Invoking History: Xi Jinping’s Challenge to Okinawan Sovereignty and the US-Japan Alliance

On June 4, 2023, Xi Jinping visited a national archive in Beijing where he commented on a 16th-century Chinese diplomatic document related to Ryukyu (present-day Okinawa): “When I was working in Fuzhou, I knew that the city had the Ryukyu residence and tombs, that its connections with Ryukyu ran deep, and that thirty-six clans from Fujian had gone to Ryukyu.” 

Beyond reflexive invocations of Taiwan and the complicated local relationship with U.S. basing on the island, China’s historical perspective regarding Okinawa remains poorly understood in Washington — a lack of understanding that has significant, but unaddressed, security implications.

Xi’s statement quickly attracted international attention as “the first that [he] has publicly made on the Ryukyu Islands since he took office.” Xi’s statement might be considered, on the one hand, a countermeasure to Japan’s increasingly unambiguous stance toward Taiwan, or a part of China’s “Ryukyu Undetermined Status Theory” (a doctrine claiming the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and thus Japan’s claim on Okinawa, is invalid) on the other. Yet this approach is unlikely to impact directly on Okinawan sentiment. 

Rather, Beijing’s general disinformation campaign against Japan is indirectly focused on supporting pro-Okinawan independence, confirming Okinawa remains key to China’s strategic vision of its periphery. That interpretation is further supported by Xi’s timing. Although Okinawa has anchored U.S. forward presence in the Pacific since 1945, Washington’s diminished commitment to its allies suggests China’s campaign is a challenge not only to Japanese sovereignty but also to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Washington, to be sufficiently positioned to respond to China’s agenda, needs to fully understand how the tributary relationship espoused in the 16th-century documents, compounded by a straining U.S.-Japan relationship, represents significant implications for strategic alliances and cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Strategic Origins

The documents Xi reviewed at the archive originate in a centuries-long tributary relationship between China and Okinawa. In the late 14th century, the newly established Ming Empire (1368–1644) began receiving tribute missions from the Ryukyu Kingdom. Since the Ming court enforced a maritime ban restricting foreign trade to designated tributary states, Ryukyu became a privileged intermediary. Any powers seeking commerce with China had to do so through Ryukyu. 

This arrangement brought considerable prosperity and left behind an archive of diplomatic documents in Chinese — like those Xi referenced. Such wealth and privileges, however, drew the attention of the Satsuma Domain in present-day Kagoshima, Japan. In 1609, Satsuma invaded Ryukyu, bringing it under its suzerainty.

Thereafter, Ryukyu entered a state of dual subordination to China and Japan. Satsuma exercised considerable control over Ryukyu’s domestic affairs, including royal succession, with Ryukyu’s kings answering ultimately to the Tokugawa Shogunate. Yet China remained unaware of this new political arrangement and continued to treat Ryukyu as a tributary state. When Ryukyuan envoys travelled to China, they wore Chinese dress; when Chinese envoys visited Ryukyu, the court adopted Chinese robes and rituals. In practice, while Ryukyu was nominally a tributary state to China, Japanese authority pervaded the island’s politics and culture.

Dual subordination ended in the late 19th century. After the........

© The Diplomat