Vietnam’s Top Leader to Visit China Next Week, Report Says |
ASEAN Beat | Diplomacy | Southeast Asia
Vietnam’s Top Leader to Visit China Next Week, Report Says
If confirmed, the trip to Beijing would be To Lam’s first since his historic appointment as state president earlier this week.
To Lam, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), attends a session of the 14th National Congress of the CPV in Hanoi, Vietnam, Jan. 21, 2026.
To Lam, the head of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), is planning a visit to China next week to meet with his counterpart Xi Jinping, days after his appointment as state president.
In an article sourced to several people familiar with the planning of the trip, Reuters news agency reported that the visit is expected to take place during April 14-17, although it said that it was “still being planned and could be postponed because of scheduling issues.”
If it eventuates, it will almost certainly be Lam’s first overseas trip since the 68-year-old was elected state president on Tuesday. The dual appointment, which has been widely expected since the CPV’s 14th National Congress in January, marks a break with Vietnam’s norm of collective leadership in which the four top leadership roles are held by different individuals.
While such a double-up has been rare in Vietnam’s recent history, it mirrors the situation in China, where Xi serves as the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and head of state.
According to Reuters, the trip is likely to involve discussions over security cooperation, and telecommunications and railway infrastructure. Vietnam “may also ask for more help on energy security as it depends on imports from China of oil products, including jet fuel and some fertilizers.” Beijing has restricted the export of both due to the supply crunch caused by the war in the Middle East.
Energy was on the agenda during the inaugural “3 plus 3” strategic dialogue that brought together the foreign, defense, and public security ministers of both nations in Hanoi in mid-March.
Lam’s reported visit would also restore a norm in which newly appointed Vietnamese leaders make China the destination of their maiden overseas trip, in recognition of the ideological and historic connection between the two nations. While China was the first nation that Lam visited after his initial appointment as party chief in August 2024, he appeared to break from this after he was reappointed to the position at the 14th National Congress. Aside from a short trip to Cambodia and Laos, Lam’s first major state visit after the Congress was to the United States, where he attended the inaugural meeting of President Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace.”
Some observers suggested at the time that this might reflect a possible incipient shift in Vietnam’s strategic orientation, although it is more likely that it was motivated by Hanoi’s pressing need to finalize a trade agreement with the Trump administration.
Whatever the truth of the matter, between the upcoming trip and last month’s “3 plus 3” strategic dialogue, a new contrivance in China-Vietnam relations, it is now clear that Vietnam’s approach to relations with China, and its centrality in Hanoi’s foreign policy, remains unchanged.
If anything, the opposite may now be true. Geoff Wade of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute last month described the “3 plus 3” meeting as a “remarkable conclave” that pointed to “a trajectory towards closer Vietnam–China integration” and “stepped-up engagement” between the two sides.
China’s status as a reliable partner, to both Vietnam and the region as a whole, has likely been burnished by the contrast provided by the chaotic foreign policy of the Trump administration, in particular the globally disruptive U.S.-Israeli war on Iran and Washington’s aggressive tariff policies.
The State of Southeast Asia 2026 survey report, which was released this week by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, found that the Trump administration has weakened Washington’s standing in Southeast Asia. The nature of the current U.S. leadership was identified as the region’s top geopolitical concern, with 51.9 percent of the survey respondents from the 11 ASEAN nations identifying it as such, up from 46.9 percent in last year’s survey.
Commenting on the survey results, Joanne Lin of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute argued that this “shift is not dramatic enough to suggest a rupture, nor uniform enough to indicate a clear regional realignment.” But, she added, “across a range of indicators – from geopolitical concerns and perceptions of US economic and political-strategic influence to Washington’s leadership on free trade and the rules-based order, assessments of the trajectory of bilateral relations and trust – the U.S.’ broader standing in the region has weakened.”
Given that the survey was conducted prior to the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, the real state of regional opinion toward the U.S. could well be much worse.
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To Lam, the head of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), is planning a visit to China next week to meet with his counterpart Xi Jinping, days after his appointment as state president.
In an article sourced to several people familiar with the planning of the trip, Reuters news agency reported that the visit is expected to take place during April 14-17, although it said that it was “still being planned and could be postponed because of scheduling issues.”
If it eventuates, it will almost certainly be Lam’s first overseas trip since the 68-year-old was elected state president on Tuesday. The dual appointment, which has been widely expected since the CPV’s 14th National Congress in January, marks a break with Vietnam’s norm of collective leadership in which the four top leadership roles are held by different individuals.
While such a double-up has been rare in Vietnam’s recent history, it mirrors the situation in China, where Xi serves as the general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and head of state.
According to Reuters, the trip is likely to involve discussions over security cooperation, and telecommunications and railway infrastructure. Vietnam “may also ask for more help on energy security as it depends on imports from China of oil products, including jet fuel and some fertilizers.” Beijing has restricted the export of both due to the supply crunch caused by the war in the Middle East.
Energy was on the agenda during the inaugural “3 plus 3” strategic dialogue that brought together the foreign, defense, and public security ministers of both nations in Hanoi in mid-March.
Lam’s reported visit would also restore a norm in which newly appointed Vietnamese leaders make China the destination of their maiden overseas trip, in recognition of the ideological and historic connection between the two nations. While China was the first nation that Lam visited after his initial appointment as party chief in August 2024, he appeared to break from this after he was reappointed to the position at the 14th National Congress. Aside from a short trip to Cambodia and Laos, Lam’s first major state visit after the Congress was to the United States, where he attended the inaugural meeting of President Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace.”
Some observers suggested at the time that this might reflect a possible incipient shift in Vietnam’s strategic orientation, although it is more likely that it was motivated by Hanoi’s pressing need to finalize a trade agreement with the Trump administration.
Whatever the truth of the matter, between the upcoming trip and last month’s “3 plus 3” strategic dialogue, a new contrivance in China-Vietnam relations, it is now clear that Vietnam’s approach to relations with China, and its centrality in Hanoi’s foreign policy, remains unchanged.
If anything, the opposite may now be true. Geoff Wade of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute last month described the “3 plus 3” meeting as a “remarkable conclave” that pointed to “a trajectory towards closer Vietnam–China integration” and “stepped-up engagement” between the two sides.
China’s status as a reliable partner, to both Vietnam and the region as a whole, has likely been burnished by the contrast provided by the chaotic foreign policy of the Trump administration, in particular the globally disruptive U.S.-Israeli war on Iran and Washington’s aggressive tariff policies.
The State of Southeast Asia 2026 survey report, which was released this week by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, found that the Trump administration has weakened Washington’s standing in Southeast Asia. The nature of the current U.S. leadership was identified as the region’s top geopolitical concern, with 51.9 percent of the survey respondents from the 11 ASEAN nations identifying it as such, up from 46.9 percent in last year’s survey.
Commenting on the survey results, Joanne Lin of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute argued that this “shift is not dramatic enough to suggest a rupture, nor uniform enough to indicate a clear regional realignment.” But, she added, “across a range of indicators – from geopolitical concerns and perceptions of US economic and political-strategic influence to Washington’s leadership on free trade and the rules-based order, assessments of the trajectory of bilateral relations and trust – the U.S.’ broader standing in the region has weakened.”
Given that the survey was conducted prior to the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, the real state of regional opinion toward the U.S. could well be much worse.
Sebastian Strangio is Southeast Asia editor at The Diplomat.
China-Vietnam relations
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)
U.S.-Vietnam relations
Vietnam foreign policy