Can the PPP Really Move on From Yoon Suk-yeol? |
The Koreas | Politics | East Asia
Can the PPP Really Move on From Yoon Suk-yeol?
Hoping to avoid a wipe-out at the local elections, the party finally issued an apology. But it’s going to be difficult to shake its pro-Yoon image – especially with the current leadership.
People Power Party leader Jang Dong-hyeok speaks to the press on Jan. 8, 2026.
Less than 100 days away from the June 3 local elections, the People Power Party (PPP), South Korea’s main opposition party, held an emergency general meeting of its lawmakers. The party adopted a unanimous resolution stating, “We clearly oppose any claims demanding the political comeback of former President Yoon Suk-yeol.”
In the resolution, PPP lawmakers apologized for the December 3 emergency martial law declaration and pledged to halt all actions and remarks that escalate conflict among party members, instead moving toward unity. Party leadership emphasized their intention to completely dissociate from “Yoon Again” forces, which advocate Yoon’s political return despite his impeachment and convictions for insurrection and other related charges.
Many PPP lawmakers had been calling for the party to sever ties with Yoon, lest the PPP shrink into a regional organization limited to Daegu and Gyeongbuk, traditional conservative strongholds. Indeed, few PPP candidates registered for local elections outside of these regions – for example, three candidates are running in the PPP primary for mayor of Seoul and two for Gyeonggi governor while nine are in the running for mayor of Daegu and six for Gyeongbuk governor. Incumbent Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon did not register his candidacy.
The PPP’s supposed declaration to sever ties with Yoon raises two questions. First, does this signal a meaningful shift in the party’s direction? Second, will it help the party in the upcoming elections? As long as Jang Dong-hyeok remains party leader and maintains his heretofore political stance, the answer to both questions appears to be no.
Jang remained silent at the meeting that passed the resolution opposing Yoon’s return. His silence reflects the political constraints he faces. Ultraright YouTuber Jeon Han-gil declared the resolution “the end of liberal democracy” and publicly pressured Jang to clarify his position, arguing that he himself had played a major role in Jang’s rise to opposition leader. Jeon’s bold and provocative criticism of efforts to reform the PPP illustrates the political environment that Jang has cultivated since Yoon’s impeachment.
Jang was elected as the PPP’s chief in August 2025 – over four months after the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld Yoon’s impeachment for his illegal declaration of martial law. Yet under Jang’s leadership, the party has become deeply entangled with Yoon. Loyalty to the former president has been the priority while conspiracy theories about election fraud have been amplified. Jang’s fiery rhetoric has aimed to consolidate a small but highly mobilized support base. He has blamed the Democratic Party for the martial law declaration, suggested that God had a plan behind the martial law decision, aligned himself with ultraright YouTubers, and refused to accept the court ruling against Yoon. Thus, as the local elections approach, Jang faces a dilemma of his own creation: how to expand toward the political center for electoral success while keeping his ultraright supporters.
It is always easier to close ranks and point fingers outward than to confront internal failures and start anew. Jang, a relative newcomer to politics, cannot easily break with the far-right forces that sustain his leadership. Without them, the PPP’s capacity for political mobilization would weaken. In other words, Jang does not merely refuse to reflect on the party’s trajectory – he is unable to do so because there is no clear alternative. Jang – and the party under him – has largely exhausted the political resources needed to rebuild the conservative camp. Severing ties with ultraright voices now would require a genuine reset of the party’s direction, principles, and platforms.
Those close to Jang have said that the party would first consolidate its base until March and then expand outward. But under that strategy, support for the party remains stagnant at roughly 20 percent. According to a recent Gallup poll, support for the Democratic Party has reached a six-month high of 46 percent, while support for the People Power Party has fallen to a six-month low of 21 percent. A solid plurality – 46 percent of respondents – said candidates from the incumbent party should be elected in the upcoming local elections, while 30 percent favored opposition candidates. The gap continues to widen. Meanwhile, President Lee Jae-myung currently enjoys a 65 percent approval rating.
Under these conditions, it seems unlikely that Jang will be able to reform the PPP. If the party fails to rebrand, it will almost certainly lose the local elections. At that point, Jang will have little choice but to resign anyway. Jang remaining in charge through the election may be the best-case scenario for the Democratic Party. Ironically, it may also be the best-case scenario for the public. Repeated electoral defeats may be the only mechanism capable of forcing meaningful reform within the conservative camp.
