China’s Taiwan Calculus Ahead of the Trump-Xi Summit |
Trans-Pacific View | Diplomacy | East Asia
China’s Taiwan Calculus Ahead of the Trump-Xi Summit
Beijing is not seeking a breakthrough on Taiwan at the Trump-Xi summit, but rather incremental gains that could gradually weaken Taiwan-U.S. ties.
U.S. President Donald Trump greets Chinese President Xi Jinping before a bilateral meeting at the Gimhae International Airport terminal in Busan, South Korea, Oct. 30, 2025.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and Cheng Li-wun, chairperson of Taiwan’s main opposition party, met in Beijing last Friday, the first meeting of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Kuomintang (KMT) leaders in a decade. The meeting took place on April 10, 2026 – the 47th anniversary of the U.S. signing of the Taiwan Relations Act. This timing reflects Beijing’s broader effort to shape the agenda of the upcoming summit between Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump.
At the summit, Beijing is expected to underscore that U.S. support of Taiwan will disrupt China-U.S. “strategic stability,” while cross-strait peace can be achieved without U.S. involvement. A grand deal over Taiwan or a fundamental shift of Washington’s One China policy is unlikely and would be difficult to sustain. However, Trump’s incoherent personal language over Taiwan or a delay of Taiwan-U.S. arms sales would constitute gains for Beijing.
Beijing’s main goal for the Trump-Xi summit would be to sustain the fragile stability in China-U.S. relations after both countries agreed on a truce in their trade war. Washington is so far interested in keeping the trade truce and has signaled that Trump will not seek confrontation during the summit.
However, China hopes that this cooperative tone will extend beyond trade. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed in March that 2026 would be a “big year” for Sino-American relations and that “unnecessary disruptions” should be cleared. This partly explains why Beijing has been avoiding publicly denouncing the U.S. attack on Iran. Trump’s ambivalence over Taiwan presents an opening for Chinese officials to persuade the U.S. president that further U.S. support for Taiwan will disrupt their broader relationship.
To support this goal, Beijing is working to reinforce the framing that matters related to Taiwan are “up to” China and not an international issue open to U.S. “interference.” During the CCP-KMT leader meeting, Xi underscored that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same Chinese “family” and the future of cross-strait relations should be “held firm within Chinese grasp.” Cheng echoed Xi’s rhetoric, linking cross-strait peace with the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Xi agreed to meet with the unpopular KMT leader because Cheng is one of the few Taiwanese politicians willing to openly self-identify as Chinese. Looking ahead, Beijing will try to convince Trump that peace in the Taiwan Strait can be managed by the “Chinese” across the Taiwan Strait; therefore, U.S. involvement is unnecessary.
Although Beijing would welcome Trump giving up Taiwan, a China-U.S. grand deal about Taiwan or changing U.S. rhetorical policy to publicly “oppose Taiwanese independence” is difficult and unsustainable. Part of Washington’s long-pursued One China policy has been to remain agnostic about Taiwan’s political status. Having Trump publicly oppose Taiwanese independence would challenge this tenet of the One China policy and erode Washington’s political basis for supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence. Beijing is aware that drastically changing the U.S. One China policy would face strong opposition within the United States and could be easily reversed, whether by Trump himself or by a future president.
Constraints within the U.S. system further limit the feasibility of any major shift in the One China policy. Congress, which has long been more vocally supportive of Taiwan than the White House, will likely pass legislation to check any unilateral changes made by Trump. Trump’s earlier remarks about negotiating U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with Beijing have already prompted U.S. legislative efforts to codify the Reagan-era Six Assurances to Taiwan into law. The Six Assurances include Washington promising that it would not consult Beijing on arms sales to Taipei or change the U.S. position on the sovereignty of Taiwan. The risks of Congress furthering U.S. support for Taiwan in compensation for Trump’s rhetorical concessions would rise as Trump is expected to lose control of Congress after the upcoming midterm elections.
The Trump administration also has no authoritative figure to negotiate or implement a grand deal over Taiwan with Beijing. The White House is currently preoccupied with complex negotiations over Ukraine and the Middle East, with no extra attention or special envoys to spare. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the Trump Cabinet member with the most experience involved in China-related matters, is unlikely to be enthusiastic about such hypothetical negotiations. Rubio stated before the previous Trump-Xi meeting in South Korea that “walking away from Taiwan” is not on the agenda. Rubio was also reportedly reluctant to visit Beijing with Trump, as he did not want to be perceived as softening his stance on China. Without dedicated implementation, any verbal deals Trump makes with Beijing would only remain empty words.
