Asia Defense | Security | South Asia

Why Is Afghanistan Developing a Drone Industry?

Air and air-defense capabilities remain Afghanistan’s most vulnerable security component. 

A U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper aircraft.

Air superiority has become an increasingly decisive factor in modern warfare. This was clearly demonstrated in the ongoing Afghanistan-Pakistan confrontation of March-February 2026, and was previously evident in October 2025, when Pakistan’s air force effectively took control of Afghan airspace, exposing the Taliban’s critical weaknesses in this domain. 

Against this backdrop, the Taliban are likely to seek the development of air capabilities and air-defense systems in the near term. Under current constraints, however, the movement appears to be prioritizing the development of unmanned systems, which likely represents a temporary and tactical response to its defense limitations.

The development of an air force in Afghanistan is closely linked to the Soviet Union. In the 1950s, with Soviet assistance, Bagram Air Base was constructed, becoming a core element of the country’s aviation infrastructure. During the 1979-1989 war, the Afghan army and air force had largely been equipped and trained by the Soviet Union.

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks and the entry of U.S.-led forces, a new government under Hamid Karzai was established and received American military equipment and support. Twenty years later, after the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, military assets worth an estimated $7.2 billion remained in Taliban hands, including at least 78 aircraft.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan Conflict

A key destabilizing factor in Afghanistan remains the activity of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which seeks to establish its authority within Pakistan and constitutes one of the main sources of tension in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Islamabad accuses the Taliban of supporting the TTP, while the Afghan side rejects these claims.

As TTP militants operate on both sides of the Durand Line, Pakistan has carried out repeated airstrikes, including in the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Nangarhar. Afghanistan has responded in kind, resulting in a continuing armed confrontation. On February 22 Pakistani forces conducted airstrikes on Nangarhar and Paktika, causing the deaths and injuries of dozens of people. Additional strikes were also carried out in Kabul and Kandahar, further escalating the situation and deepening the crisis between the two sides.

An earlier escalation in October 2025 proved particularly significant, as it exposed Afghanistan’s growing vulnerability vis-à-vis Pakistan. Pakistani special forces conducted an airstrike in Kabul, targeting a vehicle linked to TTP leader Noor Ali Mehsud. Although Mehsud survived, the incident underscored the near-total lack of effective airspace protection in Afghanistan. This was not an isolated case. In 2022, al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in Kabul by a U.S. drone strike.

Given its international isolation, Taliban-run Afghanistan is unable to establish a sustainable air-defense system to protect its airspace. Decades of conflict and the presence of terrorist organizations have made the international community highly cautious and unwilling to invest in Afghanistan’s military sector since the Taliban’s 2021 return to power. The development of air capabilities is further constrained by the fact that most existing aircraft are of U.S. origin and require access to technologies, spare parts, and maintenance services that are currently unavailable. 

The acquisition of new aircraft is unrealistic, first due to the absence of willing suppliers and second because of Afghanistan’s limited economic capacity to sustain such expenditures. 

As a result, the Taliban have relied on ground-based tactics along the Pakistani border: in response to airstrikes, ground forces and armored units are deployed to conduct cross-border attacks. This approach remains a temporary and largely ineffective solution. It is precisely these limitations that have reinforced the Taliban’s perceived need to expand its air capabilities via unmanned systems. 

“Drones Instead of Butter”

Afghanistan possesses several structural prerequisites for developing a drone sector. The country retains infrastructure from former NATO bases and has accumulated significant engineering and technical expertise shaped by decades of conflict. Prolonged warfare has produced a pool of military engineers capable of assembling and modifying unmanned systems without external assistance. Afghan officials, including the minister of education, have repeatedly emphasized the urgent need to train domestic specialists to develop modern air and air-defense capabilities.

The Taliban have been actively pursuing indigenous drone development. Assembly reportedly takes place at Camp Phoenix on the outskirts of Kabul, a former U.S. military base, while testing has occurred at a site in Logar province previously used by British forces. The program is said to draw on the experiences of Turkiye, China, Russia, and Iran. Initiated at least four years ago, the effort allegedly operates through a front company, Dinit Technology, which recruits specialists and sources civilian-grade components – such as GPS modules, motors, flight controllers, and sensors – via black markets and smuggling networks for military adaptation.

For benchmarking, the program reportedly references U.S. MQ-9 Reaper and Iranian Shahed-136 platforms. In December 2025, Afghanistan is said to have tested a stealth-capable drone with reduced radar visibility. Earlier, in 2022, the Taliban presented the Mobin drone, claimed to carry a payload of up to 70 kilograms. Notably, the Taliban government shows particular interest in kamikaze drones, highlighted by its attention to Turkish Roketsan systems showcased at the Doha defense exhibition in January 2026.

