The Pulse | Diplomacy | South Asia

Pakistan Is Mediating Between Iran and the US Because It Can – and It Must

Increased diplomatic clout made mediation possible, but the real motivation is the potential devastation the war could cause to Pakistan itself.

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif meets with the head of Iran’s delegation, Speaker of the Iranian Consultative Assembly, Mr. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, ahead of the Iran-U.S. talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, April 11, 2026.

In the ongoing Iran-Israel-U.S. war, Pakistan has positioned itself as a mediator between Washington and Tehran. It’s a status Pakistan has not enjoyed since the 1970s, when it became a bridge between East and West as it facilitated rapprochement between the United States and China. Now Pakistan has achieved a similar feat by holding talks between the U.S. and Iran in Islamabad – and playing a critical role in pausing the almost 40-day war between them. 

As Fahd Humayun, an assistant professor at Tufts University, put it in his recent interview with the Stimson Center: “I think it’s fair to say that absent Pakistan, there really are not many countries who could claim to have sufficient strategic capital with both the Americans and the Iranians to be able to cast themselves as credible mediators.” It’s true that there is no other state that can effectively mediate this conflict. 

But along with the “strategic capital” there is another element that defines Pakistan’s role as a mediator: strategic necessity. Many believe that Pakistan is taking advantage of a diplomatic opportunity; however, the continuation of the war paints a very grim picture for Pakistan itself due to geography, migration patterns of Pakistani nationals, and demography. Pakistan is more eager to act as a mediator simply because the stakes are higher for Pakistan than for other states that seek to play a role, like Turkiye and Egypt.

There’s another crucial factor as to why the United States is more comfortable with Pakistan being a mediator: the personal relationship that U.S. President, Donald Trump has forged with the Pakistani leadership, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal General Asim Munir. Pakistan’s accomplishment in convincing the U.S. and Iran to secure a ceasefire right after Trump’s ultimatum to destroy Iran’s whole civilization cannot be underestimated. 

The Islamabad talks marked the first high-level direct engagement between the U.S. and Iran since 1979. Elizabeth Threlkeld, director of the South Asia program at Stimson Center, noted that “Pakistan wouldn’t be convening these talks if it didn’t have that strong relationship with Washington and that personal trust between its leaders and President Trump.”

The Stakes for Pakistan

Many experts view Pakistan’s role in this conflict as an opportunity well grasped; however, the reality is different. The Iran-U.S. war has amplified Pakistan’s existing challenges. 

Let’s start with geography. Of its four neighbors – India, Afghanistan, Iran and China – Pakistan only has strong relations with one, China – the neighbor with which Pakistan shares the shortest border, and that in particularly difficult terrain. Pakistan has hostile relations with both Afghanistan and India. In such an environment, the last thing Pakistan would want is war and instability in the final neighbor, Iran – a country with which it shares a 900 kilometer-long border. Moreover, Iran borders Pakistan’s Balochistan province, which is already suffering from insurgency. Prolonged instability in Iran would only increase security risks in Pakistan’s western frontier.

Pakistan, like the rest of the world, is also being impacted by shipping disruptions due to Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Pakistan imports more than 85 percent of its crude oil from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) via the Strait of Hormuz. Although Islamabad was able to secure a deal with Iran to transit its crude oil through Hormuz, even when it was closed for most of the world, global oil prices surged. Thus, Pakistan could receive oil, but had to buy it at a steep price. This was a huge blow to Pakistan’s economy, because it affects not only the energy sector, but also agriculture sector. A fuel price hike ahead of the harvest season can be devastating for farmers.

Adding to the farmers’ burden, around 46 percent of the world’s supply of urea – used in over 90 percent of industrial fertilizer production – comes from the Gulf region. Around one-third of the world’s fertilizer trade has been impacted by the Strait of Hormuz closure. This has increased the price of urea by 40 percent. Pakistan is severely affected.

Pakistan both imports and domestically produces urea. However, for domestic production, Pakistani firms require natural gas, which is imported from Qatar via the Strait of Hormuz. So, one way or another, the price for fertilizer in Pakistan will surge if the conflict prolongs. 