A further constraint is Trump’s unpredictability. Beijing is painfully aware of Trump’s volatile China approach during his first presidency. Trump launched a trade war against China less than a year after Xi lavished Trump with pomp and circumstance in Beijing in November 2017. Negative memories of the first Trump administration’s China policies also include then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo calling the “free world” to “change Communist China” and anxiety that Trump might provoke war with China after losing reelection in 2020.
Despite these constraints, Beijing hopes Trump’s volatility would go the other direction and undermine relations between Washington and Taipei. Trump has a record of being verbally inconsistent on cross-strait matters, such as claiming that the China-U.S. trade truce is “great for unification and peace.” Any impression that Trump is wavering on support for Taiwan in the upcoming summit would be propagated to further weaken Taiwanese trust in Trump.
Polls already show that only 34 percent of Taiwanese respondents perceive the United States as trustworthy. Whether Taiwan should pursue closer relations with the U.S. has become a highly partisan issue in Taiwan. While there is no evidence of the Taiwanese electorate drastically shifting its trust from Washington to Beijing, Taiwan’s entrenched internal division on its external approach is self-paralyzing.
These dynamics are particularly evident in the security domain. Xi called for prudence on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in his last phone call with Trump, suggesting that the Chinese leader is pressing for a delay, if not a stop, to Taiwan-U.S. security cooperation. Beijing may also see an actual delay of arms sales as a precondition for Xi to accept Trump’s invitation to visit the United States during the latter half of 2026.
Even if Trump does not tie the security issue to his summits with Xi, Taiwan’s inability to pass its defense budget and worries about delayed U.S. weaponry delivery due to the Iran war are also posing challenges to Taiwan-U.S. arms sales. The KMT is currently the largest party in the Taiwanese legislature and has refused to pass the Taiwanese government’s defense budget, which includes funding for the largest package of U.S. arms sales announced in December 2025.
As U.S. attention remains focused on the Iran conflict, Beijing has quietly calibrated its expectations and strategy for the Trump-Xi summit. While ending Washington’s long-term support of Taipei in one summit is unrealistic, Beijing is confident that the overall trajectory of China-U.S.-Taiwan dynamics is moving in its favor. Even incremental shifts – U.S. rhetorical ambiguity, delayed arms sales, and erosion of Taiwanese confidence in the United States – would constitute progress. Whether Beijing’s Taiwan calculus succeeds will ultimately depend on Washington’s ability to articulate and maintain a coherent cross-strait strategy.
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Chinese President Xi Jinping and Cheng Li-wun, chairperson of Taiwan’s main opposition party, met in Beijing last Friday, the first meeting of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Kuomintang (KMT) leaders in a decade. The meeting took place on April 10, 2026 – the 47th anniversary of the U.S. signing of the Taiwan Relations Act. This timing reflects Beijing’s broader effort to shape the agenda of the upcoming summit between Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump.
At the summit, Beijing is expected to underscore that U.S. support of Taiwan will disrupt China-U.S. “strategic stability,” while cross-strait peace can be achieved without U.S. involvement. A grand deal over Taiwan or a fundamental shift of Washington’s One China policy is unlikely and would be difficult to sustain. However, Trump’s incoherent personal language over Taiwan or a delay of Taiwan-U.S. arms sales would constitute gains for Beijing.
Beijing’s main goal for the Trump-Xi summit would be to sustain the fragile stability in China-U.S. relations after both countries agreed on a truce in their trade war. Washington is so far interested in keeping the trade truce and has signaled that Trump will not seek confrontation during the summit.
However, China hopes that this cooperative tone will extend beyond trade. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi claimed in March that 2026 would be a “big year” for Sino-American relations and that “unnecessary disruptions” should be cleared. This partly explains why Beijing has been avoiding publicly denouncing the U.S. attack on Iran. Trump’s ambivalence over Taiwan presents an opening for Chinese officials to persuade the U.S. president that further U.S. support for Taiwan will disrupt their broader relationship.
To support this goal, Beijing is working to reinforce the framing that matters related to Taiwan are “up to” China and not an international issue open to U.S. “interference.” During the CCP-KMT leader meeting, Xi underscored that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to the same Chinese “family” and the future of cross-strait relations should be “held firm within Chinese grasp.” Cheng echoed Xi’s rhetoric, linking cross-strait peace with the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
Xi agreed to meet with the unpopular KMT leader because Cheng is one of the few Taiwanese politicians willing to openly self-identify as Chinese. Looking ahead, Beijing will try to convince Trump that peace in the Taiwan Strait can be managed by the “Chinese” across the Taiwan Strait; therefore, U.S. involvement is unnecessary.
