Serbia Hedges Its Bets With Chinese High-Speed Missiles |
Asia Defense | Security | East Asia
Serbia Hedges Its Bets With Chinese High-Speed Missiles
For Belgrade, the logic behind the acquisition of Chinese CM-400AKG missiles is multifaceted.
A Serbian Air Force MIG-29 carrying a Chinese-made CM-400 rocket.
Last month, media reports emerged that Serbia had acquired high-speed CM-400AKG missiles, manufactured by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation and adapted to Serbia’s Soviet-made MiG-29 fighter jets.
“We have a significant number of those missiles, and we will have even more,” Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić told national TV broadcaster RTS.
CM-400AKG are air-launched, high-speed anti-ship missiles with an estimated range of 100-240 kilometers, with some assessments placing it closer to 250 kilometers, and are designed to strike both maritime targets and fixed or slow-moving land targets. Reporting and imagery suggest that, alongside the CM-400AKG, Serbian MiG-29s have also been fitted with Chinese LS-6 precision-guided glide bomb kits.
Serbia’s neighbor and adversary from the 1990s wars, Croatia, criticized the transaction as threatening to regional security and, as a NATO member state, notified the alliance.
This episode raises the question of the cause. Missile procurement is part of a well-established pattern in which China seeks to win over defense markets in Europe and to promote itself as a global power. At the same time, for Serbia and its incumbent coalition, it is part of efforts to boost international leverage and domestic self-promotion, as the ruling regime tries to stay afloat.
For China, the logic is pretty straightforward. China sees itself as a rising superpower and wants to be seen as a global power capable of forming partnerships even with small countries in remote regions, as is the case with Serbia and the Balkans. Similarly, China aims to win new markets for its growing defense industry, including in Europe.
Allegedly, CM-400AKG missiles’ first combat use came during the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, when Pakistan used them, and now Serbia has become the first European country to operate these missiles. Before that, Serbia also became the first European country to acquire China’s CH-92A drones and FK-3 missile air defense systems in 2020 and 2022, respectively. The 2023 Sino-Serbian free-trade agreement is helping China as it gradually reduces tariffs on a wide range of Chinese defense products, allowing Serbia to make further purchases and giving China opportunities to penetrate European defense markets.
In the case of Serbia, the logic is more multifaceted. Militarily speaking, Serbia has been trying to modernize and replace its outdated arsenal that dates back to the days of the Yugoslav army. Particular emphasis is placed on controlling the national airspace. Serbian historical experience – most notably the Nazi bombing of Belgrade in 1941 and the NATO intervention during the 1999 Kosovo War – have contributed to airpower holding a strong symbolic and strategic appeal. In this context, Serbia has also procured from France the Mistral infrared man-portable air-defense system, the GM-400 long-range surveillance radar from Thales, and Rafale fighter jets. The list also includes Russia’s Pantsir-S1 air defense system, as well as kamikaze drones from the UAE and China’s CH-92A drones and FK-3 systems.
Beyond defense, the foreign policy component is powerful. Serbia believes that acquiring weaponry strengthens its bargaining position in regional disputes, such as the one over Kosovo, and enhances its maneuverability among great powers.
Recently, China has played a more powerful role in Serbia’s relations with other major partners, the EU, the U.S., and Russia, all of which are fraught with distrust.
After tolerating Vučić’s democratic backsliding for years in exchange for his cooperation on regional stability, the EU has begun to notice some of the worrying domestic trends in Belgrade. This did not lead the EU to become more involved in pressuring the Belgrade leadership, but mistrust remains. Despite high expectations from the Trump administration, relations with the U.S. are also uneasy, as evidenced by U.S. sanctions on Serbian oil and gas company NIS for being owned by Russia’s Gazprom, tariffs, and the collapse of the Trump Tower Belgrade project. Ties with Russia are also not carefree, as there are tensions with Moscow over the difficult process of changing ownership in the sanctioned NIS and Serbia’s ammunition deliveries to Ukraine.
By comparison, China, with its pragmatic, non-interference policies, is often perceived as a more predictable partner.
There is also the important role of domestic politics. In public opinion, Serbian armed forces tend to be among the most trusted institutions in the country, on par with the Serbian Orthodox Church and political parties that invest in the military, including through weapons procurement, which scores electoral points. Non-transparency is also at play since the contracts with the Chinese side are frequently secretive, which suits local political elites, and the same goes for the pricing of Chinese missiles.
For more than a year, the Serbian leadership has tried to stabilize itself in the face of nationwide protests over corruption and state capture, triggered by a railway station disaster that killed 16 people. Procuring weaponry amidst great international instability is a way to divert attention from domestic troubles.
Before one goes into scaremongering, war in the Balkans is unlikely. The region, through NATO, remains anchored in the Western security architecture despite its ruptures. Local states, including Serbia, are experiencing a serious demographic decline, and these countries have limited capacity for prolonged warfare. Indeed, for years, the Serbian army has also been plagued by the departure of military professionals leaving service due to unsatisfactory conditions. Serbian MiGs are set to become obsolete in a few years, which is why Serbia bought French Rafale jets. This implies limitations to Serbian capability, as modern missiles are mounted on a platform near the end of its lifecycle, making the current arrangement a temporary strike capability rather than a permanent feature of Serbian airpower.
For Serbia, the challenge will be to navigate a century of Sino-American rivalry, since Belgrade has a history of stepping back from its partnership with Beijing when faced with push back from Washington. The story of Serbia may turn out not to be a story of a new Balkan conflict, but rather of how small states navigate a world shaped by great-power rivalry.
