ASEAN Beat | Diplomacy | Southeast Asia

Vietnam’s Expanding Strategic Partnerships: Why Canada Could Be Next

Recent developments suggest that the two middle-powers are on the cusp of an important diplomatic upgrade.

Canadian Ambassador Jim Nickel presents his diplomatic credentials to Vietnamese President Luong Cuong in Hanoi, Vietnam, Oct. 3, 2025.

Vietnam organizes its foreign relations into a three-tier hierarchy: Comprehensive Partnerships (CPs) sit at the base, Strategic Partnerships (SPs) in the middle, and Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSPs) at the top. This sits alongside a category of special relationships with Cold War-era allies Laos, Cambodia, and Cuba.

Hanoi’s “bamboo diplomacy,” flexible in form but firm at its roots, has expanded all three categories at a remarkable pace. As of early 2026, Vietnam has 15 CSPs, following the upgrade of relations with the European Union in January 2026, alongside 15 SPs and 17 CPs. This network now touches every continent and every major power center, from Washington and Beijing to Moscow, Brussels, London, and Canberra.

The question that naturally follows is: who is next? Vietnam has not filled every available slot on its diplomatic hierarchy, and Hanoi has made clear – through the CPTPP chairmanship it holds in 2026 and the APEC hosting role it takes on in 2027 – that it intends to keep climbing. There are three reasons why Canada may be the next nation in line for a diplomatic upgrade.

The first is structural. Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy increasingly resembles that of other “middle powers” – states too large to be ignored but not seeking hegemony, which instead build resilience through diversified, non-aligned partnerships. Analysts have already grouped Vietnam alongside Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and Switzerland as countries capable of maintaining deep ties with rival great powers simultaneously. If Vietnam is consciously cultivating this identity, it has an incentive to deepen ties specifically with other middle powers that share its instinct for strategic autonomy rather than bloc alignment — and Canada is one of the clearest examples of that category on the world stage today.

The second reason is geographic. Vietnam’s CSP network is heavily concentrated in Asia and Europe. Of its 30 SPs and CSPs, only two are in the Americas: the United States as a CSP and Brazil as an SP. For a country pursuing “multi-directional” diplomacy and actively courting new markets to reduce its dependence on any single economy, this is a conspicuous gap. Creating a second North American SP or CSP would meaningfully reduce the imbalance and enhance Vietnam’s global footprint and give it a more credible claim to truly global reach.

Third, Vietnam already holds strategic-level partnerships with six of the seven G-7 members, namely the United States (CSP), Japan (CSP), Germany (SP), France (CSP), the United Kingdom (CSP), and Italy (SP). Canada is the only G7 economy with which Vietnam has not yet formalized a strategic-tier relationship; the two countries currently sit at the lower “Comprehensive Partnership” level. In the meantime, Vietnam’s foreign policy attaches importance to promoting relationships with “major powers and important partners.” Obviously, Vietnam sees Canada as “an important partner.”

Taken together, these three reasons converge on a single conclusion: among Vietnam’s plausible next upgrades, Canada is the most logical choice.

Indeed, what makes this more than a........

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