Beyond the Fighting: Leadership and Scams in the Thailand-Cambodia Crisis |
The renewed escalation in fighting between Thailand and Cambodia marks the most serious deterioration in their relations for decades. While attention has understandably focused on developments along the border, several features of the current crisis merit closer attention. In particular, questions of leadership and authority in Cambodia, as well as the growing prominence of scam operations in the conduct and justification of military action, shed light on why the conflict has unfolded as it has and what it may mean going forward.
Where is Hun Manet?
When the conflict first reignited in July, it became clear fairly quickly that Hun Sen was directing events. For those who follow Cambodian politics, it has long been apparent that Hun Sen never fully relinquished power to his son Hun Manet. Since taking over the prime ministership in 2023, Hun Manet has appeared to operate more as a day-to-day administrator of the state than as its primary political leader. In the run-up to, and during, the initial phase of the conflict, Hun Sen was highly visible – directing action from his “war room” and delivering public speeches – while Hun Manet played a more limited role, at best positioning himself as a conciliatory figure while his father took charge of the war effort.
This stands in stark contrast to the earlier flare-up of tensions during 2008-11, when Hun Manet was pushed prominently to the forefront, likely as part of a deliberate effort to build his profile, authority, and popularity in anticipation of an eventual succession.
In the most recent escalation over the past few weeks, however, Hun Manet has been conspicuously absent. In my monitoring of Cambodian and regional media, he features only minimally. Whether this reflects doubts on Hun Sen’s part about his son’s capacity, or a broader reluctance to cede the spotlight, is impossible to determine at this stage. What is clear is that this absence can only weaken Hun Manet’s domestic and international legitimacy as the succession question looms.
Moreover, given the extent to which the power of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) rests on control over the coercive apparatus and the loyalty of the military – as I have argued