The Significance of Zhang Youxia’s Downfall |
Asia Defense | Security | East Asia
The Significance of Zhang Youxia’s Downfall
This could have an impact on military modernization – and Taiwan.
On January 24, a Chinese defense spokesperson announced that a legal case was being prepared against Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department (JSD),of the Central Military Commission, on suspicion of serious disciplinary and legal violations. Zhang Youxia had long been regarded as Xi Jinping’s closest ally within the military and was widely seen as the most powerful proxy for Xi inside the armed forces. As a result, the news of his downfall has sent shockwaves throughout the international community. Additional purges of top military officials have since followed.
A PLA Daily editorial published on January 25 explained the allegations Zhang and Liu were facing. They were alleged to have seriously betrayed the trust and important responsibilities entrusted to them by the Party Central Committee and the CMC, and to have seriously undermined the CMC chairperson responsibility system. They were accused of weakening the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, fostering political and corruption-related problems that threaten the Party’s governing foundation, and severely damaging the image and authority of the leadership of the CMC. Finally, they were alleged to have inflicted serious damage on the military’s political development, political ecology, and the development of combat capabilities. In a subsequent article, the paper observed that “in reality, there are a variety of factors that affect the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and erode the political nature of the people’s army.”
This explanation suggests that this case involves more than a matter of corruption, and that disagreements may have emerged between Xi and Zhang. K. Tristan Tang of National Taiwan University notes that the two may have differed over military modernization, particularly the strengthening of joint operational capabilities, with a potential invasion of Taiwan in mind.
Other news outlets offered their own explanations. The South China Morning Post said the factors were corruption; a failure to properly manage close associates, family members, and relatives; and a failure to report problems to the Party leadership when they arose. By contrast, The Wall Street Journal reported that the reasons included the leaking of nuclear weapons plans to the U.S.; corruption related to the promotion of former Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu; and the formation of political factions.
There is little doubt that corruption was involved, in Zhang’s case and indeed in others. However, if corruption alone had been the decisive factor, Zhang would likely have been dealt with alongside figures such as Li Shangfu. Allegations involving the leaking of nuclear weapons plans would warrant far more severe punishment, but it is hard to believe that Zhang, then the highest-ranking uniformed officer, would have played an active role. These factors suggest that the primary reason for Zhang’s removal was concern about factionalism. Chieh Chung of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research argues that Xi was growing wary of Zhang’s increasing influence following the downfall of He Weidong and Miao Hua, and ultimately chose to remove him as a political risk.
Taken together, we can speculate that Xi found himself at odds with Zhang, and chose to remove him out of concern over his increasing influence within the military.
Party-Military Relations
Under a policy of “running the military in accordance with the law,” Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign that removed senior officers appointed under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. This helped consolidate Xi’s control over the PLA and stabilize his power base within the Party. However, disciplinary actions against senior military officials since October 2023 cannot be explained by the same logic. The officials who were removed were appointed by Xi himself, most notably Zhang, who had long been regarded as Xi’s most powerful proxy inside the PLA. As a result, these recent purges are likely to have undermined, rather than strengthened, Xi’s control over the armed forces.
Zhang’s removal marks the first time since the founding of the People’s Republic of China that the PLA has lost its seat at Politburo meetings. As a result, the PLA forces now face a diminished ability to influence top-level Party decision-making.
As a result, Zhang’s downfall is likely to trigger instability in party-military relations. A PLA Daily commentary published on January 31 noted that the military is “currently facing challenges that include short-term difficulties and pain.” In the lead-up to the announcement of the disciplinary action, the paper stepped up its propaganda efforts, suggesting an attempt to preempt and contain the negative effects of the move.
To stabilize his control over the military, Xi will need to find a new proxy he can trust. However, with Xu Qiliang having died of illness and with both Zhang and Miao Hua out of the picture, the prospects for identifying such a person remain uncertain.
Implications for Taiwan?