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Last month, media reports emerged that Serbia had acquired high-speed CM-400AKG missiles, manufactured by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation and adapted to Serbia’s Soviet-made MiG-29 fighter jets.
“We have a significant number of those missiles, and we will have even more,” Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić told national TV broadcaster RTS.
CM-400AKG are air-launched, high-speed anti-ship missiles with an estimated range of 100-240 kilometers, with some assessments placing it closer to 250 kilometers, and are designed to strike both maritime targets and fixed or slow-moving land targets. Reporting and imagery suggest that, alongside the CM-400AKG, Serbian MiG-29s have also been fitted with Chinese LS-6 precision-guided glide bomb kits.
Serbia’s neighbor and adversary from the 1990s wars, Croatia, criticized the transaction as threatening to regional security and, as a NATO member state, notified the alliance.
This episode raises the question of the cause. Missile procurement is part of a well-established pattern in which China seeks to win over defense markets in Europe and to promote itself as a global power. At the same time, for Serbia and its incumbent coalition, it is part of efforts to boost international leverage and domestic self-promotion, as the ruling regime tries to stay afloat.
For China, the logic is pretty straightforward. China sees itself as a rising superpower and wants to be seen as a global power capable of forming partnerships even with small countries in remote regions, as is the case with Serbia and the Balkans. Similarly, China aims to win new markets for its growing defense industry, including in Europe.
Allegedly, CM-400AKG missiles’ first combat use came during the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, when Pakistan used them, and now Serbia has become the first European country to operate these missiles. Before that, Serbia also became the first European country to acquire China’s CH-92A drones and FK-3 missile air defense systems in 2020 and 2022, respectively. The 2023 Sino-Serbian free-trade agreement is helping China as it gradually reduces tariffs on a wide range of Chinese defense products, allowing Serbia to make further purchases and giving China opportunities to penetrate European defense markets.
In the case of Serbia, the logic is more multifaceted. Militarily speaking, Serbia has been trying to modernize and replace its outdated arsenal that dates back to the days of the Yugoslav army. Particular emphasis is placed on controlling the national airspace. Serbian historical experience – most notably the Nazi bombing of Belgrade in 1941 and the NATO intervention during the 1999 Kosovo War – have contributed to airpower holding a strong symbolic and strategic appeal. In this context, Serbia has also procured from France the Mistral infrared man-portable air-defense system, the GM-400 long-range surveillance radar from Thales, and Rafale fighter jets. The list also includes Russia’s Pantsir-S1 air defense system, as well as kamikaze drones from the UAE and China’s CH-92A drones and FK-3 systems.
Beyond defense, the foreign policy component is powerful. Serbia believes that acquiring weaponry strengthens its bargaining position in regional disputes, such as the one over Kosovo, and enhances its maneuverability among great powers.
Recently, China has played a more powerful role in Serbia’s relations with other major partners, the EU, the U.S., and Russia, all of which are fraught with distrust.
After tolerating Vučić’s democratic backsliding for years in exchange for his cooperation on regional stability, the EU has begun to notice some of the worrying domestic trends in Belgrade. This did not lead the EU to become more involved in pressuring the Belgrade leadership, but mistrust remains. Despite high expectations from the Trump administration, relations with the U.S. are also uneasy, as evidenced by U.S. sanctions on Serbian oil and gas company NIS for being owned by Russia’s Gazprom, tariffs, and the collapse of the Trump Tower Belgrade project. Ties with Russia are also not carefree, as there are tensions with Moscow over the difficult process of changing ownership in the sanctioned NIS and Serbia’s ammunition deliveries to Ukraine.
By comparison, China, with its pragmatic, non-interference policies, is often perceived as a more predictable partner.
There is also the important role of domestic politics. In public opinion, Serbian armed forces tend to be among the most trusted institutions in the country, on par with the Serbian Orthodox Church and political parties that invest in the military, including through weapons procurement, which scores electoral points. Non-transparency is also at play since the contracts with the Chinese side are frequently secretive, which suits local political elites, and the same goes for the pricing of Chinese missiles.
For more than a year, the Serbian leadership has tried to stabilize itself in the face of nationwide protests over corruption and state capture, triggered by a railway station disaster that killed 16 people. Procuring weaponry amidst great international instability is a way to divert attention from domestic troubles.
Before one goes into scaremongering, war in the Balkans is unlikely. The region, through NATO, remains anchored in the Western security architecture despite its ruptures. Local states, including Serbia, are experiencing a serious demographic decline, and these countries have limited capacity for prolonged warfare. Indeed, for years, the Serbian army has also been plagued by the departure of military professionals leaving service due to unsatisfactory conditions. Serbian MiGs are set to become obsolete in a few years, which is why Serbia bought French Rafale jets. This implies limitations to Serbian capability, as modern missiles are mounted on a platform near the end of its lifecycle, making the current arrangement a temporary strike capability rather than a permanent feature of Serbian airpower.
For Serbia, the challenge will be to navigate a century of Sino-American rivalry, since Belgrade has a history of stepping back from its partnership with Beijing when faced with push back from Washington. The story of Serbia may turn out not to be a story of a new Balkan conflict, but rather of how small states navigate a world shaped by great-power rivalry.
Vuk Vuksanović is a Lecturer in Foreign Policy and Grand Strategy at the Department of War Studies – King’s College London and an associate of LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think tank within the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is the author of the book “Serbia’s Balancing Act: Between Russia and the West” (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2025).
China-Serbia arms trade
China-Serbia defense relations
Serbia-China relations