That will pose a huge challenge for Pakistan as the agriculture sector is the fifth-largest contributor to Pakistan’s GDP, and 40 percent of Pakistan’s population depends on this sector for livelihood – and that’s not to mention the emerging food security crisis should the crisis reduce future harvests. 

There’s another angle to the economic burden. Pakistan exports a significant number of its workforce to the Middle East and receives remittances, which, in return, contribute greatly to its economy. So far in fiscal year 2025-26, Pakistan’s total trade deficit is around $28 billion, whereas it has received around $30 billion as remittances. Over 50 percent of those remittances came from the Middle East. 

Every year, around 700,000 to 800,000 Pakistanis migrate to the Middle East. However, prolonged conflict can stop fresh migration to the Gulf region. Meanwhile, according to one estimate, up to 1.4 million Pakistani workers already in the region may return home, causing a decline of $3 to $4 billion in remittances annually. 

The scenario presents a multifaceted threat to Pakistan’s economy. If the war continues, oil, gas, and fertilizer prices will rise, which will increase Pakistan’s net import costs and widen the balance of payments (BoP) deficit. Simultaneously, with labor returning home, remittances will decline, further constraining Pakistan’s ability to stabilize its external account. 

Furthermore, Pakistan will have to absorb returning labor from the Middle East in the domestic market, along with 2 million new entrants in the labor force. On the flip side, if the U.S. and Iran could reach an agreement, this could pave the way for a boom in Pakistani workers in sectors like construction and health care, as demand in these sectors will increase in Middle Eastern countries when the war finally ends. 

Finally, there’s the impact of the war on Pakistan’s internal security concerns. Approximately 10-15 percent of Pakistan’s population follows Shia Islam, the dominant sect in Iran. This amounts to around 21.5 million people, making Pakistan the country with the largest population of Shia Muslims after Iran. 

The problem for Pakistan is that most Shia Muslims in Pakistan regard Iran’s leadership as their spiritual leaders. Following the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Pakistan witnessed nationwide protests, resulting in 21 deaths, of which 10 deaths were due to a firing incident that took place outside U.S. Consulate in Karachi. A Shi’ite network in Pakistan, known as Millat-e-Jafaria, called for an investigation and a criminal case against the U.S. consul general for killing demonstrators in Karachi. A prolonged conflict between the U.S. and Iran can further aggravate the Shi’ites in Pakistan, which can result in sectarian unrest. 

Diplomacy Born of Strategic Necessity

Geography, remittances, and demography all motivate Pakistan to act as a mediator, but its increasing strategic capital puts it in a position to actually perform this role. 

In recent years, Pakistan has been diplomatically constrained by India; however, in this conflict, India’s role is limited due to its diplomatic proximity to Israel. China is also not an ideal mediator due its strategic competition with the United States. In past conflicts, Gulf countries, especially Qatar, played mediatory roles, but their anti-Iranian sentiment and alignment with U.S.-led regional frameworks diminished their chances. Other neutral options; such as Turkiye and Egypt, lack the motivation as well as strategic capital that Pakistan enjoys. 

More than a year ago, Pakistan was considered a diplomatic outcast, but now it is a mediator between the U.S. and Iran and a trusted partner for both. 

Islamabad has always maintained functional relations with Tehran. Even during the 1980s in the Iran-Iraq War, Pakistan chose neutrality over taking a side, although there was pressure from the United States and the Arab world. That carefully balancing has paid off. In the current context, Pakistan is Iran’s preferred mediator. Tehran believes that the geographical exposure and the domestic constraints of Islamabad will structurally incapacitate it from becoming an instrument of Washington. 

On the other hand, Pakistan currently enjoys a special bond with Trump’s Washington. 

After the conclusion of the first round of Iran-U.S. talks in Islamabad, which ended with no real results, the U.S. leadership was quick to praise the Pakistani leadership. Trump called Munir and Sharif, “extraordinary men.” Before leaving Pakistan after the talks, U.S. Vice President JD Vance called them “incredible hosts” and further clarified: “Whatever shortcomings in the negotiation, it wasn’t because of the Pakistanis, who did an amazing job.” 

This level of trust in the Pakistani leadership from the U.S. leadership is not just because of Pakistan’s mediating efforts in the current conflict, but due to a long list of efforts made by Sharif and Munir since Trump took office in January 2025. 

