The Iran War Mediation and Pakistan’s ‘Reverse Bismarck’ |
The Pulse | Diplomacy | South Asia
The Iran War Mediation and Pakistan’s ‘Reverse Bismarck’
Despite the positive optics of punching above its weight in diplomacy, Pakistan has become weaker over time.
Pakistan’s stature has been on the rise amid reports of its mediating role during the ongoing Iran conflict. Last weekend it hosted the foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, other key states that are seeking to bring an end to the hostilities. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar has just visited China where he met his counterpart Wang Yi, and both countries issued a five-point plan “for restoring peace and stability in the Guld and Middle East region.” This builds on earlier visits by Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir – Trump’s self-professed “favorite field marshal” – to Washington, D.C. last year.
Proactive Rather Than Passive Strategic Autonomy
Islamabad has long practiced a proactive strategic autonomy, in contrast to India’s more passive strategic autonomy. Where New Delhi keeps its distance from key global flashpoints, Islamabad is happy to jump in. History is replete with examples: Pakistan’s joining the U.S.-led anti-communist Baghdad Pact in the 1950s; facilitating the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the late 1960s and 1970s; allying with the United States in countering the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and U.S.-led “War on Terror” in the 2000s, all while maintaining its “all weather” relationship with China and pursuing deepening relations with the Islamic world. Recent developments demonstrate the dexterity of Pakistan’s foreign policy and build on those earlier actions.
Focusing on the Middle East, Pakistan has maintained a longstanding role in the region. It has provided security assistance to Saudi Arabia since the 1950s, culminating in the announcement of a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between both countries last year. Former Pakistan Army Chief Raheel Sharif has led the Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition (IMCTC), a 43-nation coalition since it was established in 2017. Pakistan joined the Trump administration’s Gaza Board of Peace earlier this year. Its nuclear weapons capability has often been referred to as an “Islamic bomb.”
Were Pakistan to play a role in bringing an end to the Iran conflict that has upended global commodity markets, global air travel and the security of the Middle East, its standing on the world stage would undoubtedly go up. Aside from its enhanced status with the United States and Islamic world, Islamabad would likely also gain material benefits in the form of financial assistance to support its ailing economy and possibly a string of new defense deals with the United States. In the context of its perennial rivalry with India, many would also see a diplomatic victory for Islamabad as a diplomatic defeat for New Delhi (although such a zero-sum narrative is overly simplistic).
To be sure, success remains elusive given the highly fluid situation. Amid reports of a potential U.S. ground invasion of Iranian territory and the Houthis joining the conflict, Islamabad’s efforts could amount to naught. Moreover, there are several underlying contradictions in Pakistan’s role in the Middle East. While Islamabad is offering its services as mediator in the Iran conflict, Tehran has offered to mediate ongoing hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan. While Pakistan maintains close relations with Gulf Arab states and the United States, it maintains no diplomatic relations with Israel and patchy relations with Iran – as indicated by border skirmishes in 2024 and the historically close relationship between New Delhi and Tehran. Iranian drone and missile attacks on neighboring countries have notably not targeted Pakistan. But were Saudi Arabia to invoke their mutual defense pact, Pakistan would be compelled to respond, which could incur the wrath of Tehran. This raises questions about the credibility of Pakistan’s role as an impartial mediator.
On a more fundamental level, Pakistan faces the challenge of translating tactical wins into long-term strategic gains for the country. Despite the positive optics of punching above its weight, Pakistan has become weaker over time. Its global ambitions are weighed down by internal pressures – including economic distress, political dysfunction, and security instabilities within the country – and regional insecurities, with Pakistan maintaining poor relations with three of its four neighbors (Afghanistan, India, and Iran, with China being the only exception).
Take the country’s dire economic situation. Pakistan is currently in the midst of its 25th bailout. As recently as 1990, India and Pakistan maintained similar per capita incomes, and Pakistan’s per capita GDP was actually higher than India’s for several years. But both countries have been on divergent trajectories since India launched its economic liberalization reforms in the early 1990s. India’s per capita income is now almost twice that of Pakistan, with India being the world’s fastest growing major economy on course to emerge as the world’s third-largest economy by the end of this decade.
