding war, its facilitation is compromised. That argument ignores that all mediators have interests. The immediate effect of such framing is to cast doubt on Pakistan’s neutrality, complicate trust in the Islamabad channel, and reinforce the narrative of those who want to weaken diplomacy rather than let it succeed.
These pieces appeared in sequence, not in isolation. Their timing is difficult to ignore. They came after Pakistan’s role gained recognition, not before. Their message is also similar: Pakistan is too interested in mediating, Pakistan’s military leadership has ulterior motives, and Pakistan’s internal politics weaken its credibility. That argument does not hold. Every mediator has interests. Qatar has interests. Oman has interests. Pakistan has interests because the war in the Gulf directly affects its security.
The immediate purpose of this line of commentary appears to be to cast doubt on Pakistan’s credibility, complicate trust between Islamabad and Washington, and weaken a channel that has produced results. The one in It is easier to question the facilitator than openly oppose diplomacy.
There are similar pressures from hardline circles in Tehran. The IRGC-linked Tasnim reference to Balochistan should be read in this context. It looked less like routine reporting than pressure signalling. It may reflect discomfort with Pakistan’s role, or concern over what Pakistan may do if a wider Gulf contingency emerges. Either way, it points to spoilers. These pressures from different directions converge in one way: they raise costs around diplomacy.
Yet the channel has held. That is why Friday’s calls matter more than they may appear. They show that despite hardline pressure, external criticism and military signalling, Tehran still sees value in keeping Pakistan engaged.
The trend now points in two directions at once. One direction still leads back to diplomacy. The ceasefire remains. Lebanon has bought time. Washington has not closed the offer. Pakistan remains prepared. Senior Iranian contact with Islamabad has resumed. These are real indicators that a second round remains possible.
The other direction points toward escalation. The blockade continues. U.S. military pressure remains. Israel can still act as a spoiler. A maritime or regional incident could again shift the balance. This is why the present moment should not be exaggerated, but it should not be dismissed.
There is still a diplomatic opening, though narrower than before. If Tehran responds to the broad U.S. points already conveyed through Pakistan, the Vance-led delegation can return, and the Islamabad track can move toward a framework. If it delays further, pressure will intensify while Iran’s room for manoeuvre narrows.
For now, Pakistan has kept the venue ready, preserved the channel, and helped prevent war from resuming while others tested diplomacy’s limits. That is not a settlement. But it is enough to keep a settlement possible. That possibility is what Friday’s calls have restored. The question is whether Tehran uses it before the balance shifts further against it.