The Koreas | Politics | East Asia

6 Takeaways From North Korea’s 9th Party Congress

The biggest takeaway: there were no groundbreaking changes, whether in foreign policy or domestic politics.

In this photo provided by North Korean state media, Kim Jong Un leads a group of delegates out of the concluding session of the Ninth Party Congress, Feb. 25, 2026.

North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress is now over. Culminating on the seventh day with a Politburo meeting, final plenary session, and a military parade, the Kim Jong Un regime concluded this once-every-five-year event with relatively modest fanfare by North Korean standards. 

Analysts will be poring through the party congress reporting for any semblance of external signaling and indications of what to expect from the Kim Jong Un regime in the coming years. While there are many important details nested within the nearly-15,000 word end-of-congress report, there were six key takeaways about North Korea’s priorities at home and abroad. Ultimately, rather than announcing a new strategic direction, the Ninth Party Congress underscored Kim Jong Un’s effort to institutionalize stability and establish a sustainable policy direction for his regime. 

Background on the Ninth Party Congress

The Ninth Party Congress took place from February 19 to 25, and North Korean state media was deliberate in revealing how the events surrounding the congress unfolded. 

It was preceded by a series of party conferences at the municipal, provincial, and central levels, where each respective party chapter elected their congressional delegates. Immediately prior to the congress, the party’s Political Bureau (or Politburo) convened to finalize the agenda. Party delegates journeyed to Pyongyang from across the country, paid homage to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, and received their credentials, at which point the event began in earnest.

The Congress followed the same general format as the Eighth Party Congress in 2021. The specific breakdown was as follows:

Day one: Opening speech and review work

Day three: Review work

Day four: Finalizing review work, amending party rules, holding party leadership elections

Day five: Central Committee meeting, sectoral policymaking work

Day six: Finalizing sectoral policymaking work

Day seven: Politburo meeting, closing speeches, military parade

There was reporting throughout the congress, but the main policy points did not come out until the publication of the lengthy final report on February 26. The military parade held on the last day was modest in comparison to other major processions, opting for a personnel-focused event rather than rolling out major weapon systems.

When taking the entire event and its reporting together, there were six key takeaways.

1: There was nothing groundbreaking from the Ninth Party Congress; rather, this was more about formalizing sustainable institutions and policy processes.

Kim Jong Un has already articulated his intent to make the party congresses a regular, quinquennial (every-five-year) event, but this party congress added procedural normalization, reduced spectacle, and focused on consistency of policy direction. 

Everything about the execution of this congress has been deliberate, from the preceding conferences at the municipal, provincial, and central level to the Politburo meetings and Central Committee activities throughout the event. Even the fact that the military parade was not over-the-top is likely part of this routinization effort. From all indications, the goal was sustainable policy-making practices, not epoch-making policy shifts.

For Kim Jong Un, stable governance equals regime survival, and he has departed from his father and grandfather in employing party congresses in this effort. While Kim Jong Il never used party congresses and Kim Il Sung reserved them for major power consolidation efforts, Kim Jong Un has now regularized them. This is another indicator of how Kim Jong Un is evolving the government he inherited from his forebears, and it signals an intent for stability over insecurity.

2: There was a notable shift in party leaders away from Kim Jong Un’s old mentors and advisors to his generational and institutional allies. 

During the Ninth Party Congress, the Kim regime swapped out a large percentage of party leadership. Several high-profile figures were removed, including longtime insiders such as Choe Ryong Hae, missile official Ri Pyong Chol, and former senior military and diplomatic figures Kim Yong Chol and Ri Son Gwon. Those departing senior postings may reflect a combination of age-related retirement, internal purges, and policy recalibration as the regime moves forward in its policy implementation. Because party positions anchor appointments across the Cabinet and military, these changes are expected to reverberate throughout the entire governing system.

At the same time, Kim elevated a mix of generational and institutional allies, reinforcing a political class closely tied to his leadership. Key individuals such as Jo Yong Won and Kim Yo Jong received prominent promotions, while trusted officials like Kim Jae Ryong, Ri Il Hwan, and Jong Kyong Thaek also advanced to senior posts. 

The reshuffle suggests that elite management mechanisms remain intact, but more importantly, it underscores a clear generational shift: Kim’s early mentors and political advisers he inherited are giving way to those individuals he has picked. The congress thus marks a transition from Kim as a consolidating successor to a mature leader shaping the long-term durability and direction of his regime.

3: There are unlikely to be any major near-term policy perturbations from North Korea. 