In China, at the central level, the CMC Joint Operations Command Center is responsible for command and control, while the JSD oversees operational planning. At the theater level, command and control is handled by the Joint Operations Command Center of the Theater Command. These organizations have gained operational experience and expertise in recent years. As such, the impact of these latest ousters on military exercises around Taiwan, which are primarily led by the Eastern Theater Command, will be limited.
In contrast, they will very likely impact the PLA’s ability to undertake an invasion of Taiwan in the near future. Zhang and Liu were among the few senior officers with direct combat experience, having participated in the Sino-Vietnamese War and Sino-Vietnamese Border Conflict. Many other senior officers connected to the two men have also been disciplined, while the earlier purges of He Weidong and Miao Hua meanwhile ended the careers of many more. As a consequence, numerous key posts are vacant.
Given this, plus the instability in Party-military that we’ve noted is likely to ensue, it is hard to see how the PLA could be ready in those circumstances to launch a large-scale operation like an invasion of Taiwan, which would require it to mobilize its full combat capabilities. As such, from a short-term perspective, the probability of a Taiwan emergency appears to have declined.
Over the medium to long term, by contrast, the picture is quite different, and the chances of a Taiwan emergency may now have risen, as the officers Xi appoints to key military positions going forward are likely to be those who will faithfully act on his policy of accelerating military modernization and advancing preparations for an invasion of Taiwan. These appointments may prioritize aligning with Xi’s perceived intentions, potentially resulting in flawed assessments, advice, or reporting. This in turn could increase the risk that Xi will make a strategic decisions about Taiwan based on flawed or partial information.
To stabilize party-military relations, meanwhile, Xi will need to find new proxies within the PLA whom he can trust. However, whether these new proxies will provide accurate assessments and information is unclear. With Xu Qiliang, Miao Hua, and Zhang Youxia all now out of the picture, attention will now turn to Xi’s choices to fill the key posts in the CMC and the military.
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On January 24, a Chinese defense spokesperson announced that a legal case was being prepared against Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli, Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department (JSD),of the Central Military Commission, on suspicion of serious disciplinary and legal violations. Zhang Youxia had long been regarded as Xi Jinping’s closest ally within the military and was widely seen as the most powerful proxy for Xi inside the armed forces. As a result, the news of his downfall has sent shockwaves throughout the international community. Additional purges of top military officials have since followed.
A PLA Daily editorial published on January 25 explained the allegations Zhang and Liu were facing. They were alleged to have seriously betrayed the trust and important responsibilities entrusted to them by the Party Central Committee and the CMC, and to have seriously undermined the CMC chairperson responsibility system. They were accused of weakening the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, fostering political and corruption-related problems that threaten the Party’s governing foundation, and severely damaging the image and authority of the leadership of the CMC. Finally, they were alleged to have inflicted serious damage on the military’s political development, political ecology, and the development of combat capabilities. In a subsequent article, the paper observed that “in reality, there are a variety of factors that affect the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and erode the political nature of the people’s army.”
This explanation suggests that this case involves more than a matter of corruption, and that disagreements may have emerged between Xi and Zhang. K. Tristan Tang of National Taiwan University notes that the two may have differed over military modernization, particularly the strengthening of joint operational capabilities, with a potential invasion of Taiwan in mind.
Other news outlets offered their own explanations. The South China Morning Post said the factors were corruption; a failure to properly manage close associates, family members, and relatives; and a failure to report problems to the Party leadership when they arose. By contrast, The Wall Street Journal reported that the reasons included the leaking of nuclear weapons plans to the U.S.; corruption related to the promotion of former Minister of National Defense Li Shangfu; and the formation of political factions.