For smaller countries in South Asia this comparison is even more stark. Sri Lanka’s per capita GDP is almost three times that of Pakistan despite Sri Lanka suffering a three-decade civil war and sovereign default in 2022. Bangladesh’s per capita GDP, female workforce participation rate, and GDP growth have all beaten Pakistan. The fact that Bangladesh was once part of Pakistan only adds insult to injury. Nepal is also close to surpassing Pakistan’s per capita GDP.
This economic malaise has been fueled by several structural challenges rooted in Pakistan’s security state, which places the military and intelligence “establishment” on a pedestal above all other institutions. As the key arbiter of power in Pakistan, the actions of the establishment can be seen as anti-Bismarckian: it is adept in the art of realpolitik, but unable to translate this into lasting gains for the country. While Otto von Bismarck’s machinations resulted in the unification of Germany, the Pakistani military’s actions contributed to the break-up of the country in 1971 and its ongoing destabilization.
In this context, the key watchpoint is not whether Pakistan’s status will be elevated by its mediating role in the Iran-Israel-U.S. war, but whether it can translate these gains into real, lasting and long-term improvements for the country. Making such improvements will require a shift in mindset. This includes abjuring Pakistan’s hybrid governments, whereby the military overtly or covertly rules the country. The country holds the unenviable status of not having a single prime minister complete a full term in office. Momentum is also required in facilitating a genuine ethnic reconciliation, which entails empowering the provinces and a less Punjab-centric government. Doing so would help to quell the chronic violence that grips the country from a plethora of ethnic insurgent, separatist and terrorist movements, including the Baloch separatist insurgency and the Pashtun Pakistani Taliban terrorist outfit.
And finally, and perhaps most challenging is seeking a genuine rapprochement with India – not one that makes a rhetorical pledge of dialogue while continuing to “bleed India” (literally and figuratively) by a “thousand cuts” through sponsoring or giving sanctuary to terrorism and other hybrid warfare.
These actions would help to ensure that Pakistan’s tactical wins become a strategic victory for the country.
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Pakistan’s stature has been on the rise amid reports of its mediating role during the ongoing Iran conflict. Last weekend it hosted the foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, other key states that are seeking to bring an end to the hostilities. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar has just visited China where he met his counterpart Wang Yi, and both countries issued a five-point plan “for restoring peace and stability in the Guld and Middle East region.” This builds on earlier visits by Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir – Trump’s self-professed “favorite field marshal” – to Washington, D.C. last year.
Proactive Rather Than Passive Strategic Autonomy
Islamabad has long practiced a proactive strategic autonomy, in contrast to India’s more passive strategic autonomy. Where New Delhi keeps its distance from key global flashpoints, Islamabad is happy to jump in. History is replete with examples: Pakistan’s joining the U.S.-led anti-communist Baghdad Pact in the 1950s; facilitating the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the late 1960s and 1970s; allying with the United States in countering the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s and U.S.-led “War on Terror” in the 2000s, all while maintaining its “all weather” relationship with China and pursuing deepening relations with the Islamic world. Recent developments demonstrate the dexterity of Pakistan’s foreign policy and build on those earlier actions.
Focusing on the Middle East, Pakistan has maintained a longstanding role in the region. It has provided security assistance to Saudi Arabia since the 1950s, culminating in the announcement of a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between both countries last year. Former Pakistan Army Chief Raheel Sharif has led the Islamic Military Counterterrorism Coalition (IMCTC), a 43-nation coalition since it was established in 2017. Pakistan joined the Trump administration’s Gaza Board of Peace earlier this year. Its nuclear weapons capability has often been referred to as an “Islamic bomb.”
Were Pakistan to play a role in bringing an end to the Iran conflict that has upended global commodity markets, global air travel and the security of the Middle East, its standing on the world stage would undoubtedly go up. Aside from its enhanced status with the United States and Islamic world, Islamabad would likely also gain material benefits in the form of financial assistance to support its ailing economy and possibly a string of new defense deals with the United States. In the context of its perennial rivalry with India, many would also see a diplomatic victory for Islamabad as a diplomatic defeat for New Delhi (although such a zero-sum narrative is overly simplistic).