There was nothing in this Congress that signaled major shifts in Pyongyang’s approaches, particularly in the realms of foreign policy and security. For example, the Kim regime’s explicit mention of fortifying the “southern border” without alluding to any potential expansion in maritime areas is consistent with its approach of the past few years. Further, all other areas seem to be on track with what North Korea has already been doing, such as the “20×10 regional development policy.”

What will be notable for observers is specific objectives that the party congress identified within the broader strategic efforts. For example, items on the menu for development include the following: “ICBM complexes of ground and underwater launching… various AI unmanned attack complexes, special assets for attacking the enemy’s satellite in emergency, very powerful electronic warfare weapons systems to paralyze the enemy’s command center, and more evolved reconnaissance satellites.” The Ninth Party Congress also called for upgrading existing conventional weapon systems to make them nuclear-capable.

4: There was a renewed signal to Washington that North Korea is ready to normalize relations if the U.S. accepts its status as a sovereign, nuclear-armed state. 

This is not a new signal; rather, this is something the North Korean government has been deliberately messaging since at least 2023 when it published a Kim Yo Jong-attributed statement articulating as much. However, the fact that the Kim regime included this in the Ninth Party Congress report is notable given the White House’s repeated statements related to U.S. President Donald Trump’s willingness to meet Kim Jong Un anywhere without preconditions.

There are likely two factors driving this. The first is the North Korean hedge against the potential end of the Russia-Ukraine War, which will affect their power dynamics with the Kremlin. The second is that the Kim regime can see how the White House is engaging with the Kremlin and Beijing, likely identifying a potential window of opportunity to establish a new paradigm for North Korea-U.S. diplomacy with a Trump-led White House that appears willing to reset relations with traditional competitors and adversaries.

5: The Kim regime unequivocally messaged Seoul to reinforce its point that the old inter-Korean policy paradigm is dead and that there is no room for engagement.

The Ninth Party Congress report was clear in its rejection of past inter-Korean initiatives and denouncement of South Korea’s unwillingness to recognize two separate and sovereign states on the Korean Peninsula. This signaling came as the Lee Jae-myung administration called for revival of the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement and his goal for the two Koreas to maintain peaceful coexistence. 

Through this messaging, the Kim Jong Un regime has essentially responded to the South Korean government. Pyongyang’s demands are clear: that Seoul stop trying to revive past agreements, that they abandon unification as a policy objective, and that they change their constitution to align with the new paradigm.

In response to the party congress reporting, the South Korean government has reiterated its position that it wishes to pursue peaceful coexistence with North Korea. However, the North Korean policy position will likely generate intensified internal debate within the South Korean government as they seek some way to open the door to inter-Korean dialogue.

6: There were no major changes to the leadership hierarchy related to succession.

Prior to this party congress, there was substantial reporting on the potential elevation of Kim Jong Un’s daughter as heir to the Kim regime. This was based on a South Korean National Intelligence Service briefing to domestic lawmakers, who interpreted this as the spy agency’s formal position on the matter. Thus, many were looking at the Ninth Party Congress for signs that this succession plan was indeed coming to fruition.

While Kim Jong Un’s daughter accompanied him on the viewing platform for the end-of-congress military parade, she did not attend the actual congress, likely due to her age (she’s believed to be around 13 years old). There was no reporting from the Ninth Party Congress that would indicate a change of rules to set her up for taking on formal roles in government or receiving a nod to become the country’s next ruler.

Instead, the indicators seemed to point further away from this, namely in the amount of female representation within the party.

One of the inherent challenges to making Kim Jong Un’s daughter the successor is North Korea’s institutionalized patriarchy. Up to this point, the succession has been necessarily patrilineal, passing from father-son: from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il, and from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. If the intent was to break this chain, there likely would have been some deliberate attempt in the congress to elevate the role of women within the party, but things went the opposite direction. 

The number of female delegates dropped from 501 in 2021 to 413 this year. On stage, only three of 110 delegates were women. Although an authoritarian regime can simply impose a new rule upon its will, institutionally, there was nothing in this congress that indicated a potential succession plan involving Kim Jong Un’s daughter.

Taken together, the outcomes of the Ninth Party Congress point to a regime that is pursuing sustainable institutions and policies. It was an important event, but perhaps not one that produced the sort of groundbreaking decisions that some may have expected. Instead of rewriting the playbook, the Kim Jong Un regime has refined it, and the rest of the world now has five years – until the next party congress –to adjust.

