Bangladesh’s Parties are Divided Over the Reform Process |
The Pulse | Politics | South Asia
Bangladesh’s Parties are Divided Over the Reform Process
Despite a clear “yes” vote in the referendum, the BNP government is dragging its feet, prompting the opposition to protest in parliament and the streets.
Leaders of the 11-party opposition hold a rally in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, on Apr. 4, 2026, demanding the implementation of the “yes” vote of the referendum on reform.
After 18 months of political uncertainty following the ouster of the Awami League government, Bangladeshis voted in an election for a new parliament and a referendum on reforms on February 12. The post-election phase was expected to bring clarity, especially with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party winning a strong mandate and the reforms receiving a 68 percent “yes” vote.
However, instead of proceeding along a well-defined reform path, the process has gotten more complicated.
It was in October 2025 that the major political parties signed the July National Charter, which provided an overall structure for constitutional and governance reforms. This charter was subsequently endorsed in the referendum, which gave the reforms legitimacy and urgency.
The problem before Bangladesh today is not the lack of a mandate for the reforms, but how that mandate is to be applied.
The first signs of disagreement appeared right after the election. At their swearing-in, the newly elected members of parliament (MPs) were to two oaths: as MPs and as members of a proposed Constitution Reform Council, mandated with executing the constitutional changes endorsed by the referendum within 180 working days.
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) members and their allies, including National Citizen Party (NCP), took both oaths. But members of the ruling BNP, which won a majority in the parliament, refused to take the second oath.
There have been direct institutional impacts of this decision. The reform council that was to be the main process of transferring referendum results to amendments in the constitution has not been established. In its absence, the path to introducing reform proposals remains uncertain.
This disagreement shows a bigger difference in approach. BNP leaders argue that the reform council lacks constitutional status and that any major change must proceed through parliament following established legislative procedures. In contrast, opposition actors and participants in the earlier consensus process view the referendum as a binding political commitment that should guide immediate implementation.
The difference between public expectation and legal procedure is now at the center of the debate.
At the same time, the reform debate has widened beyond the question of the reform council itself. It now extends to the fate of ordinances issued during the interim period. A total of 133 ordinances were promulgated during the 18-month period of the Muhammad Yunus-led interim government, of which 97 were passed without change, and 13 were amended before approval. Another 7 were introduced as repeal bills. The remaining 16 ordinances were not brought before parliament, with the law minister stating that these require further review and consultation rather than being discarded.
This has made the situation more sensitive since some of the ordinances that await decisions are those that were part of the focus of the post-uprising reform agenda. These involve actions associated with the referendum system, forced disappearance, judicial reforms such as the appointment procedure and institutional autonomy, the National Human Rights Commission, and anti-corruption systems. Consequently, the present dispute is no longer confined to the constitutional structure. It is also about whether the protections that were put in place in the interim period........