Japan’s FOIP 3.0: Is Pragmatism That Delivers Resilience Enough?
Tokyo Report | Diplomacy | East Asia
Japan’s FOIP 3.0: Is Pragmatism That Delivers Resilience Enough?
Japan’s updated vision is sharper and more self-interested.
Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae meets with Vietnam’s President and Communist Party chief To Lam, in Hanoi, Vietnam, May. 2, 2026.
When Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae visited Vietnam in early May this year, she presented an “evolved version” of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), a key plank in Japanese foreign policy, which is being called FOIP 3.0. The “Updated FOIP” specifies as priority areas “Building economic infrastructure for the age of AI and data,” “Co-creation of economic growth opportunities through public-private collaboration and rule sharing,” and “Enhancing cooperation in the field of security to ensure regional peace and stability,” each with its own items for concrete cooperation.
The FOIP was first proposed by the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in a speech in Nairobi in 2016. The keyword for FOIP 1.0 was “connectivity,” reflecting the fact that it was launched in the middle of a major shift in the power balance triggered by the rise of China.
International division has only deepened since, following the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and with the rise of the Global South, international politics have become more complex still. It was in response to this that then Prime Minister Kishida Fumio proposed the New Plan for a FOIP, or FOIP 2.0, in 2023, along with the keyword “inclusiveness.”
Building on this foundation, the keyword for FOIP 3.0 as proposed by the Takaichi administration is “resilience.” With any improvement of relations with China unlikely in the near time, and with the United States pursuing an exceedingly unpredictable foreign policy under Trump, Japan faces what might be called a double risk. It needs to deepen cooperation with Indo-Pacific countries to mitigate those risks and ensure autonomy and resilience. The new FOIP is thus heavily shaped by the imperative to revitalize the Japanese economy and strengthen economic security through cooperation with the Global South, including the ASEAN countries.
The idea of connecting Japanese growth strategy, economic security, and Global South strategy has been clear enough since the Kishida administration. That administration adopted the New Policy toward Enhanced Cooperation with Global South Countries in June 2024. It also implemented institutional schemes to strengthen cooperation with the Global South, such as launching the Global South Future-Oriented Co-Creation Project and Official Security Assistance........