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North Korea’s Ninth Party Congress is now over. Culminating on the seventh day with a Politburo meeting, final plenary session, and a military parade, the Kim Jong Un regime concluded this once-every-five-year event with relatively modest fanfare by North Korean standards. 

Analysts will be poring through the party congress reporting for any semblance of external signaling and indications of what to expect from the Kim Jong Un regime in the coming years. While there are many important details nested within the nearly-15,000 word end-of-congress report, there were six key takeaways about North Korea’s priorities at home and abroad. Ultimately, rather than announcing a new strategic direction, the Ninth Party Congress underscored Kim Jong Un’s effort to institutionalize stability and establish a sustainable policy direction for his regime. 

Background on the Ninth Party Congress

The Ninth Party Congress took place from February 19 to 25, and North Korean state media was deliberate in revealing how the events surrounding the congress unfolded. 

It was preceded by a series of party conferences at the municipal, provincial, and central levels, where each respective party chapter elected their congressional delegates. Immediately prior to the congress, the party’s Political Bureau (or Politburo) convened to finalize the agenda. Party delegates journeyed to Pyongyang from across the country, paid homage to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il at the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, and received their credentials, at which point the event began in earnest.

The Congress followed the same general format as the Eighth Party Congress in 2021. The specific breakdown was as follows:

Day one: Opening speech and review work

Day three: Review work

Day four: Finalizing review work, amending party rules, holding party leadership elections

Day five: Central Committee meeting, sectoral policymaking work

Day six: Finalizing sectoral policymaking work

Day seven: Politburo meeting, closing speeches, military parade

There was reporting throughout the congress, but the main policy points did not come out until the publication of the lengthy final report on February 26. The military parade held on the last day was modest in comparison to other major processions, opting for a personnel-focused event rather than rolling out major weapon systems.

When taking the entire event and its reporting together, there were six key takeaways.

1: There was nothing groundbreaking from the Ninth Party Congress; rather, this was more about formalizing sustainable institutions and policy processes.

Kim Jong Un has already articulated his intent to make the party congresses a regular, quinquennial (every-five-year) event, but this party congress added procedural normalization, reduced spectacle, and focused on consistency of policy direction. 

Everything about the execution of this congress has been deliberate, from the preceding conferences at the municipal, provincial, and central level to the Politburo meetings and Central Committee activities throughout the event. Even the fact that the military parade was not over-the-top is likely part of this routinization effort. From all indications, the goal was sustainable policy-making practices, not epoch-making policy shifts.

For Kim Jong Un, stable governance equals regime survival, and he has departed from his father and grandfather in employing party congresses in this effort. While Kim Jong Il never used party congresses and Kim Il Sung reserved them for major power consolidation efforts, Kim Jong Un has now regularized them. This is another indicator of how Kim Jong Un is evolving the government he inherited from his forebears, and it signals an intent for stability over insecurity.

2: There was a notable shift in party leaders away from Kim Jong Un’s old mentors and advisors to his generational and institutional allies. 

During the Ninth Party Congress, the Kim regime swapped out a large percentage of party leadership. Several high-profile figures were removed, including longtime insiders such as Choe Ryong Hae, missile official Ri Pyong Chol, and former senior military and diplomatic figures Kim Yong Chol and Ri Son Gwon. Those departing senior postings may reflect a combination of age-related retirement, internal purges, and policy recalibration as the regime moves forward in its policy implementation. Because party positions anchor appointments across the Cabinet and military, these changes are expected to reverberate throughout the entire governing system.

At the same time, Kim elevated a mix of generational and institutional allies, reinforcing a political class closely tied to his leadership. Key individuals such as Jo Yong Won and Kim Yo Jong received prominent promotions, while trusted officials like Kim Jae Ryong, Ri Il Hwan, and Jong Kyong Thaek also advanced to senior posts. 

The reshuffle suggests that elite management mechanisms remain intact, but more importantly, it underscores a clear generational shift: Kim’s early mentors and political advisers he inherited are giving way to those individuals he has picked. The congress thus marks a transition from Kim as a consolidating successor to a mature leader shaping the long-term durability and direction of his regime.

3: There are unlikely to be any major near-term policy perturbations from North Korea. 

There was nothing in this Congress that signaled major shifts in Pyongyang’s approaches, particularly in the realms of foreign policy and security. For example, the Kim regime’s explicit mention of fortifying the “southern border” without alluding to any potential expansion in maritime areas is consistent with its approach of the past few years. Further, all other areas seem to be on track with what North Korea has already been doing, such as the “20×10 regional development policy.”

