Crossroads Asia | Economy | Central Asia

The Politics of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway

With the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to be completed by 2030, discussion is shifting from regional connectivity to who will benefit most. 

In late March 2026, during the celebration of the Central Asian new year, Nawruz, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov announced the latest target for the completion of  China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway: 2030.

“If now we live in a ‘dead-end’ country between Europe and China, with the completion of the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway we will turn into a transit power,” Japarov said. 

To construct the railway, a joint venture was launched, with 51 percent owned by China and the rest divided between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. China provided a $2.3 billion loan while the remaining financing was to be contributed by the three partner countries in proportion to their shares: $1.1 billion by China, and $573 million each from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The opening ceremony of the construction of the railway was held on December 27, 2024. Japarov called it “a historical event that gave impetus to the development of Central Asian countries.” The railway is expected to be 533 kilometers long, with 305 km running through Kyrgyzstan. 

Once completed, this new route will shave about a week off cargo delivery times. The railway will run from Kashgar through Torugart, Makmal, and Jalal-Abad to Andijan, creating a new east-west link that could integrate with Trans-Caspian routes toward Turkiye and Europe. In the longer term, it may also connect to southbound corridors toward Pakistan, although those links remain under development.

As the CKU railway’s construction progresses, the questions have shifted from the practical to the strategic: who will control the corridor’s economy? Kyrgyz discussions of logistics hubs and warehouse infrastructure demonstrate that  the corridor is already being conceptualized in Bishkek beyond mere tracks. The project currently employs over 4,000 workers and 5,000,000 units of equipment in Kyrgyzstan and includes the construction of 50 bridges and 29 tunnels. Earlier Japarov noted the CKU railway could generate $200 million in revenue for Kyrgyzstan. However, in a recent interview with the Times of Central Asia, Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s deputy prime minister, forecast $300 million annual revenue.

Bishkek’s optimism around the CKU is not limited to revenue from being a transit country. Kyrgyzstan is looking for a wider transformation in the country’s economy with an increase in the export of natural resources as well as the development of metallurgical plants and even new towns along the railroad. Baisalov noted that during the Soviet era, Kyrgyzstan’s raw materials were largely ignored in favor of other resource-rich countries and Kyrgyzstan remained agrarian. The lack of railroads has further constrained the transport of Kyrgyz raw materials from mountainous areas to markets. 

Ninety percent of the CKU in Kyrgyzstan runs through Naryn – one of the most mountainous regions in the country. In fact, 70 percent of the region is mountain ranges. It is difficult to construct a railroad through such terrain, requiring many tunnels and bridges, with complicated long-term maintenance issues. The Kyrgyz segment of the CKU risks being an expensive and operationally sensitive part of the corridor, particularly when compared to flatter and more established alternative routes.

While Kyrgyzstan is excited about becoming a transit country and looks forward to enjoying significant revenue, the challenge for Uzbekistan is avoiding becoming a simple endpoint in a China-driven corridor. Although Uzbekistan is located at the center of Central Asia and historically used to be in the heart of various trade routes, this geographic location does not guarantee centrality in modern transport routes. Modern logistics depend on infrastructure quality, border efficiency, pricing, and other conditions that are weighed in comparison to alternative routes, both land and sea. 

China dominates the corridor hierarchy, holding the majority equity in the project as well as maintaining control over the originating segment. Beijing will be the main actor in deciding routing priorities, pricing, and logistics chains. Uzbekistan risks being relegated to the downstream in the hierarchy. To generate real value out of the CKU, Tashkent needs to develop logistics hubs, warehousing centers, and, in the future, integrate the railway into broader regional corridors toward the Caspian, South Asia, and beyond. 

Absolute success is not guaranteed for the CKU, regardless of the interests of the three parties. The route to Europe from China through Central Asia is reported to be 900 km shorter than through Russia and Kazakhstan. While the railway could become a potential alternative to Russia-linked routes in light of the Ukraine war, it does not necessarily mean it will become a dominant one. The new corridor is entering a competitive environment, pitted against other established and new routes. The Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor has already increased freight volumes significantly. The mountainous areas the CKU goes through might limit its capacity, and thus it is likely that the CKU will function as a feeder or complementary route, not a standalone alternative. 

This research was supported by a Marie Curie Staff Exchange within the Horizon Europe Programme (CARSI, no: 101086415) 

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In late March 2026, during the celebration of the Central Asian new year, Nawruz, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov announced the latest target for the completion of  China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway: 2030.