Undoubtedly, the breakthrough in Pakistan-U.S. relations came when Pakistan arrested the suspect associated with the 2021 Kabul airport bombing, which resulted in the death of 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. ⁠soldiers. Trump praised Pakistan for its assistance in the first joint session of Congress. Former Pakistan’s Ambassador to the U.S., Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, called this event “critical” in reestablishing trust between the U.S. and Pakistan after a decade of mistrust. 

The second breakthrough came after the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025. Trump became the peacemaker by mediating the conflict. Sharif quickly thanked Trump for his facilitation and even nominated him for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize in June. This was really special for Trump, as he has long coveted the award. Trump openly counts the India-Pakistan ceasefire as one of eight conflicts he has supposedly resolved. However, India never acknowledged Trump’s mediation claims, which created a bad impression with Trump. Pakistan capitalized on that discord.

Moreover, at the start of 2026, Pakistan joined the Board of Peace, a new global body created by Trump in the aftermath of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, despite skepticism from the Pakistani public. This further increased Trump’s trust in Pakistani leadership. 

Trump has a special liking for Pakistan’s chief of defense forces. The U.S. president has called Munir his “favorite field marshal” as well as “a great fighter,” “a very important guy,” and an “exceptional human being.” That rapport matters. On April 5, a day before the deadline of Trump’s ultimatum to Iran, Munir personally made sure a ceasefire was reached, as he made “a flurry of calls” to U.S. leaders. 

The role of Pakistan’s civil-military leadership will pay diplomatic dividends. Even if Iran-U.S. talks never resume, and the war continues, Pakistan will still emerge as a winner on the world stage. However, Pakistan’s leaders have to be mindful that a reputational victory will not suffice. Pakistan faces many challenges associated with this war in the security, energy, agriculture, fiscal, and sectarian domains. Thus, for a true victory, Pakistan needs to use its strategic diplomatic clout and make sure the U.S. and Iran reach an agreement.  

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In the ongoing Iran-Israel-U.S. war, Pakistan has positioned itself as a mediator between Washington and Tehran. It’s a status Pakistan has not enjoyed since the 1970s, when it became a bridge between East and West as it facilitated rapprochement between the United States and China. Now Pakistan has achieved a similar feat by holding talks between the U.S. and Iran in Islamabad – and playing a critical role in pausing the almost 40-day war between them. 

As Fahd Humayun, an assistant professor at Tufts University, put it in his recent interview with the Stimson Center: “I think it’s fair to say that absent Pakistan, there really are not many countries who could claim to have sufficient strategic capital with both the Americans and the Iranians to be able to cast themselves as credible mediators.” It’s true that there is no other state that can effectively mediate this conflict. 

But along with the “strategic capital” there is another element that defines Pakistan’s role as a mediator: strategic necessity. Many believe that Pakistan is taking advantage of a diplomatic opportunity; however, the continuation of the war paints a very grim picture for Pakistan itself due to geography, migration patterns of Pakistani nationals, and demography. Pakistan is more eager to act as a mediator simply because the stakes are higher for Pakistan than for other states that seek to play a role, like Turkiye and Egypt.

There’s another crucial factor as to why the United States is more comfortable with Pakistan being a mediator: the personal relationship that U.S. President, Donald Trump has forged with the Pakistani leadership, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal General Asim Munir. Pakistan’s accomplishment in convincing the U.S. and Iran to secure a ceasefire right after Trump’s ultimatum to destroy Iran’s whole civilization cannot be underestimated. 

The Islamabad talks marked the first high-level direct engagement between the U.S. and Iran since 1979. Elizabeth Threlkeld, director of the South Asia program at Stimson Center, noted that “Pakistan wouldn’t be convening these talks if it didn’t have that strong relationship with Washington and that personal trust between its leaders and President Trump.”

The Stakes for Pakistan

Many experts view Pakistan’s role in this conflict as an opportunity well grasped; however, the reality is different. The Iran-U.S. war has amplified Pakistan’s existing challenges. 

