2025 in South Asia: A Year of Economic and Political Shocks |
Every year is eventful in South Asia. But 2025 wasn’t just turbulent; it destabilized the region structurally. This was due to the convergence of multiple shocks. Many countries in the region experienced domestic political upheaval, interstate military escalation, and climate disasters. Long-held assumptions on the role of exports, especially to developed countries, collapsed due to the tariffs imposed by the United States. These developments took place at a time when millions of South Asians were quickly losing patience with the political establishments that had long ruled these countries.
South Asia seemed to be on the verge of a polycrisis, but South Asian elites haven’t been able to present a new path forward. The only thing that remained unchanged during the year was the acrimonious relationship between India and Pakistan.
Return of Mass Politics, and the Crisis of Representation
As in 2024, mass politics in the form of protests toppled a South Asian government in 2025. In Nepal, youth-led protests in September forced the resignation of Prime Minister K. P. Sharma Oli. The immediate triggers for the protests ranged from bad governance to arrogant elites who can’t read the room, but the deeper drivers – economic precarity, rising unemployment and living costs, and a political system that does not offer meaningful participation – were unmistakable.
Nepal’s upheaval was not an anomaly, but a continuation of earlier mass movements in Sri Lanka (2022) and Bangladesh (2024) led by digitally connected youth and supported by political parties. The success of these anti-elite mobilizations should have alerted the Oli government, but it was slow in learning from the mistakes of others, like many fossilized South Asian political establishments.
However, despite the success of these movements in removing incumbents from power, except for Sri Lanka, they have struggled to translate disruption into institutional renewal. In fact, the events of 2025 showed that the gap between political mobilization and political transformation was widening. Nearly a year and a half after the departure of Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina, reform remains partial and contested. None of the main Bangladeshi political parties has moved away from traditions of centralized leadership, opaque financing, and patronage.
In the case of Sri Lanka, the National People’s Power (NPP), which was not part of the political establishment and has extensive cadre-based organizational structures, was a natural choice for many disgruntled voters. There is no such party waiting in the wings either in Bangladesh or Nepal. Religious and identity-based parties such as the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami seem to have gained ground because they have better organizational discipline and grassroots networks, but whether the emergence of Islamists as a strong political force is a positive development for Bangladesh remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, new political groups, including student-led parties, seem to be popular among certain sections in urban areas and have garnered social media attention. Yet, these groups have little organizational reach beyond metropolitan centers. Law and order has not been restored and violence has become normalized in Bangladesh. Instead of restoring democratic credibility, these dynamics have deepened public........