Australia’s Submarine Problems |
Oceania | Security | Oceania
Australia’s Submarine Problems
In 2009, the Australian government recognized the need to replace its aging Collins-class submarines. What followed has been a mess of indecision, changing plans, and squandered opportunities.
HMAS Farncomb docking at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, in June 2012.
Procuring a new submarine fleet has been a persistent problem for Australia’s defense strategy for almost two decades. In 2009, the government of Kevin Rudd commissioned a defense white paper that recognized the need for Australia to replace its aging Collins-class submarines, as well as expand the fleet from six boats to 12. What followed has been a mess of indecision, changing plans, and squandered opportunities. All of this has left the maritime nation, highly dependent on the Indo-Pacific’s sea lines of communication, without the adequate hardware to defend its own interests.
From the initial negotiations with Japan to construct a new fleet, to the agreement with France to produce 12 diesel-powered Attack-class submarines – which was cancelled in favor of AUKUS after work had commenced – Canberra continually returned itself to square one. Now all six Collins-class boats are expected to remain in service into the early 2040s, when the first nuclear-powered AUKUS-class submarines are scheduled to become operational. Submarines that first entered service in the 1990s will be asked to serve for half a century.
This has put the government in a bind. Previously, the government sought to invest in a “life-of-type extension” (LOTE) program for the Collins-class submarines. However, at a speech for the Lowy Institute in Melbourne this week, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defense Richard Marles announced a significant $7.8 billion refocus of the program.
Rather than replacing major systems across the fleet – including diesel engines and generators – the government will now adopt what it calls a “conditions-based sustainment” approach. Each submarine will be individually assessed and upgraded only where deemed strictly necessary, with priority placed on combat systems, weapons, and sensors.
The stated rationale is pragmatic: reduce engineering risk, shorten maintenance periods, and maximize operational availability during the critical bridging period before the nuclear submarines arrive. HMAS Farncomb, due to retire at the end of May, will instead undergo a detailed engineering assessment, though it is not expected to return to active service for at least two years.
The case for the life extension........