There is little doubt that corruption was involved, in Zhang’s case and indeed in others. However, if corruption alone had been the decisive factor, Zhang would likely have been dealt with alongside figures such as Li Shangfu. Allegations involving the leaking of nuclear weapons plans would warrant far more severe punishment, but it is hard to believe that Zhang, then the highest-ranking uniformed officer, would have played an active role. These factors suggest that the primary reason for Zhang’s removal was concern about factionalism. Chieh Chung of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research argues that Xi was growing wary of Zhang’s increasing influence following the downfall of He Weidong and Miao Hua, and ultimately chose to remove him as a political risk.
Taken together, we can speculate that Xi found himself at odds with Zhang, and chose to remove him out of concern over his increasing influence within the military.
Party-Military Relations
Under a policy of “running the military in accordance with the law,” Xi launched an anti-corruption campaign that removed senior officers appointed under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. This helped consolidate Xi’s control over the PLA and stabilize his power base within the Party. However, disciplinary actions against senior military officials since October 2023 cannot be explained by the same logic. The officials who were removed were appointed by Xi himself, most notably Zhang, who had long been regarded as Xi’s most powerful proxy inside the PLA. As a result, these recent purges are likely to have undermined, rather than strengthened, Xi’s control over the armed forces.
Zhang’s removal marks the first time since the founding of the People’s Republic of China that the PLA has lost its seat at Politburo meetings. As a result, the PLA forces now face a diminished ability to influence top-level Party decision-making.
As a result, Zhang’s downfall is likely to trigger instability in party-military relations. A PLA Daily commentary published on January 31 noted that the military is “currently facing challenges that include short-term difficulties and pain.” In the lead-up to the announcement of the disciplinary action, the paper stepped up its propaganda efforts, suggesting an attempt to preempt and contain the negative effects of the move.
To stabilize his control over the military, Xi will need to find a new proxy he can trust. However, with Xu Qiliang having died of illness and with both Zhang and Miao Hua out of the picture, the prospects for identifying such a person remain uncertain.
Implications for Taiwan?
In China, at the central level, the CMC Joint Operations Command Center is responsible for command and control, while the JSD oversees operational planning. At the theater level, command and control is handled by the Joint Operations Command Center of the Theater Command. These organizations have gained operational experience and expertise in recent years. As such, the impact of these latest ousters on military exercises around Taiwan, which are primarily led by the Eastern Theater Command, will be limited.
In contrast, they will very likely impact the PLA’s ability to undertake an invasion of Taiwan in the near future. Zhang and Liu were among the few senior officers with direct combat experience, having participated in the Sino-Vietnamese War and Sino-Vietnamese Border Conflict. Many other senior officers connected to the two men have also been disciplined, while the earlier purges of He Weidong and Miao Hua meanwhile ended the careers of many more. As a consequence, numerous key posts are vacant.
Given this, plus the instability in Party-military that we’ve noted is likely to ensue, it is hard to see how the PLA could be ready in those circumstances to launch a large-scale operation like an invasion of Taiwan, which would require it to mobilize its full combat capabilities. As such, from a short-term perspective, the probability of a Taiwan emergency appears to have declined.
Over the medium to long term, by contrast, the picture is quite different, and the chances of a Taiwan emergency may now have risen, as the officers Xi appoints to key military positions going forward are likely to be those who will faithfully act on his policy of accelerating military modernization and advancing preparations for an invasion of Taiwan. These appointments may prioritize aligning with Xi’s perceived intentions, potentially resulting in flawed assessments, advice, or reporting. This in turn could increase the risk that Xi will make a strategic decisions about Taiwan based on flawed or partial information.
To stabilize party-military relations, meanwhile, Xi will need to find new proxies within the PLA whom he can trust. However, whether these new proxies will provide accurate assessments and information is unclear. With Xu Qiliang, Miao Hua, and Zhang Youxia all now out of the picture, attention will now turn to Xi’s choices to fill the key posts in the CMC and the military.
SUGIURA Yasuyuki is a Senior Fellow at the China Division of the Regional Studies Department of the National Institute for Defense Studies.
China party-military relations
China-Taiwan conflict
People's Liberation Army (PLA)