To be sure, success remains elusive given the highly fluid situation. Amid reports of a potential U.S. ground invasion of Iranian territory and the Houthis joining the conflict, Islamabad’s efforts could amount to naught. Moreover, there are several underlying contradictions in Pakistan’s role in the Middle East. While Islamabad is offering its services as mediator in the Iran conflict, Tehran has offered to mediate ongoing hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan. While Pakistan maintains close relations with Gulf Arab states and the United States, it maintains no diplomatic relations with Israel and patchy relations with Iran – as indicated by border skirmishes in 2024 and the historically close relationship between New Delhi and Tehran. Iranian drone and missile attacks on neighboring countries have notably not targeted Pakistan. But were Saudi Arabia to invoke their mutual defense pact, Pakistan would be compelled to respond, which could incur the wrath of Tehran. This raises questions about the credibility of Pakistan’s role as an impartial mediator.
On a more fundamental level, Pakistan faces the challenge of translating tactical wins into long-term strategic gains for the country. Despite the positive optics of punching above its weight, Pakistan has become weaker over time. Its global ambitions are weighed down by internal pressures – including economic distress, political dysfunction, and security instabilities within the country – and regional insecurities, with Pakistan maintaining poor relations with three of its four neighbors (Afghanistan, India, and Iran, with China being the only exception).
Take the country’s dire economic situation. Pakistan is currently in the midst of its 25th bailout. As recently as 1990, India and Pakistan maintained similar per capita incomes, and Pakistan’s per capita GDP was actually higher than India’s for several years. But both countries have been on divergent trajectories since India launched its economic liberalization reforms in the early 1990s. India’s per capita income is now almost twice that of Pakistan, with India being the world’s fastest growing major economy on course to emerge as the world’s third-largest economy by the end of this decade.
For smaller countries in South Asia this comparison is even more stark. Sri Lanka’s per capita GDP is almost three times that of Pakistan despite Sri Lanka suffering a three-decade civil war and sovereign default in 2022. Bangladesh’s per capita GDP, female workforce participation rate, and GDP growth have all beaten Pakistan. The fact that Bangladesh was once part of Pakistan only adds insult to injury. Nepal is also close to surpassing Pakistan’s per capita GDP.
This economic malaise has been fueled by several structural challenges rooted in Pakistan’s security state, which places the military and intelligence “establishment” on a pedestal above all other institutions. As the key arbiter of power in Pakistan, the actions of the establishment can be seen as anti-Bismarckian: it is adept in the art of realpolitik, but unable to translate this into lasting gains for the country. While Otto von Bismarck’s machinations resulted in the unification of Germany, the Pakistani military’s actions contributed to the break-up of the country in 1971 and its ongoing destabilization.
In this context, the key watchpoint is not whether Pakistan’s status will be elevated by its mediating role in the Iran-Israel-U.S. war, but whether it can translate these gains into real, lasting and long-term improvements for the country. Making such improvements will require a shift in mindset. This includes abjuring Pakistan’s hybrid governments, whereby the military overtly or covertly rules the country. The country holds the unenviable status of not having a single prime minister complete a full term in office. Momentum is also required in facilitating a genuine ethnic reconciliation, which entails empowering the provinces and a less Punjab-centric government. Doing so would help to quell the chronic violence that grips the country from a plethora of ethnic insurgent, separatist and terrorist movements, including the Baloch separatist insurgency and the Pashtun Pakistani Taliban terrorist outfit.
And finally, and perhaps most challenging is seeking a genuine rapprochement with India – not one that makes a rhetorical pledge of dialogue while continuing to “bleed India” (literally and figuratively) by a “thousand cuts” through sponsoring or giving sanctuary to terrorism and other hybrid warfare.
These actions would help to ensure that Pakistan’s tactical wins become a strategic victory for the country.
Chietigj Bajpaee is a senior research fellow for South Asia at Chatham House, a U.K.-based public policy think-tank.
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