What Would OPCON Transfer Mean for the UN Command in Korea? |
The transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the South Korea (formally the Republic of Korea, or ROK) once again is a widespread topic of discussion and debate in Washington and Seoul. Although OPCON transition in one form or another has been an official alliance policy for two decades, if not longer, its implementation has been fitful. A constellation of cross-cutting variables has shaped the policy process, at times propelling it forward and at others obstructing it. Successive U.S. and South Korean administrations have been inconsistent in how and to what extent they have prioritized OPCON transition, largely because of the cacophonous operation of the different variables.
Recent political transitions in Washington and Seoul brought into office policymakers eager to prioritize once more the policy of wartime OPCON transition, if driven by distinct and potentially clashing motivations. That U.S. and South Korean officials appear to have linked OPCON transition with a broader modernization of the alliance could be a positive development, especially considering that changes to the alliance’s military command architecture reflect – and will affect – core aspects of the relationship. Nonetheless, analysts and policymakers must consider the array of variables surrounding OPCON transition and the complex ways they have interacted in the past and very likely will in the future. Otherwise, they will produce poor analysis and potentially counterproductive or even destabilizing policy.
This series of articles explores each of the key variables that have shaped the policy process around OPCON transition and how they have aligned or clashed with one another to either advance or complicate – if not outright delay – the policy. Previous articles explored the “control rod” logic, South Korean “sovereignty narrative,” variations in alliance command structures over the last 20 years, and how the language around the Condition-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP) has evolved over time.
This article focuses on the role of the U.S.-led United Nations Command in a post-OPCON transition environment. The final article will examine how OPCON transition relates to the regional role of US forces and the alliance.
Originally, the United Nations Command (UNC) was the unified, multinational command established in the early stages of the Korean War. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) – through UNSC Resolution 84 (UNSCR 84) and pursuant to UNSCRs 82 and 83 – recommended U.N. member states make available military forces or other assistance to a unified command, requested the United States designate the commander, and authorized the unified command to fly the U.N. flag during its operations against North Korea. Sixteen UNC Sending States provided forces to the command, and five others provided humanitarian or medical assistance.
Most ROK military forces were under the U.S.-led UNC’s OPCON during the Korean War and for a quarter century thereafter, during which the UNC was both the alliance’s warfighting command and enforced the armistice. Yet as UNC Sending States withdrew their forces and reduced their commitment to the UNC following the Korean War, and South Korea advanced its military capabilities, the South Korea-U.S. alliance developed a new command architecture.
With its establishment in 1978, the bilateral South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) became the alliance’s warfighting command. The defense of South Korea shifted from the UNC – which held mostly unilateral OPCON over ROK forces – primarily to the alliance’s combined command structure, within which OPCON was more jointly guided, albeit still under the strategic command of a four-star U.S. general. Thereafter, the UNC’s main priority was the enforcement and maintenance of the armistice.
With the 1994 transfer of peacetime or armistice OPCON, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) took over day-to-day security of the Korean Peninsula, fully removing its force from any form of UNC OPCON.
The current alliance policy of wartime OPCON transition is primarily about a shift in leadership from the current U.S.-led CFC to the South Korea-led Future CFC (F-CFC). While the transition could strengthen Seoul’s relative position within the alliance’s combined defense posture, it will not change the fact that the United States will continue to lead the UNC.
Nor will OPCON transition alter the UNC’s main priorities: enforcing and maintaining the armistice; maintaining UNC Sending States’ cohesion and international support for the South Korea-U.S. alliance; maintaining access to UNC-Rear bases in Japan; and establishing procedures to coordinate UNC Sending State force flow and force generation in........