What will be notable for observers is specific objectives that the party congress identified within the broader strategic efforts. For example, items on the menu for development include the following: “ICBM complexes of ground and underwater launching… various AI unmanned attack complexes, special assets for attacking the enemy’s satellite in emergency, very powerful electronic warfare weapons systems to paralyze the enemy’s command center, and more evolved reconnaissance satellites.” The Ninth Party Congress also called for upgrading existing conventional weapon systems to make them nuclear-capable.

4: There was a renewed signal to Washington that North Korea is ready to normalize relations if the U.S. accepts its status as a sovereign, nuclear-armed state. 

This is not a new signal; rather, this is something the North Korean government has been deliberately messaging since at least 2023 when it published a Kim Yo Jong-attributed statement articulating as much. However, the fact that the Kim regime included this in the Ninth Party Congress report is notable given the White House’s repeated statements related to U.S. President Donald Trump’s willingness to meet Kim Jong Un anywhere without preconditions.

There are likely two factors driving this. The first is the North Korean hedge against the potential end of the Russia-Ukraine War, which will affect their power dynamics with the Kremlin. The second is that the Kim regime can see how the White House is engaging with the Kremlin and Beijing, likely identifying a potential window of opportunity to establish a new paradigm for North Korea-U.S. diplomacy with a Trump-led White House that appears willing to reset relations with traditional competitors and adversaries.

5: The Kim regime unequivocally messaged Seoul to reinforce its point that the old inter-Korean policy paradigm is dead and that there is no room for engagement.

The Ninth Party Congress report was clear in its rejection of past inter-Korean initiatives and denouncement of South Korea’s unwillingness to recognize two separate and sovereign states on the Korean Peninsula. This signaling came as the Lee Jae-myung administration called for revival of the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement and his goal for the two Koreas to maintain peaceful coexistence. 

Through this messaging, the Kim Jong Un regime has essentially responded to the South Korean government. Pyongyang’s demands are clear: that Seoul stop trying to revive past agreements, that they abandon unification as a policy objective, and that they change their constitution to align with the new paradigm.

In response to the party congress reporting, the South Korean government has reiterated its position that it wishes to pursue peaceful coexistence with North Korea. However, the North Korean policy position will likely generate intensified internal debate within the South Korean government as they seek some way to open the door to inter-Korean dialogue.

6: There were no major changes to the leadership hierarchy related to succession.

Prior to this party congress, there was substantial reporting on the potential elevation of Kim Jong Un’s daughter as heir to the Kim regime. This was based on a South Korean National Intelligence Service briefing to domestic lawmakers, who interpreted this as the spy agency’s formal position on the matter. Thus, many were looking at the Ninth Party Congress for signs that this succession plan was indeed coming to fruition.

While Kim Jong Un’s daughter accompanied him on the viewing platform for the end-of-congress military parade, she did not attend the actual congress, likely due to her age (she’s believed to be around 13 years old). There was no reporting from the Ninth Party Congress that would indicate a change of rules to set her up for taking on formal roles in government or receiving a nod to become the country’s next ruler.

Instead, the indicators seemed to point further away from this, namely in the amount of female representation within the party.

One of the inherent challenges to making Kim Jong Un’s daughter the successor is North Korea’s institutionalized patriarchy. Up to this point, the succession has been necessarily patrilineal, passing from father-son: from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il, and from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. If the intent was to break this chain, there likely would have been some deliberate attempt in the congress to elevate the role of women within the party, but things went the opposite direction. 

The number of female delegates dropped from 501 in 2021 to 413 this year. On stage, only three of 110 delegates were women. Although an authoritarian regime can simply impose a new rule upon its will, institutionally, there was nothing in this congress that indicated a potential succession plan involving Kim Jong Un’s daughter.

Taken together, the outcomes of the Ninth Party Congress point to a regime that is pursuing sustainable institutions and policies. It was an important event, but perhaps not one that produced the sort of groundbreaking decisions that some may have expected. Instead of rewriting the playbook, the Kim Jong Un regime has refined it, and the rest of the world now has five years – until the next party congress –to adjust.

Michael MacArthur Bosack

Michael MacArthur Bosack is the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative and the Special Adviser for Government Relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies. He previously served as the Deputy Secretary of the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea and the Deputy Chief of Government Relations at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan. You can follow him on X (Twitter) @MikeBosack.

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