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Less than 100 days away from the June 3 local elections, the People Power Party (PPP), South Korea’s main opposition party, held an emergency general meeting of its lawmakers. The party adopted a unanimous resolution stating, “We clearly oppose any claims demanding the political comeback of former President Yoon Suk-yeol.”
In the resolution, PPP lawmakers apologized for the December 3 emergency martial law declaration and pledged to halt all actions and remarks that escalate conflict among party members, instead moving toward unity. Party leadership emphasized their intention to completely dissociate from “Yoon Again” forces, which advocate Yoon’s political return despite his impeachment and convictions for insurrection and other related charges.
Many PPP lawmakers had been calling for the party to sever ties with Yoon, lest the PPP shrink into a regional organization limited to Daegu and Gyeongbuk, traditional conservative strongholds. Indeed, few PPP candidates registered for local elections outside of these regions – for example, three candidates are running in the PPP primary for mayor of Seoul and two for Gyeonggi governor while nine are in the running for mayor of Daegu and six for Gyeongbuk governor. Incumbent Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon did not register his candidacy.
The PPP’s supposed declaration to sever ties with Yoon raises two questions. First, does this signal a meaningful shift in the party’s direction? Second, will it help the party in the upcoming elections? As long as Jang Dong-hyeok remains party leader and maintains his heretofore political stance, the answer to both questions appears to be no.
Jang remained silent at the meeting that passed the resolution opposing Yoon’s return. His silence reflects the political constraints he faces. Ultraright YouTuber Jeon Han-gil declared the resolution “the end of liberal democracy” and publicly pressured Jang to clarify his position, arguing that he himself had played a major role in Jang’s rise to opposition leader. Jeon’s bold and provocative criticism of efforts to reform the PPP illustrates the political environment that Jang has cultivated since Yoon’s impeachment.
Jang was elected as the PPP’s chief in August 2025 – over four months after the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld Yoon’s impeachment for his illegal declaration of martial law. Yet under Jang’s leadership, the party has become deeply entangled with Yoon. Loyalty to the former president has been the priority while conspiracy theories about election fraud have been amplified. Jang’s fiery rhetoric has aimed to consolidate a small but highly mobilized support base. He has blamed the Democratic Party for the martial law declaration, suggested that God had a plan behind the martial law decision, aligned himself with ultraright YouTubers, and refused to accept the court ruling against Yoon. Thus, as the local elections approach, Jang faces a dilemma of his own creation: how to expand toward the political center for electoral success while keeping his ultraright supporters.
It is always easier to close ranks and point fingers outward than to confront internal failures and start anew. Jang, a relative newcomer to politics, cannot easily break with the far-right forces that sustain his leadership. Without them, the PPP’s capacity for political mobilization would weaken. In other words, Jang does not merely refuse to reflect on the party’s trajectory – he is unable to do so because there is no clear alternative. Jang – and the party under him – has largely exhausted the political resources needed to rebuild the conservative camp. Severing ties with ultraright voices now would require a genuine reset of the party’s direction, principles, and platforms.
Those close to Jang have said that the party would first consolidate its base until March and then expand outward. But under that strategy, support for the party remains stagnant at roughly 20 percent. According to a recent Gallup poll, support for the Democratic Party has reached a six-month high of 46 percent, while support for the People Power Party has fallen to a six-month low of 21 percent. A solid plurality – 46 percent of respondents – said candidates from the incumbent party should be elected in the upcoming local elections, while 30 percent favored opposition candidates. The gap continues to widen. Meanwhile, President Lee Jae-myung currently enjoys a 65 percent approval rating.
Under these conditions, it seems unlikely that Jang will be able to reform the PPP. If the party fails to rebrand, it will almost certainly lose the local elections. At that point, Jang will have little choice but to resign anyway. Jang remaining in charge through the election may be the best-case scenario for the Democratic Party. Ironically, it may also be the best-case scenario for the public. Repeated electoral defeats may be the only mechanism capable of forcing meaningful reform within the conservative camp.
Soyoung Kim is an assistant professor in the Faculty of International Studies, Nagoya University of Commerce and Business.
South Korea conservatives
South Korea local elections
Yoon Suk-yeol impeachment