The Kissinger Tapes and China-US Rapprochement |
Interviews | Politics | East Asia
The Kissinger Tapes and China-US Rapprochement
Insights from Tom Wells.
The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Tom Wells – author of “The Kissinger Tapes: Inside His Secretly Recorded Phone Conversations” (Oxford 2026) – is the 506th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
What do Henry Kissinger’s tapes reveal about his realpolitik savoir-faire?
Kissinger’s phone transcripts show his preeminent concern for limiting Soviet influence in the world while also achieving détente with the Soviet Union. He tended to see conflicts around the world in light of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry and to overestimate the Soviet Union’s role in these conflicts, e.g., the India-Pakistan conflict, the Jordan crisis over the Palestinian insurgency there, the Vietnam War.
Morality was basically a non-factor in his policies. Advancing American national interests, as he viewed them, was central. He saw himself as maintaining a stable balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union with China being a lesser power than the Soviet Union at the time, and viewed the application of American power as critical to advancing America’s interests.
He had superior skills as a diplomat, and his fortitude in protracted negotiations was impressive, but he also used deception to achieve his goals. He seemed to care little about the human costs of his policies. In Vietnam, he was callous to civilian casualties and seemed to be concerned about them only to the extent that they provoked domestic and international condemnation.
Describe the dynamics between President Richard Nixon and Kissinger on the tapes.
Kissinger was invariably deferential to Nixon and always addressed him as “Mr. President.” He was quite disciplined about acting deferential and subservient. He praised Nixon frequently for his “toughness,” courage, insights, speeches, and so on, but Nixon doubted Kissinger’s sincerity and loyalty. They had an uneasy and mutually distrustful relationship, and there was a good deal of tension between them. Nixon was sometimes short, snappish, and impatient with Kissinger. But Kissinger couldn’t afford to act that way with Nixon: his standing with Nixon was always a major concern.
Kissinger was somewhat insecure about their relationship, which Nixon fostered, and practiced self-restraint when Nixon made dubious claims or requests, though he sometimes laughed or complained bitterly about Nixon behind his back (for example, about public remarks or orders by Nixon that he disagreed with, or over Nixon’s failure to back him in his relentless and tiresome battle with Secretary of State William Rogers). But Nixon knew Kissinger was indispensable to him and thought his many skills outweighed the headaches he caused him.
Examine the tapes’ intriguing insights into Nixon and Kissinger’s decision-making behind facilitating China-U.S. rapprochement.
Nixon and Kissinger were concerned about appearing too eager with the Chinese for fear that China would then go “back into a shell,” as Kissinger put it. Nixon wanted to play it “very cool and aloof” with the Chinese, while conveying that the door to rapprochement was now open. “We’re not going overboard but we’re saying, well, if they open the door, we’ll open the door,” Nixon told Kissinger.
They hoped that opening relations with China, including holding a........