Transition Without Change: Kazakhstan’s Tokayev Era

Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, succeeded in maintaining his hold on power for decades but failed to establish a robust mechanism to safeguard his position after stepping down from the presidency in March 2019. The mass protests of January 2022 shattered his remaining legitimacy and led to the true transfer of power to his successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. 

Tokayev not only ensured the regime’s survival but also consolidated his authority by promoting a narrative that pitted the “old” against the “new” Kazakhstan, thereby reframing the succession arrangements with his predecessor. Since then, the super-presidential political system he inherited has undergone no substantive change, leaving him to eventually confront a dilemma: whether to remain in power or transfer it, and how to ensure his own safety either way.

Reframed Succession

At the height of the January 2022 crisis, as thousands of protesters occupied the streets of major cities and chanted “old man, go away,” it became evident that Nazarbayev’s nephews, who at the time controlled the security forces, had failed to contain the protests and the resulting political fallout for the family. The scale and character of the protests completely eroded the Nazarbayevs’ legitimacy not only among the broader public but also within segments of the elite, particularly those excluded from access to resources. 

The crisis thereby exposed pre-existing divisions within Nazarbayev’s inner circle, especially between members of his family and groups aligned with Tokayev, who ascended to the presidency in 2019 following Nazarbayev’s resignation. Any further political stabilization, and ultimately the survival of the regime, even with the harsh suppression of protests and the presence of Russian troops (formally under the CSTO umbrella), required Nazarbayev’s resignation as head of the Security Council and the transfer of the powers he’d retained past his presidency to Tokayev. The Kremlin appears to have recognized this as well. 

To ensure his own safety and the security of his assets, Nazarbayev now had to depend on guarantees from his successor. Tokayev, in turn, faced the task of consolidating power, which involved appointing loyal figures to key positions in state institutions, establishing control over the main financial flows in the economy, and reshaping the regime’s image by distancing himself from Nazarbayev. To this end, alongside promises to restore social justice and return assets, a narrative of “New Kazakhstan,” set in opposition to the “old” one, was promoted to gain public support. 

In the new configuration of power, the people on whom Nazarbayev had previously relied, including members of his family and close associates, were required to vacate their official posts in government, state companies, and the presidential party Nur Otan (later renamed Amanat). Meanwhile, the former head of the National Security Committee and close associate of the first president, Karim Masimov, was accused of treason and an attempted seizure of power, and became the main scapegoat blamed as responsible for the January events.

The 2022 constitutional reforms announced by Tokayev were primarily aimed at preserving presidential powers and strengthening his control over the bureaucracy, while introducing only limited formal changes, such as the restoration of the Constitutional Court, a ban on close relatives of the president holding government positions, and the institution of a single seven-year presidential term. Since these reforms fell short of public expectations for political........

© The Diplomat