Crossroads Asia | Diplomacy | Central Asia

SCO Summit Produces Surprising Winners

The organization’s smaller members can use a China-India-Russia-dominated forum without becoming subordinate to any single major power. 

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan August 31-September 1 marked a quarter century since the organization’s founding. Its anniversary motto, “Together for Sustainable Peace, Development and Prosperity,” hinted at ambitions considerably grander than the institution’s record. The SCO now encompasses ten member states, including China, India, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and four Central Asian republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – representing nearly half of humanity and a substantial share of global economic activity.

Yet headlines emerging from Bishkek often highlighted the organization’s internal dynamics and differing national priorities. Unlike last year’s summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not hold a formal bilateral meeting, although their brief interaction during the summit quickly became a meme template among Indian netizens. Modi and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif traded predictable barbs. Most stunningly, Modi directly urged Russian President Vladimir Putin to end the war in Ukraine “for humanity’s sake.” This comes shortly after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy revealed that China delivered an ultimatum to Russia not to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, something China has not denied.

This focus on discord is not merely dramatic headline chasing; it reflects a genuine and consistently noted problem with the SCO. The organization brings together several geopolitical rivals. It is therefore difficult to imagine the institution ever evolving into a mirror of NATO. The SCO lacks the degree of institutionalization necessary to impose coherent policy on its members, while its principal powers lack sufficient leverage over one another to establish a common strategic direction.

But these features should not lead observers to dismiss the organization’s practical value for its members, especially the smaller ones. 

Institutionalization is a slow process, particularly among states with divergent political systems and strategic interests. The SCO already possesses permanent structures, including its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent, while members continue to debate additional mechanisms for economic and security cooperation. 

The summit featured credible proposals for institutional development, including Xi proposing AI hubs, Uzbekistan proposing an industrial cooperation mechanism, Kyrgyzstan pushing its Tamchy Special Financial Investment Territory for joint SCO projects and advocating for Bishkek as the headquarters of a joint development bank, and Tajikistan pushing for a regional digital agro-ecological platform. 

Other developments emerged from the forum, especially multilateral initiatives in which the SCO serves not as an institutional organizer but as an exhibition hall for projects that individual governments want to pursue. 

This has created an unusual dynamic within the organization. While SCO’s largest powers are often stalemated by competing interests, institution-building initiatives that make the greatest practical progress frequently emerge because smaller member states want them to. 

SCO summits have increasingly become venues where host governments promote their own economic and diplomatic priorities. The pattern was particularly visible after the 2017 meeting in Astana. The massive Astana Expo opened the following day, underscoring how the summit could function as a platform for the host country’s broader international ambitions rather than simply as a meeting of an increasingly institutionalized organization.

Kyrgyzstan continued that tradition in Bishkek this year. As the outgoing chair and summit host, Bishkek had an obvious incentive to use the gathering to advance national priorities. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway received prominent attention. The project, a flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) corridor running from Kashgar through Kyrgyzstan into Uzbekistan, has the potential to reshape the country’s position within Eurasian transportation networks. Kyrgyzstan also successfully promoted emerging trade routes connecting with India and Pakistan via China and the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and inked a deal to drastically increase trade with Pakistan.

Kyrgyzstan, like many smaller SCO members, appears interested in maximizing the benefits of participation without presenting itself as uncritically aligned with the organization’s largest powers. While Bishkek has been open about its close economic relationship with Beijing, it retains an interest in attracting capital from outside the SCO’s economic orbit. Western capital remains valuable precisely because it provides an alternative source of financing, expertise, and commercial relationships. The establishment of the Tamchy Special Financial and Investment Territory in 2025, a special economic zone which serves as an outpost of Western regulatory codes and law in the region, illustrates this broader effort to create a more........

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