The EU’s China Fault Line Runs Through Spain |
Europe’s China debate has become a test of how far the Union can turn a broad strategic consensus into coherent action. Since 2019, Brussels has framed China as a cooperation partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival – an institutionalized hedge that seeks flexibility rather than binary alignment. Spain has internalized this logic, but in a manner that reflects its own political economy. It supports the EU’s economic-security agenda, yet avoids steps that could entrench an open-ended confrontation or expose key domestic sectors to retaliation.
This posture can be described as a “Europeanist hedge.” Madrid’s China policy is neither revisionist nor evasive; it accepts the EU’s problem diagnosis and the language of de-risking, but translates both into a strategy that privileges negotiated off-ramps, risk-managed engagement, and EU-anchored solutions over unilateral hardening. Crucially, this hedge does not deny coercion risks; it seeks to manage them in ways that are politically sustainable for a “non-frontline” member state.
Such an approach unfolds across two levels. At the EU level, Spain bargains within a framework it broadly endorses. At home, policymakers confront sectoral exposure, an industrial strategy centered on the green transition, and coalition dynamics that temper the appetite for escalation. These constraints do not produce obstructionism, but subtler forms of moderation: abstentions rather than vetoes, calibrated implementation rather than maximalist enforcement, and persistent pressure for negotiated outcomes once retaliation becomes credible.
Seen through the lens of weaponized interdependence, this behavior is intelligible. Asymmetric positions in trade, finance and technology networks give external actors leverage over specific EU member states. The central analytical question is therefore not whether Spain is “soft” or “hard” on China, but how EU economic-security policy internalizes – or fails to internalize – the distributive politics that shape such hedging behavior across the Union.
From EU Doctrine to Spanish Strategy: Doctrinal Alignment Without Maximalism
At the EU level, the 2019 “EU–China: A Strategic Outlook” classified China simultaneously as a cooperation partner, an economic competitor, and a systemic rival, and called for a flexible but united European approach. Later debates about “de-risking, not decoupling” have been presented as a calibrated extension of this framework rather than a rupture.
Spanish strategy documents broadly internalize this logic. The 2021 National Security Strategy treats the Indo-Pacific as an arena of intensifying great power competition, emphasizes risks tied to critical dependencies and hybrid threats, and situates Spain’s China posture firmly within EU and allied frameworks. China is not treated as a singular, overriding military threat; rather, it is framed as a systemic challenge that intersects with economic security, technology and multilateral governance.
In parallel, Spanish foreign policy analysis – most prominently from the Real Instituto Elcano – describes Spain’s China policy as “informal” but coherent: explicitly Europeanist, broadly loyal to EU and NATO........