Although Afghanistan’s economy is ill-suited for mass drone production, the government may still allocate substantial budgetary resources toward this priority. Echoing the historical logic of “guns instead of butter,” the Afghan approach could evolve into a “drones instead of butter” model – elevating military spending at the cost of curtailing socio-economic expenditures. 

The Taliban’s pursuit of indigenous drone capabilities is driven in part by the intensified external surveillance of Afghan airspace in recent years. According to available reports, foreign unmanned aerial vehicles have been regularly observed over the provinces of Ghazni and Wardak, as well as in the Panjshir and Kapisa regions. It was also reported that on January 1 that an MQ-9 Reaper drone crashed in Maidan Wardak province, approximately 40 kilometers from Kabul. The aircraft was widely assessed as belonging to the United States.

The primary mission of U.S. drones in the region is aerial surveillance and the monitoring of terrorist networks such as al-Qaida and Islamic State Khorasan Province, against which Washington continues to conduct counterterrorism operations.

At the same time, the expansion of air and unmanned capabilities carries serious risks, particularly the potential proliferation of such technologies to terrorist organizations. In January 2026, for example, the TTP reportedly announced the creation of its own “air force” unit during an internal meeting. Earlier, in 2025, TTP militants had already employed drones in attacks against Pakistan. These developments have heightened regional and international concerns over the further militarization and diffusion of drone technologies in Afghanistan.

Air and air-defense capabilities remain Afghanistan’s most vulnerable security component. U.S. aerial patrols and the ongoing confrontation with Pakistan have accelerated the Taliban’s shift toward ground forces and unmanned systems, particularly loitering munitions.

Iran and Russia could emerge as potential partners in this domain, as their own international isolation may lead them to view Afghanistan as a prospective arena for military-technical cooperation. The ongoing conflicts in which both are involved – Russia in Ukraine and Iran’s conflict with the U.S. and its allies across the Middle East – will arguably hamper the development of such cooperation in the short term. Meanwhile, the continued presence of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan makes further militarization highly risky for regional and international security.

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Air superiority has become an increasingly decisive factor in modern warfare. This was clearly demonstrated in the ongoing Afghanistan-Pakistan confrontation of March-February 2026, and was previously evident in October 2025, when Pakistan’s air force effectively took control of Afghan airspace, exposing the Taliban’s critical weaknesses in this domain. 

Against this backdrop, the Taliban are likely to seek the development of air capabilities and air-defense systems in the near term. Under current constraints, however, the movement appears to be prioritizing the development of unmanned systems, which likely represents a temporary and tactical response to its defense limitations.

The development of an air force in Afghanistan is closely linked to the Soviet Union. In the 1950s, with Soviet assistance, Bagram Air Base was constructed, becoming a core element of the country’s aviation infrastructure. During the 1979-1989 war, the Afghan army and air force had largely been equipped and trained by the Soviet Union.

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks and the entry of U.S.-led forces, a new government under Hamid Karzai was established and received American military equipment and support. Twenty years later, after the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces, military assets worth an estimated $7.2 billion remained in Taliban hands, including at least 78 aircraft.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan Conflict

A key destabilizing factor in Afghanistan remains the activity of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which seeks to establish its authority within Pakistan and constitutes one of the main sources of tension in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations. Islamabad accuses the Taliban of supporting the TTP, while the Afghan side rejects these claims.

As TTP militants operate on both sides of the Durand Line, Pakistan has carried out repeated airstrikes, including in the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Nangarhar. Afghanistan has responded in kind, resulting in a continuing armed confrontation. On February 22 Pakistani forces conducted airstrikes on Nangarhar and Paktika, causing the deaths and injuries of dozens of people. Additional strikes were also carried out in Kabul and Kandahar, further escalating the situation and deepening the crisis between the two sides.

An earlier escalation in October 2025 proved particularly significant, as it exposed Afghanistan’s growing vulnerability vis-à-vis Pakistan. Pakistani special forces conducted an airstrike in Kabul, targeting a vehicle linked to TTP leader Noor Ali Mehsud. Although Mehsud survived, the incident underscored the near-total lack of effective airspace protection in Afghanistan. This was not an isolated case. In 2022, al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in Kabul by a U.S. drone strike.