Let’s start with geography. Of its four neighbors – India, Afghanistan, Iran and China – Pakistan only has strong relations with one, China – the neighbor with which Pakistan shares the shortest border, and that in particularly difficult terrain. Pakistan has hostile relations with both Afghanistan and India. In such an environment, the last thing Pakistan would want is war and instability in the final neighbor, Iran – a country with which it shares a 900 kilometer-long border. Moreover, Iran borders Pakistan’s Balochistan province, which is already suffering from insurgency. Prolonged instability in Iran would only increase security risks in Pakistan’s western frontier.

Pakistan, like the rest of the world, is also being impacted by shipping disruptions due to Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Pakistan imports more than 85 percent of its crude oil from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) via the Strait of Hormuz. Although Islamabad was able to secure a deal with Iran to transit its crude oil through Hormuz, even when it was closed for most of the world, global oil prices surged. Thus, Pakistan could receive oil, but had to buy it at a steep price. This was a huge blow to Pakistan’s economy, because it affects not only the energy sector, but also agriculture sector. A fuel price hike ahead of the harvest season can be devastating for farmers.

Adding to the farmers’ burden, around 46 percent of the world’s supply of urea – used in over 90 percent of industrial fertilizer production – comes from the Gulf region. Around one-third of the world’s fertilizer trade has been impacted by the Strait of Hormuz closure. This has increased the price of urea by 40 percent. Pakistan is severely affected.

Pakistan both imports and domestically produces urea. However, for domestic production, Pakistani firms require natural gas, which is imported from Qatar via the Strait of Hormuz. So, one way or another, the price for fertilizer in Pakistan will surge if the conflict prolongs. 

That will pose a huge challenge for Pakistan as the agriculture sector is the fifth-largest contributor to Pakistan’s GDP, and 40 percent of Pakistan’s population depends on this sector for livelihood – and that’s not to mention the emerging food security crisis should the crisis reduce future harvests. 

There’s another angle to the economic burden. Pakistan exports a significant number of its workforce to the Middle East and receives remittances, which, in return, contribute greatly to its economy. So far in fiscal year 2025-26, Pakistan’s total trade deficit is around $28 billion, whereas it has received around $30 billion as remittances. Over 50 percent of those remittances came from the Middle East. 

Every year, around 700,000 to 800,000 Pakistanis migrate to the Middle East. However, prolonged conflict can stop fresh migration to the Gulf region. Meanwhile, according to one estimate, up to 1.4 million Pakistani workers already in the region may return home, causing a decline of $3 to $4 billion in remittances annually. 

The scenario presents a multifaceted threat to Pakistan’s economy. If the war continues, oil, gas, and fertilizer prices will rise, which will increase Pakistan’s net import costs and widen the balance of payments (BoP) deficit. Simultaneously, with labor returning home, remittances will decline, further constraining Pakistan’s ability to stabilize its external account. 

Furthermore, Pakistan will have to absorb returning labor from the Middle East in the domestic market, along with 2 million new entrants in the labor force. On the flip side, if the U.S. and Iran could reach an agreement, this could pave the way for a boom in Pakistani workers in sectors like construction and health care, as demand in these sectors will increase in Middle Eastern countries when the war finally ends. 

Finally, there’s the impact of the war on Pakistan’s internal security concerns. Approximately 10-15 percent of Pakistan’s population follows Shia Islam, the dominant sect in Iran. This amounts to around 21.5 million people, making Pakistan the country with the largest population of Shia Muslims after Iran. 

The problem for Pakistan is that most Shia Muslims in Pakistan regard Iran’s leadership as their spiritual leaders. Following the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Pakistan witnessed nationwide protests, resulting in 21 deaths, of which 10 deaths were due to a firing incident that took place outside U.S. Consulate in Karachi. A Shi’ite network in Pakistan, known as Millat-e-Jafaria, called for an investigation and a criminal case against the U.S. consul general for killing demonstrators in Karachi. A prolonged conflict between the U.S. and Iran can further aggravate the Shi’ites in Pakistan, which can result in sectarian unrest. 

Diplomacy Born of Strategic Necessity

Geography, remittances, and demography all motivate Pakistan to act as a mediator, but its increasing strategic capital puts it in a position to actually perform this role. 

