EU Sanctions Envoy Asks Kyrgyzstan to Stop Helping Russia Dodge Sanctions |
Crossroads Asia | Economy | Central Asia
EU Sanctions Envoy Asks Kyrgyzstan to Stop Helping Russia Dodge Sanctions
“We are not asking Kyrgyzstan not to have trading relations with Russia. We only ask that that trading relationship does not involve the deliberate circumvention of our sanctions…”
Amid a highly anticipated visit to Kyrgyzstan this week, the EU’s sanctions envoy, David O’Sullivan, laid out European concerns about the country’s role in re-exporting sanctioned goods to Russia.
O’Sullivan told reporters that trade flows suggest that some goods “are being imported into Kyrgyzstan with the sole purpose of being re-exported to Russia, in breach of our sanctions.” Specifically, he mentioned radio equipment and machine tools produced in Europe and imported into Kyrgyzstan with the exclusive purpose of re-export to Russia.
“What is disturbing for us is the fact that there has been a significant and very noticeable percentage, a big increase in the percentages of your imports and re-export of these products compared to the pre-war period,” O’Sullivan said.
“We are not asking Kyrgyzstan not to have trading relations with Russia. We only ask that that trading relationship does not involve the deliberate circumvention of our sanctions by the transmission through Kyrgyzstan of sanctioned EU goods to Russia,” he added.
As the Western sanctions regime targeting Russia in the wake of its February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has expanded, pressure on Central Asian states has intensified. Kyrgyzstan in particular has slid into an intermediary position, given its strategic location on trade routes between China and Russia, and its economic ties – such as through membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – to Russia.
In recent years, several Kyrgyz banks have come under sanctions. In August 2025, when the United Kingdom announced new sanctions targeting the Kyrgyz financial system and crypto networks London stressed, “With sanctions continuing to bite, Russia has turned to the Kyrgyz financial sector to channel money through opaque financial networks, including through the use of cryptocurrencies.”
In October 2025, the European Union adopted its 19th package of sanctions against Russia related to the war in Ukraine, including sanctions against two Kyrgyz banks, three in Tajikistan, and one in Kazakhstan.
These moves came despite Kyrgyz officials promising action.
Back in 2023, following media reports highlighting Central Asia, and Kyrgyzstan in particular, as a key sanctions evasion node, the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) put out a statement announcing plans to launch investigations to stop private companies from violating sanctions.
The statement went on to stress that “neither the Kyrgyz state itself, nor any state structures and companies are involved in the violation of the regime of compliance with the sanctions restrictions imposed by the United States and Western countries against Russia.”
The Kyrgyz government has continued to push back against criticism. In his September 2025 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov fired broadsides at the United Kingdom for its August sanctions, repeating allegations he’d made previously that “sanctions imposed on Kyrgyzstan are based on false information spread by certain non-governmental organizations and malicious citizens.”
The Kyrgyz president framed the sanctions targeting Kyrgyz banks as hypocrisy, though he didn’t use that word. Japarov conflated the Kyrgyz case – in which Kyrgyzstan-based banks have been allegedly used to pay for military goods destined for Russia – with London’s ongoing trade relationship with Moscow, which does not involve military goods.
It seems that these public denials may have been matched with relative inaction domestically.
Earlier this month, the Financial Times reported on an internal European Commission document listing proposed sanctions. The document reportedly proposed a ban on the export of specific dual-use goods to Kyrgyzstan.
“Imports of common high-priority items from the EU to Kyrgyzstan have grown almost 800 percent since the war began, while exports from the country to Russia are 1,200 percent higher,” the Financial Times reported the document stating. This, it added, “demonstrates a continuing and particularly high risk of circumvention.”
“Despite multiple requests and engagements, the Kyrgyz Republic has not adopted or enforced sufficient measure,” the document stated.
While in Bishkek, as reported by the AFP, O’Sullivan noted that neighboring Kazakhstan had taken “significant” steps to prevent goods that could be used for military purposes from being exported to Russia.
O’Sullivan also sought to clarify that the sanctions against the two Kyrgyz banks targeted in the 19th package aren’t sanctions against their operations in Kyrgyzstan. “This is a ban on transactions with European banks, which effectively cuts them off from SWIFT,” he said.
The EU had aimed to roll out its 20th package of sanctions ahead of the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion this week, but failed to achieve consensus on the back of vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia. If and when that package moves forward, Kyrgyzstan is likely to see itself in the document.
