Can the NPT Survive Amid Global Disorder? |
Features | Security | East Asia
Can the NPT Survive Amid Global Disorder?
The 2026 NPT Review Conference is unfolding against a backdrop of geopolitical upheaval. Absent strong U.S. leadership inside and outside the conference, even modest success appears remote.
The “Baker” explosion, a nuclear weapon test by the United States military, at Bikini Atoll, Marshall Islands, on July 25, 1946.
For more than 50 years, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has stood between the world and nuclear chaos.
At a moment of unprecedented strain on the global nuclear order, diplomats are meeting in New York to review the treaty’s three pillars – nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy – and to seek agreement on forward-looking steps to strengthen the regime. Yet with regional conflicts raging, key arms control agreements lapsed, and nuclear-weapon states actively expanding and modernizing their arsenals, even modest progress seems unlikely.
The NPT is under significant stress in five key areas: 1) the debate over U.S. and Israeli strikes to prevent a nuclear Iran; 2) the unwinding of great power restraint, as a rising China, belligerent Russia, and assertive United States compete for nuclear advantage; 3) uncertainty in Europe and Asia over the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella; 4) a nuclear-armed Russia’s war against non-nuclear Ukraine; and 5) the further spread of nuclear fuel-making technologies that could be repurposed for nuclear weapons.
It is squarely in the U.S. national interest to spearhead tangible progress on these challenges – both at the conference and beyond.
The NPT formally recognizes five nuclear-weapon states – the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China – while committing all other parties to forgo nuclear weapons and preserving their access to peaceful nuclear energy. Israel, India, and Pakistan, all de facto nuclear-armed states, never joined the treaty and participate only as observers. North Korea withdrew in 2003.
Although the conference aims to adopt a consensus final document assessing implementation and outlining practical commitments, success is far from assured. Of the 10 previous Review Conferences, only four produced consensus outcomes (in 1975, 1985, 2000, and 2010). More modest written understandings or targeted commitments remain possible.
At the conference, Washington should therefore focus on shaping a meaningful outcome by uniting states behind clear language condemning proliferation risks, reinforcing the norm against new nuclear-weapon states, and advancing practical steps on transparency and risk reduction – even if a comprehensive consensus document proves elusive.
Debate Over U.S. and Israeli Strikes to Prevent a Nuclear Iran
The most contentious issue is the recent Israeli-U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. Washington and Jerusalem argue that Operations Midnight Fury and Rising Lion (2025) and Epic Fury and Roaring Lion (2026) prevented Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold.
At the time of the first strikes, which hit more than two dozen nuclear sites and killed 12 nuclear scientists, Tehran was on the cusp of a medium-sized nuclear arsenal. The regime was engaged in active weaponization efforts, long-running safeguards violations, and had amassed enough highly enriched uranium for roughly 11 bombs, plus additional stocks enriched to lower levels for another 11. It could have assembled a crude nuclear device within six months.
The subsequent strikes targeted at least 10 more nuclear sites and eight scientists, further degrading Iran’s nuclear weapons pathway. Absent foreign assistance, Tehran’s nuclear breakout capability has likely been set back by more than two and a half years – and possibly significantly longer.
Iran and its allies in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) strongly reject this justification. A bloc of about 120 developing countries, the NAM coordinates positions on areas to extract concessions from nuclear-weapon states and prepares commitments for NPT meetings. After already condemning the strikes (noting that Israel is not an NPT party), the NAM is expected to leverage the issue to resist new nonproliferation measures. Its selection of Tehran as representative and vice chair of the conference signals a clear pro-Iran tilt.
Amid renewed negotiations aimed at ending the conflict, but with dual naval blockades continuing to inflict global economic pain, the stalemate could drag on well beyond the Review Conference. For the United States, Europe, and Israel, the desired endgame – verifiable elimination of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles, the end of all enrichment activities, dismantling of remaining facilities and assets, and unrestricted International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) access – would be worth the sustained effort. The region would benefit from a permanently disarmed Iran and a more durable peace. But Washington still must translate these goals into action.
Intense disagreement over Iran will almost certainly scuttle a final consensus document. Yet one clear lesson has already emerged: the United States is willing to use military force to prevent new nuclear proliferation.
Great Power Competition and the Unwinding of Restraint
It is not solely the fault of the United States that the nuclear-weapon states have little credible progress to offer on disarmament. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and Russia continues its nuclear saber-rattling.
In February, New START – the last remaining Russia-U.S. nuclear arms control agreement – expired without a successor. Russia had suspended the treaty’s verification provisions in 2022 after its invasion of Ukraine. Washington had criticized the treaty for failing to constrain Moscow’s larger non-strategic nuclear arsenal and new delivery systems, while also limiting the United States’ ability to respond to China’s nuclear buildup.
China is pursuing the most rapid nuclear buildup in its history, growing from roughly 200 nuclear weapons to an estimated 600 today, with projections reaching 1,000 by 2030. The United States has even accused China of possible low-yield nuclear tests in violation of the global testing moratorium. Beijing has refused arms control talks.
New START’s expiration has prompted a necessary reevaluation of the U.S. nuclear force posture in a multipolar nuclear environment. Rather than pursuing costly nuclear arsenal increases and nuclear testing, Washington should optimize its existing arsenal, refine overdue and over-budget nuclear modernization programs, complete the long-delayed Sentinel........