Although Beijing would welcome Trump giving up Taiwan, a China-U.S. grand deal about Taiwan or changing U.S. rhetorical policy to publicly “oppose Taiwanese independence” is difficult and unsustainable. Part of Washington’s long-pursued One China policy has been to remain agnostic about Taiwan’s political status. Having Trump publicly oppose Taiwanese independence would challenge this tenet of the One China policy and erode Washington’s political basis for supporting Taiwan’s de facto independence. Beijing is aware that drastically changing the U.S. One China policy would face strong opposition within the United States and could be easily reversed, whether by Trump himself or by a future president.
Constraints within the U.S. system further limit the feasibility of any major shift in the One China policy. Congress, which has long been more vocally supportive of Taiwan than the White House, will likely pass legislation to check any unilateral changes made by Trump. Trump’s earlier remarks about negotiating U.S. arms sales to Taiwan with Beijing have already prompted U.S. legislative efforts to codify the Reagan-era Six Assurances to Taiwan into law. The Six Assurances include Washington promising that it would not consult Beijing on arms sales to Taipei or change the U.S. position on the sovereignty of Taiwan. The risks of Congress furthering U.S. support for Taiwan in compensation for Trump’s rhetorical concessions would rise as Trump is expected to lose control of Congress after the upcoming midterm elections.
The Trump administration also has no authoritative figure to negotiate or implement a grand deal over Taiwan with Beijing. The White House is currently preoccupied with complex negotiations over Ukraine and the Middle East, with no extra attention or special envoys to spare. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the Trump Cabinet member with the most experience involved in China-related matters, is unlikely to be enthusiastic about such hypothetical negotiations. Rubio stated before the previous Trump-Xi meeting in South Korea that “walking away from Taiwan” is not on the agenda. Rubio was also reportedly reluctant to visit Beijing with Trump, as he did not want to be perceived as softening his stance on China. Without dedicated implementation, any verbal deals Trump makes with Beijing would only remain empty words.
A further constraint is Trump’s unpredictability. Beijing is painfully aware of Trump’s volatile China approach during his first presidency. Trump launched a trade war against China less than a year after Xi lavished Trump with pomp and circumstance in Beijing in November 2017. Negative memories of the first Trump administration’s China policies also include then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo calling the “free world” to “change Communist China” and anxiety that Trump might provoke war with China after losing reelection in 2020.
Despite these constraints, Beijing hopes Trump’s volatility would go the other direction and undermine relations between Washington and Taipei. Trump has a record of being verbally inconsistent on cross-strait matters, such as claiming that the China-U.S. trade truce is “great for unification and peace.” Any impression that Trump is wavering on support for Taiwan in the upcoming summit would be propagated to further weaken Taiwanese trust in Trump.
Polls already show that only 34 percent of Taiwanese respondents perceive the United States as trustworthy. Whether Taiwan should pursue closer relations with the U.S. has become a highly partisan issue in Taiwan. While there is no evidence of the Taiwanese electorate drastically shifting its trust from Washington to Beijing, Taiwan’s entrenched internal division on its external approach is self-paralyzing.
These dynamics are particularly evident in the security domain. Xi called for prudence on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in his last phone call with Trump, suggesting that the Chinese leader is pressing for a delay, if not a stop, to Taiwan-U.S. security cooperation. Beijing may also see an actual delay of arms sales as a precondition for Xi to accept Trump’s invitation to visit the United States during the latter half of 2026.
Even if Trump does not tie the security issue to his summits with Xi, Taiwan’s inability to pass its defense budget and worries about delayed U.S. weaponry delivery due to the Iran war are also posing challenges to Taiwan-U.S. arms sales. The KMT is currently the largest party in the Taiwanese legislature and has refused to pass the Taiwanese government’s defense budget, which includes funding for the largest package of U.S. arms sales announced in December 2025.
As U.S. attention remains focused on the Iran conflict, Beijing has quietly calibrated its expectations and strategy for the Trump-Xi summit. While ending Washington’s long-term support of Taipei in one summit is unrealistic, Beijing is confident that the overall trajectory of China-U.S.-Taiwan dynamics is moving in its favor. Even incremental shifts – U.S. rhetorical ambiguity, delayed arms sales, and erosion of Taiwanese confidence in the United States – would constitute progress. Whether Beijing’s Taiwan calculus succeeds will ultimately depend on Washington’s ability to articulate and maintain a coherent cross-strait strategy.
Yi-Chuan Chiu is a doctoral candidate in Area Studies (China) at the University of Oxford. His current doctoral project focuses on the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995-1996 and Pelosi’s Taiwan visit in 2022.
China Taiwan strategy
Cross-Strait Relations
Trump-Xi summit Taiwan
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
U.S. skepticism in Taiwan