“If now we live in a ‘dead-end’ country between Europe and China, with the completion of the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway we will turn into a transit power,” Japarov said. 

To construct the railway, a joint venture was launched, with 51 percent owned by China and the rest divided between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. China provided a $2.3 billion loan while the remaining financing was to be contributed by the three partner countries in proportion to their shares: $1.1 billion by China, and $573 million each from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

The opening ceremony of the construction of the railway was held on December 27, 2024. Japarov called it “a historical event that gave impetus to the development of Central Asian countries.” The railway is expected to be 533 kilometers long, with 305 km running through Kyrgyzstan. 

Once completed, this new route will shave about a week off cargo delivery times. The railway will run from Kashgar through Torugart, Makmal, and Jalal-Abad to Andijan, creating a new east-west link that could integrate with Trans-Caspian routes toward Turkiye and Europe. In the longer term, it may also connect to southbound corridors toward Pakistan, although those links remain under development.

As the CKU railway’s construction progresses, the questions have shifted from the practical to the strategic: who will control the corridor’s economy? Kyrgyz discussions of logistics hubs and warehouse infrastructure demonstrate that  the corridor is already being conceptualized in Bishkek beyond mere tracks. The project currently employs over 4,000 workers and 5,000,000 units of equipment in Kyrgyzstan and includes the construction of 50 bridges and 29 tunnels. Earlier Japarov noted the CKU railway could generate $200 million in revenue for Kyrgyzstan. However, in a recent interview with the Times of Central Asia, Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s deputy prime minister, forecast $300 million annual revenue.

Bishkek’s optimism around the CKU is not limited to revenue from being a transit country. Kyrgyzstan is looking for a wider transformation in the country’s economy with an increase in the export of natural resources as well as the development of metallurgical plants and even new towns along the railroad. Baisalov noted that during the Soviet era, Kyrgyzstan’s raw materials were largely ignored in favor of other resource-rich countries and Kyrgyzstan remained agrarian. The lack of railroads has further constrained the transport of Kyrgyz raw materials from mountainous areas to markets. 

Ninety percent of the CKU in Kyrgyzstan runs through Naryn – one of the most mountainous regions in the country. In fact, 70 percent of the region is mountain ranges. It is difficult to construct a railroad through such terrain, requiring many tunnels and bridges, with complicated long-term maintenance issues. The Kyrgyz segment of the CKU risks being an expensive and operationally sensitive part of the corridor, particularly when compared to flatter and more established alternative routes.

While Kyrgyzstan is excited about becoming a transit country and looks forward to enjoying significant revenue, the challenge for Uzbekistan is avoiding becoming a simple endpoint in a China-driven corridor. Although Uzbekistan is located at the center of Central Asia and historically used to be in the heart of various trade routes, this geographic location does not guarantee centrality in modern transport routes. Modern logistics depend on infrastructure quality, border efficiency, pricing, and other conditions that are weighed in comparison to alternative routes, both land and sea. 

China dominates the corridor hierarchy, holding the majority equity in the project as well as maintaining control over the originating segment. Beijing will be the main actor in deciding routing priorities, pricing, and logistics chains. Uzbekistan risks being relegated to the downstream in the hierarchy. To generate real value out of the CKU, Tashkent needs to develop logistics hubs, warehousing centers, and, in the future, integrate the railway into broader regional corridors toward the Caspian, South Asia, and beyond. 

Absolute success is not guaranteed for the CKU, regardless of the interests of the three parties. The route to Europe from China through Central Asia is reported to be 900 km shorter than through Russia and Kazakhstan. While the railway could become a potential alternative to Russia-linked routes in light of the Ukraine war, it does not necessarily mean it will become a dominant one. The new corridor is entering a competitive environment, pitted against other established and new routes. The Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor has already increased freight volumes significantly. The mountainous areas the CKU goes through might limit its capacity, and thus it is likely that the CKU will function as a feeder or complementary route, not a standalone alternative. 

This research was supported by a Marie Curie Staff Exchange within the Horizon Europe Programme (CARSI, no: 101086415) 

Niginakhon Saida is a doctoral research fellow at MALVA Center for the Study of War, Language, and Memory at JGU Mainz.

China in Central Asia

China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway

Kyrgyzstan transportation

Uzbekistan railway projects

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