The Pulse | Diplomacy | South Asia

How Myanmar Fits Into India’s Troubled Neighborhood Policy

Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to India may help Delhi seal deals with the military-backed government. But it has angered pro-democracy forces in Myanmar.

Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his visit to New Delhi, India, Jun. 1, 2026.

Min Aung Hlaing’s decision to choose India as the destination of his first official foreign visit since becoming Myanmar’s president in April came as a surprise to many, who were expecting him to head to Beijing first. After all, China was one of the strongest supporters of the military junta, since it grabbed power via a coup in February 2021.

For New Delhi, however, the visit of the former junta chief, who only two months ago transitioned to becoming Myanmar’s president, signaled the success of its “pragmatic approach,” which has long dictated ties with Myanmar.

Indeed, New Delhi, which had strong ties with Myanmar under the National League for Democracy government, carefully continued engagement after the coup with the junta leadership through various channels.

Yet Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Delhi marks an important milestone in India’s relations with Myanmar, as it accorded de facto recognition to the military-backed government.

The election, which was widely criticized as deeply flawed as it aimed to perpetuate the military’s grip on power in Myanmar, brought to power the military’s proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party.  The new government remains largely diplomatically isolated, especially by Western countries.

The significance of Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to India should therefore not be understated.

The timing of the visit provides some clues as to why New Delhi is making this very public outreach to a much-reviled leader. It took place amid growing disarray in India’s relations with its neighbors, and China’s aggressive strategic expansion into New Delhi’s traditional sphere of influence. Bangladesh offers the most striking example of this interlinked dynamic. Despite New Delhi’s long-standing opposition to Chinese involvement in the Teesta River restoration project – a vital transboundary river flowing from the Himalayas through Indian territories of Sikkim and West Bengal before crossing into Bangladesh – Dhaka’s recent attempts at formally seeking support from China on the project signal a definitive strategic shift in the India-China geopolitical tug of war.

Even with Nepal, tensions have been simmering since the new government came to power after general elections in March. Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s recent controversial remarks calling for mediation from China to resolve India-Nepal border tensions have reignited questions about whether New Delhi has lost strategic space to Beijing in Kathmandu.

These developments are playing out against the backdrop of a rise in anti-India sentiments throughout the region.

Myanmar is a key country in India’s “Neighborhood First” policy. New Delhi is visibly keen to retain influence in Naypyidaw, even if it means formally engaging with the........

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