Bishkek is walking a precarious line, with its economy booming – some would argue because of the opportunities created by Russia’s war in Ukraine – but at risk of overheating, as Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Chris Rickleton reported recently for The Diplomat.
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Amid a highly anticipated visit to Kyrgyzstan this week, the EU’s sanctions envoy, David O’Sullivan, laid out European concerns about the country’s role in re-exporting sanctioned goods to Russia.
O’Sullivan told reporters that trade flows suggest that some goods “are being imported into Kyrgyzstan with the sole purpose of being re-exported to Russia, in breach of our sanctions.” Specifically, he mentioned radio equipment and machine tools produced in Europe and imported into Kyrgyzstan with the exclusive purpose of re-export to Russia.
“What is disturbing for us is the fact that there has been a significant and very noticeable percentage, a big increase in the percentages of your imports and re-export of these products compared to the pre-war period,” O’Sullivan said.
“We are not asking Kyrgyzstan not to have trading relations with Russia. We only ask that that trading relationship does not involve the deliberate circumvention of our sanctions by the transmission through Kyrgyzstan of sanctioned EU goods to Russia,” he added.
As the Western sanctions regime targeting Russia in the wake of its February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has expanded, pressure on Central Asian states has intensified. Kyrgyzstan in particular has slid into an intermediary position, given its strategic location on trade routes between China and Russia, and its economic ties – such as through membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) – to Russia.
In recent years, several Kyrgyz banks have come under sanctions. In August 2025, when the United Kingdom announced new sanctions targeting the Kyrgyz financial system and crypto networks London stressed, “With sanctions continuing to bite, Russia has turned to the Kyrgyz financial sector to channel money through opaque financial networks, including through the use of cryptocurrencies.”
In October 2025, the European Union adopted its 19th package of sanctions against Russia related to the war in Ukraine, including sanctions against two Kyrgyz banks, three in Tajikistan, and one in Kazakhstan.
These moves came despite Kyrgyz officials promising action.
Back in 2023, following media reports highlighting Central Asia, and Kyrgyzstan in particular, as a key sanctions evasion node, the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) put out a statement announcing plans to launch investigations to stop private companies from violating sanctions.
The statement went on to stress that “neither the Kyrgyz state itself, nor any state structures and companies are involved in the violation of the regime of compliance with the sanctions restrictions imposed by the United States and Western countries against Russia.”
The Kyrgyz government has continued to push back against criticism. In his September 2025 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov fired broadsides at the United Kingdom for its August sanctions, repeating allegations he’d made previously that “sanctions imposed on Kyrgyzstan are based on false information spread by certain non-governmental organizations and malicious citizens.”
The Kyrgyz president framed the sanctions targeting Kyrgyz banks as hypocrisy, though he didn’t use that word. Japarov conflated the Kyrgyz case – in which Kyrgyzstan-based banks have been allegedly used to pay for military goods destined for Russia – with London’s ongoing trade relationship with Moscow, which does not involve military goods.
It seems that these public denials may have been matched with relative inaction domestically.
Earlier this month, the Financial Times reported on an internal European Commission document listing proposed sanctions. The document reportedly proposed a ban on the export of specific dual-use goods to Kyrgyzstan.
“Imports of common high-priority items from the EU to Kyrgyzstan have grown almost 800 percent since the war began, while exports from the country to Russia are 1,200 percent higher,” the Financial Times reported the document stating. This, it added, “demonstrates a continuing and particularly high risk of circumvention.”
“Despite multiple requests and engagements, the Kyrgyz Republic has not adopted or enforced sufficient measure,” the document stated.
While in Bishkek, as reported by the AFP, O’Sullivan noted that neighboring Kazakhstan had taken “significant” steps to prevent goods that could be used for military purposes from being exported to Russia.
O’Sullivan also sought to clarify that the sanctions against the two Kyrgyz banks targeted in the 19th package aren’t sanctions against their operations in Kyrgyzstan. “This is a ban on transactions with European banks, which effectively cuts them off from SWIFT,” he said.
The EU had aimed to roll out its 20th package of sanctions ahead of the fourth anniversary of the full-scale invasion this week, but failed to achieve consensus on the back of vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia. If and when that package moves forward, Kyrgyzstan is likely to see itself in the document.
Bishkek is walking a precarious line, with its economy booming – some would argue because of the opportunities created by Russia’s war in Ukraine – but at risk of overheating, as Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Chris Rickleton reported recently for The Diplomat.
Catherine Putz is managing editor of The Diplomat.
Central Asia Ukraine sanctions
Kyrgyzstan sanctions evasion
Russian invasion of Ukraine