In recent years, Pakistan has been diplomatically constrained by India; however, in this conflict, India’s role is limited due to its diplomatic proximity to Israel. China is also not an ideal mediator due its strategic competition with the United States. In past conflicts, Gulf countries, especially Qatar, played mediatory roles, but their anti-Iranian sentiment and alignment with U.S.-led regional frameworks diminished their chances. Other neutral options; such as Turkiye and Egypt, lack the motivation as well as strategic capital that Pakistan enjoys. 

More than a year ago, Pakistan was considered a diplomatic outcast, but now it is a mediator between the U.S. and Iran and a trusted partner for both. 

Islamabad has always maintained functional relations with Tehran. Even during the 1980s in the Iran-Iraq War, Pakistan chose neutrality over taking a side, although there was pressure from the United States and the Arab world. That carefully balancing has paid off. In the current context, Pakistan is Iran’s preferred mediator. Tehran believes that the geographical exposure and the domestic constraints of Islamabad will structurally incapacitate it from becoming an instrument of Washington. 

On the other hand, Pakistan currently enjoys a special bond with Trump’s Washington. 

After the conclusion of the first round of Iran-U.S. talks in Islamabad, which ended with no real results, the U.S. leadership was quick to praise the Pakistani leadership. Trump called Munir and Sharif, “extraordinary men.” Before leaving Pakistan after the talks, U.S. Vice President JD Vance called them “incredible hosts” and further clarified: “Whatever shortcomings in the negotiation, it wasn’t because of the Pakistanis, who did an amazing job.” 

This level of trust in the Pakistani leadership from the U.S. leadership is not just because of Pakistan’s mediating efforts in the current conflict, but due to a long list of efforts made by Sharif and Munir since Trump took office in January 2025. 

Undoubtedly, the breakthrough in Pakistan-U.S. relations came when Pakistan arrested the suspect associated with the 2021 Kabul airport bombing, which resulted in the death of 170 Afghans and 13 U.S. ⁠soldiers. Trump praised Pakistan for its assistance in the first joint session of Congress. Former Pakistan’s Ambassador to the U.S., Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, called this event “critical” in reestablishing trust between the U.S. and Pakistan after a decade of mistrust. 

The second breakthrough came after the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025. Trump became the peacemaker by mediating the conflict. Sharif quickly thanked Trump for his facilitation and even nominated him for the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize in June. This was really special for Trump, as he has long coveted the award. Trump openly counts the India-Pakistan ceasefire as one of eight conflicts he has supposedly resolved. However, India never acknowledged Trump’s mediation claims, which created a bad impression with Trump. Pakistan capitalized on that discord.

Moreover, at the start of 2026, Pakistan joined the Board of Peace, a new global body created by Trump in the aftermath of the Israel-Hamas ceasefire, despite skepticism from the Pakistani public. This further increased Trump’s trust in Pakistani leadership. 

Trump has a special liking for Pakistan’s chief of defense forces. The U.S. president has called Munir his “favorite field marshal” as well as “a great fighter,” “a very important guy,” and an “exceptional human being.” That rapport matters. On April 5, a day before the deadline of Trump’s ultimatum to Iran, Munir personally made sure a ceasefire was reached, as he made “a flurry of calls” to U.S. leaders. 

The role of Pakistan’s civil-military leadership will pay diplomatic dividends. Even if Iran-U.S. talks never resume, and the war continues, Pakistan will still emerge as a winner on the world stage. However, Pakistan’s leaders have to be mindful that a reputational victory will not suffice. Pakistan faces many challenges associated with this war in the security, energy, agriculture, fiscal, and sectarian domains. Thus, for a true victory, Pakistan needs to use its strategic diplomatic clout and make sure the U.S. and Iran reach an agreement.  

Waleed Sami is a postgraduate of Strategic Studies from the Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), a prestigious school of the National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Islamabad.

Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi

Dr. Syed Muhammad Saad Zaidi is an adjunct faculty member at Bahria University, Islamabad. He earned his Ph.D. in International Relations from Bahria University, Islamabad, as a recipient of the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan's Indigenous Ph.D. Fellowship. 

Pakistan mediatory role

Pakistan U.S.-Iran mediation

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