Given its international isolation, Taliban-run Afghanistan is unable to establish a sustainable air-defense system to protect its airspace. Decades of conflict and the presence of terrorist organizations have made the international community highly cautious and unwilling to invest in Afghanistan’s military sector since the Taliban’s 2021 return to power. The development of air capabilities is further constrained by the fact that most existing aircraft are of U.S. origin and require access to technologies, spare parts, and maintenance services that are currently unavailable. 

The acquisition of new aircraft is unrealistic, first due to the absence of willing suppliers and second because of Afghanistan’s limited economic capacity to sustain such expenditures. 

As a result, the Taliban have relied on ground-based tactics along the Pakistani border: in response to airstrikes, ground forces and armored units are deployed to conduct cross-border attacks. This approach remains a temporary and largely ineffective solution. It is precisely these limitations that have reinforced the Taliban’s perceived need to expand its air capabilities via unmanned systems. 

“Drones Instead of Butter”

Afghanistan possesses several structural prerequisites for developing a drone sector. The country retains infrastructure from former NATO bases and has accumulated significant engineering and technical expertise shaped by decades of conflict. Prolonged warfare has produced a pool of military engineers capable of assembling and modifying unmanned systems without external assistance. Afghan officials, including the minister of education, have repeatedly emphasized the urgent need to train domestic specialists to develop modern air and air-defense capabilities.

The Taliban have been actively pursuing indigenous drone development. Assembly reportedly takes place at Camp Phoenix on the outskirts of Kabul, a former U.S. military base, while testing has occurred at a site in Logar province previously used by British forces. The program is said to draw on the experiences of Turkiye, China, Russia, and Iran. Initiated at least four years ago, the effort allegedly operates through a front company, Dinit Technology, which recruits specialists and sources civilian-grade components – such as GPS modules, motors, flight controllers, and sensors – via black markets and smuggling networks for military adaptation.

For benchmarking, the program reportedly references U.S. MQ-9 Reaper and Iranian Shahed-136 platforms. In December 2025, Afghanistan is said to have tested a stealth-capable drone with reduced radar visibility. Earlier, in 2022, the Taliban presented the Mobin drone, claimed to carry a payload of up to 70 kilograms. Notably, the Taliban government shows particular interest in kamikaze drones, highlighted by its attention to Turkish Roketsan systems showcased at the Doha defense exhibition in January 2026.

Although Afghanistan’s economy is ill-suited for mass drone production, the government may still allocate substantial budgetary resources toward this priority. Echoing the historical logic of “guns instead of butter,” the Afghan approach could evolve into a “drones instead of butter” model – elevating military spending at the cost of curtailing socio-economic expenditures. 

The Taliban’s pursuit of indigenous drone capabilities is driven in part by the intensified external surveillance of Afghan airspace in recent years. According to available reports, foreign unmanned aerial vehicles have been regularly observed over the provinces of Ghazni and Wardak, as well as in the Panjshir and Kapisa regions. It was also reported that on January 1 that an MQ-9 Reaper drone crashed in Maidan Wardak province, approximately 40 kilometers from Kabul. The aircraft was widely assessed as belonging to the United States.

The primary mission of U.S. drones in the region is aerial surveillance and the monitoring of terrorist networks such as al-Qaida and Islamic State Khorasan Province, against which Washington continues to conduct counterterrorism operations.

At the same time, the expansion of air and unmanned capabilities carries serious risks, particularly the potential proliferation of such technologies to terrorist organizations. In January 2026, for example, the TTP reportedly announced the creation of its own “air force” unit during an internal meeting. Earlier, in 2025, TTP militants had already employed drones in attacks against Pakistan. These developments have heightened regional and international concerns over the further militarization and diffusion of drone technologies in Afghanistan.

Air and air-defense capabilities remain Afghanistan’s most vulnerable security component. U.S. aerial patrols and the ongoing confrontation with Pakistan have accelerated the Taliban’s shift toward ground forces and unmanned systems, particularly loitering munitions.

Iran and Russia could emerge as potential partners in this domain, as their own international isolation may lead them to view Afghanistan as a prospective arena for military-technical cooperation. The ongoing conflicts in which both are involved – Russia in Ukraine and Iran’s conflict with the U.S. and its allies across the Middle East – will arguably hamper the development of such cooperation in the short term. Meanwhile, the continued presence of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan makes further militarization highly risky for regional and international security.

Islomkhon Gafarov, Ph.D. in political science, is a policy analyst at the Center for Progressive Reforms, and a senior lecturer at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Saidakbar Shamsiev is an associated researcher at the Center for Progressive Reforms, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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