Former Lieutenant-General Tariq Khan has recently penned a short piece on counterinsurgency, which needs serious reading and discussion. A word about Khan before I get to the points he has raised.
During the days of the so-called 'War on Terror,' Khan first commanded a division based in Dera Ismail Khan with its area of operations in South Waziristan and later took over as Inspector-General Frontier Corps. In both command capacities, he arguably garnered the most hands-on experience of any general officer in planning and executing small-, medium- and large-scale operations. His analysis, therefore, is guided by practical experience.
Later, as lieutenant-general he commanded 1 Corps, which is one of the two strike corps of Pakistan Army.
Let me now proceed to the central points of his analysis under four heads: analysing the threat, strategic response, tactical response, and administrative response.
[NB: the summary of Khan's points is in italics; my assessment is in plain text.]
The militant does not seek space primarily, though his tactics are designed to gradually expand his presence by reducing the state's/government's writ. He does this by seeking and attacking political and military targets. Once he manages to dilute the state's writ, he secures space which he can govern by raising revenue and dispensing justice. This cycle is repeated to enlarge the physical space. The state loses credibility, and the people in those spaces come to rely on the militant because of the state's absence or near-absence. The militant's approach is incremental and he targets government officials, security forces and, in some cases, mounts spectacular attacks to cause civilian casualties. Simultaneously, he attempts to dominate the lines of communication by using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushing security forces' convoys and raiding bases and posts in the area.
Pakistan’s Intelligentsia Does Not Properly Understand Blasphemy VigilantismAllowing the militant to ingress incrementally and ultimately capture physical spaces then requires major operations that are necessarily disruptive of sociopolitical and economic life in those areas. A proactive strategy, on the other hand, takes the 'war' to the adversary and, in the initial phases, relies on the scalpel
This is a good overall assessment of the threat. We experienced it in........