Drones Offer Central Asian an Escape From Foreign Dependency |
Asia Defense | Security | Central Asia
Drones Offer Central Asian an Escape From Foreign Dependency
Central Asian states should jointly develop drone capabilities to prepare for current and future security needs.
A Turkish Baykar Bayraktar TB2
Drones are everywhere in the news and on the frontlines of the Iran-U.S. War and the Russia-Ukraine War, but their most recent use on a battlefield in Central Asia represents a long-term issue – continued dependency on foreign suppliers. The Central Asian states may just be replacing their long-term Russian security dependency with a Turkish one.
Central Asian leaders risk deepening this dependency and worsening security vulnerabilities as they announce deals with foreign suppliers that are often headquartered in a single state – Turkiye. However, developments in 2026 show that opportunities for local development and production that would benefit regional economies without offloading security responsibilities exist. Local politicians just need to invest locally.
In the 2022 border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Turkiye’s Baykar Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) played a well-publicized role. After that conflict, Bishkek decided to deepen its Turkish dependency, ordering Aksungur and Akinci platforms, both from Turkish manufacturers, TAI and Baykar, respectively. It had already ordered additional TB2s and Anka (from TAI) as well.
Drones are certainly cheaper than manned aircraft, but these imported platforms weren’t without cost. Civil servants took a pay hit to fund the purchase of the new systems. And this doesn’t factor in the cost of operations and maintenance. To keep these aircraft flying with spare parts, ammunition, and sensors will require continual funding. When buying any big-ticket item, that platform is committing the state to long-term sustainment with certain suppliers.
Given Turkiye’s mercurial defense policy in recent years, can Bishkek rely on adequate sustainment in the event of another conflict? Turkiye, a NATO ally, hoped to procure F-35s, but acquired Russian S-400s, and is reportedly trying to resell those air defense system to the UAE, before aiming to rejoin F-35 talks. In addition to the initial procurement, depending on a foreign supplier means worrying about receiving additional parts and frames to replace losses from wear and tear or combat operations.
Russia and Ukraine initially looked to foreign support for their attritive war. Tehran supplied Moscow with propeller-driven one-way attack Shahed-136 drones within the first year of the conflict. Yet, Moscow soon realized that the battlefield demanded the systems evolve. Manufacturing facilities were set up inside Russia and improvements were applied to the platform including jet power, anti-radar materials, and better guidance (the latest Russian-made version is dubbed the Geran-4/5).
A similar learning process happened on Kyiv’s side. Chinese-made DJI Mavics, Turkish TB2s, and American Switchblades provided early inventory for Ukrainian forces. Yet, soon manufacturing was moved in country and development processes brought closer to the frontlines, to incorporate the daily lessons of countermeasures, deception, and the realities of a non-permissive battlespace.
While the support systems needed to keep UAVs aloft are simpler than those required for fighters, the current Iran-U.S. War – a much more permissive environment than that in eastern Ukraine – has shown how vulnerable drones are to anti-air capabilities. The U.S. has lost 45 MQ-9 Reaper tactical UAVs, 25 percent of its fleet, since the start of the campaign. Given the years and cost to replace its vehicles, the Pentagon may just switch over to different systems altogether.
Perhaps as a response to its competition and conflict with Bishkek, Dushanbe turned to its own foreign partner to develop a UAV capability. Around the same time, in 2022, it was reported that a program to produce, likely assemble, Iranian Ababil-2s in Tajikistan, was reached. At the signing were Iranian Major General Mohammad Bagheri and Tajik Defense Minister Sherali Mirzo. Bagheri was killed in Israeli air strikes in 2025 and Mirzo was shuffled out of office the same year.
It is unclear how much progress has been made with this facility, or if this was all just a smoke screen. Yet, even if this project had gotten off the ground, it is hard to see how that would not have resulted in significant risk. Manufacturing drones for Tehran could very quickly bring banking and dollar restrictions from Washington, making such a venture a real security risk and potential big money-loser. Ultimately, this appears to be four years with only minimal progress on UAV capabilities for Tajikistan.
Given the pitfalls of foreign dependency, Central Asia may look to develop its own systems, or at the very least license the full production process for its own domestically manufactured unmanned systems. First off, the costs are not prohibitive, unlike, say, developing an armored vehicle, ship, or manned aircraft. Second, the scale and security needs in the region are sufficient to support domestic UAV production.
Third, regional states already have a start on the research, development, and manufacturing needed to make such cooperation a success. Finally, the opportunities of joint drone research and production could lead to increased security cooperation along borders and against transnational threats. Doing so will help to escape the pitfalls of learned incapacity. What’s key though is that local leaders invest in R&D domestically – not outsource solutions.
Take for example the Kyrgyz company Nanospace that announced in May 2026 plans to open a UAV........