Tokyo Report | Diplomacy | East Asia

Is Japan Decoupling From China?  

The new generation of Japanese policymakers is far less willing to accommodate China than its predecessors.

Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae (left) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a meeting on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Gyeongju, South Korea, Oct. 31, 2025.

Japan’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) began before formal diplomatic relations were established. Although diplomatic relations were not normalized until 1972, the two countries had already created an unofficial trade mechanism in 1962 that enabled bilateral trade despite the absence of mutual diplomatic recognition.

In a famous article published in Foreign Affairs in 1967, former U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon argued that “we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations.” At the time, Japan’s China policy had already been moving in that direction, going beyond even the policy imagination of its closest ally, the United States.

This was despite intense diplomatic pressure from the United States, which remained firmly anti-communist. Throughout the 1960s, Washington publicly opposed Japan’s efforts to normalize relations with one of its closest neighbors and discouraged any move toward diplomatic recognition of the PRC. The “shock” caused by Nixon’s announcement of his planned visit to mainland China in 1971 stemmed, in part, from Japanese frustration that this policy framework toward China – shaped and constrained by U.S. diplomatic pressure against Japan’s preference – was abruptly reversed without prior consultation with Tokyo.

After normalization, Japan and China entered a honeymoon period in which their relationship resembled a quasi-alliance, rooted in their shared distrust of the Soviet Union as a common adversary. This perception was also shared by the United States, which intensified its pressure against Moscow as Cold War tensions began to rise. From the late 1970s through the 1980s, Japan expanded its industrial assistance to China, while the United States strengthened military cooperation with Beijing, including transfers of military technology. These developments highlight the strategic importance that both Japan and the United States placed on their relationship with China.

A turning point in China-Japan relations came on June 4, 1989, when the People’s Liberation Army moved into Tiananmen Square to suppress student protesters. Images of the violence were broadcast around the world, prompting the U.S.-led Western bloc to impose sanctions in response to China’s violent crackdown. 

Although Japan suspended its aid program to China, it was reluctant to fully participate in broader sanctions. It was Japan, at the critical G7 summit in Paris, that took the lead in preventing China’s complete isolation from the international community. Its efforts resulted in the inclusion of the following sentence in the summit declaration: “We look to the Chinese authorities to create conditions which will avoid their isolation and provide for a return to cooperation based upon the resumption of movement towards political and economic reform, and openness.” At that critical juncture, Japan was prepared to break with the emerging Western consensus in order to prevent China from being pushed back into international isolation.

The history reviewed above is essential for understanding the current state of China-Japan relations. Since the 1960s, the two nations have consistently maintained some level of economic exchange despite the political circumstances of each period. The characterization of their relationship as “hot economics and cold politics” has been a defining feature of bilateral ties, particularly over the past several decades. During the 1980s, and especially in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, a strategic dimension also helped sustain the partnership, as both countries continued to view their relationship through the lens of shared geopolitical interests.

However, when examining the China-Japan relationship today, it may be more accurately described as one of “cooling economics and colder politics” – a trajectory that relations had not previously taken.

The turn of events can be traced back to Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae’s controversial statements in late 2025 hinting at the possible deployment of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in the event of a crisis surrounding Taiwan. Some have argued that Takaichi’s remarks were bold and resolute, while others have criticized them as insensitive to China’s red lines and emblematic of her tendency toward gaffes. Regardless of the interpretation, what is clear is that Beijing was provoked by Takaichi’s statements and has sought to apply maximum pressure on Japan in response.

Even after Takaichi’s electoral victory in early 2026, China has continued to exert pressure on critical........

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