What’s on the Agenda for the 3rd Lee-Takaichi Summit? |
The Koreas | Diplomacy | East Asia
What’s on the Agenda for the 3rd Lee-Takaichi Summit?
Japan and South Korea are seeking to further institutionalize their security, energy, and strategic cooperation – especially after Trump’s trip to Beijing.
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae during a summit meeting in Nara, Japan, Jan. 13, 2026.
On May 15, the South Korean presidential office confirmed that Japan’s Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae will pay a two-day visit to South Korea beginning on May 19. The venue for this high-level visit will be the city of Andong, Gyeongsangbuk Province, the hometown of incumbent South Korean President Lee Jae-myung. The meeting is seen as a continuation of the Japan-South Korea summit earlier this year, when Lee visited Takaichi’s hometown, as well as an attempt to further institutionalize shuttle diplomacy between the two leaders. It will also serve as a new test for bilateral cooperation as both sides seek to strengthen coordination on security, economic affairs, and regional stability.
The timing of the meeting between Seoul and Tokyo is particularly noteworthy, as it comes immediately after the China-U.S. summit that ended on May 15. Amid intensifying strategic competition among major powers and an increasingly volatile regional security environment, Japan and South Korea are sharing growing strategic interests as well as common security concerns, particularly regarding the risk of disruptions to energy supply chains following the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz.
The recent China-U.S. summit quickly became the focus of international attention, as it marked U.S. President Donald Trump’s second visit to China – while also representing the first time in nearly a decade that a sitting U.S. president had made an official visit to the country. Immediately after the Trump-Xi meeting concluded, Japan and South Korea officially announced plans to hold a bilateral summit to discuss regional issues as well as prospects for advancing Japan-South Korea relations. This move can be seen as a form of follow-up response, reflecting both countries’ close observation of the reactions and strategic calculations of the two superpowers after the summit, while also illustrating the timely strategic adjustments being made by Seoul and Tokyo in an increasingly uncertain environment.
For decades, South Korea-Japan relations have fluctuated due to prolonged historical and political frictions, despite the fact that the two countries continue to share many common values, strategic interests, and a similar geopolitical environment marked by comparable security threats. As two key U.S. allies in East Asia, Tokyo and Seoul have long simultaneously competed with and depended on one another within the Washington-led regional security structure. However, changes in the U.S. approach toward its allies under Trump’s second term, combined with intensifying great power competition and growing risks related to economic and energy security, are creating stronger incentives for South Korea and Japan to move closer together.
Trump’s ambiguous remarks during his meeting with Xi Jinping, particularly those seen as alluding to Taiwan, as well as his limited attention to the North Korea nuclear issue, have generated two common forms of security anxiety among U.S. allies in East Asia: fears of abandonment and fears of entrapment in conflicts led by the United States. Within an asymmetric alliance structure, where smaller states accept partial constraints on strategic autonomy in exchange for security guarantees from a major power, allies are often the most vulnerable objectives when the patron state changes its strategic thinking or policy priorities.
Tokyo and Seoul are naturally well aware of this reality. Therefore, while maintaining close alliance relations with Washington despite pressure related to tariffs, defense burden-sharing, and trade imbalances, Japan and South Korea are also gradually activating “self-help” mechanisms aimed at minimizing strategic risks. This does not mean that the two countries are attempting to decouple from the U.S. alliance framework, but rather reflects a broader effort to enhance strategic adaptability through expanding bilateral cooperation, diversifying diplomatic networks, and strengthening resilience.
Pressure from the international environment may make security one of the central pillars of the agenda at the third Lee-Takaichi summit. Tokyo and Seoul share concerns not only over tensions surrounding the Taiwan Strait and the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear program, but also over the possibility that escalating conflicts could undermine economic security and disrupt supply chains.
When the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz erupted, Japan and South Korea were among the countries most negatively affected by disruptions to energy supplies supporting strategic industries. Statistics show that Japan depends on the Middle East for roughly 90 percent of its crude oil imports, while South Korea’s dependence stands at around 70 percent. Conflict between Iran and the United States not only created fuel supply instability, but also drove up oil prices, placing significant pressure on the economies of South Korea and Japan, both of which are among the world’s largest importers and consumers of crude oil.
As a result, unlike many previous Japan-South Korea summits that focused........