The Domestic Politics of Cheng Li-wun’s China Trip |
China Power | Politics | East Asia
The Domestic Politics of Cheng Li-wun’s China Trip
Cheng’s meeting with Xi Jinping was not just about cross-strait dynamics, but about securing her own position within the KMT.
KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun applauds after listening to a performance by the National Theater Orchestra in Beijing, China, Apr. 10, 2026.
Cheng Li-wun, the chair of Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT), visited China from April 7 to April 12 as part of a six-day trip during which she met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The trip is expected to make the domestic politics of the pan-Blue camp more contentious going forward.
Cheng’s rise to become KMT chair was relatively unexpected. Although not new to the political stage, Cheng was mostly a marginal figure, and it was expected that former Taipei mayor Hau Lung-bin would handily win the chair race.
Cheng won as a dark horse candidate who expressed hardline views in support of unification. She said she hoped to one day see “Taiwanese proud to be Chinese,” and framed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a defensive war provoked by Ukraine becoming too close to NATO. The implication was that Taiwan might see a similar fate if it became too close to the United States. As chair of the KMT, Cheng further stoked controversy by attending a memorial ceremony for a spy executed by the KMT government for spying for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the Cold War.
Cheng also made her desire to visit China to meet with Xi known while campaigning in the chair race.
It is not unusual for KMT chairs to meet with Xi Jinping. During Xi’s 13 years in office as Chinese president, the KMT has rotated through six chairs (not counting temporary acting chairs). Cheng is the fourth of those six KMT chairs to meet with Xi. Of the two chairs that did not meet with Xi – Wun Den-yih and Johnny Chiang – Chiang expressed a willingness to meet with Xi, even if Chiang is generally considered a moderate on cross-strait relations and may not have actually wanted to meet with Xi.
Over the course of her trip to China, Cheng made two major policy addresses. The first address took place at the Sun Yat-Sen Mausoleum in Nanjing, Cheng’s first destination on her travels, while the second was during her meeting with Xi. During her speech, Cheng drew on the history of Sun Yat-sen as a figure who unites the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China, in that both polities consider him to be their founding father. Cheng discussed the history of shared culture between Taiwan and China in civilizational terms.
However, Cheng was notably aggressive in her comments toward what she termed “Western despotic culture” (西方的霸道文化) juxtaposing this to the peaceful Asian civilization that embodied Sun Yat-sen’s “Kingly Way” (東方的王道文化). Cheng referenced the history of the Sino-Japanese War, suggesting that the war occurred, this occurred because Japan had strayed and internalized Western influences.
Cheng was wading into a charged debate in Taiwan about World War II. Taiwan has a complicated history with the Sino-Japanese War, during which Taiwan was a Japanese colony. Accordingly, Taiwanese troops fought on the side of Japan.
President Lai Ching-te of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) commemorated the 70th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War last year by stating that the outcome of the war showed the fate of powers bent on annexation – a jab at China. The KMT accused Lai of failing to call out the Japanese Empire.
Cheng’s comments at the Sun Yat-Sen Mausoleum were also notable because of how she framed the 1992 Consensus. The 1992 Consensus has historically been referred to as the consensus that there is “One China,” with “different interpretations” of that “One China” between the ROC and PRC. In past years, the CCP has been criticized for dropping the “different interpretations” aspect of the 1992 Consensus, to only emphasize “One China.”
Cheng, however, phrased the 1992 Consensus as “One China, oppose Taiwanese independence.” This phrasing was notably echoed by Xi Jinping when he and Cheng met. This has been interpreted as Cheng calling for a United Front between the CCP and KMT to combat the DPP. Both the CCP and KMT have depicted the DPP as dead-set on an ideological agenda of independence, even if the party currently claims to uphold the status quo.
Cheng’s meeting with Xi mostly took place behind closed doors. Media heard Xi’s opening remarks – which included framing the 1992 Consensus as “One China, oppose Taiwanese independence” – but were asked to leave midway through Cheng’s comments. The KMT later released Cheng’s remarks, and Cheng herself recapped some of what Xi said in a press conference held after the meeting. Nevertheless, pan-Green critics have suggested that Xi may have said something different than what Cheng recounted, as well as pointing out that she may not have read the version of her remarks that was released to the Taiwanese public during the actual meeting.
Cheng’s released comments referenced framings used in past years to depict Taiwan as being part of China, including referring to both sides of the Taiwan Strait as a “community of common destiny,” “one family,” and “descendants of the Yellow and Yan Emperors.” Cheng also stated that Taiwan should contribute to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” a phrase commonly used by Xi Jinping to refer to a project of national revival (and which, notably, includes the project of cross-strait unification).
Cheng called for the 1992 Consensus to serve as the bedrock of exchanges between both sides. She also praised China for its poverty alleviation and having achieved a “moderately prosperous society” through its five-year plans, echoing language commonly used by the CCP to describe its domestic achievements.
Cheng outlined several avenues for cooperation between Taiwan and China, including AI, sustainable development, disaster prevention, medical care, and carbon reduction. To win over young people born after 1992, there would be an emphasis on youth exchanges. She also stated that Xi had suggested energy as a potential field of cooperation. After the outbreak of the Iran War, China made an offer to guarantee Taiwan’s energy security if Taiwan agreed to accept Chinese sovereignty.
Cheng called for institutional mechanisms to hold dialogue between the CCP and KMT on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. She also urged Taiwan’s inclusion in international organizations from which it is currently excluded due to Chinese pressure, such as the World Health Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization, and accession to regional trade blocs where Chinese pressure currently poses an obstacle to Taiwan’s participation,........